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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Life is uncertain. From the prediction of stock prices and the behavior of market com-
petitors to the anticipation of the behavior of other road users, decisions are often made
in absence of precise knowledge of their consequences. Rather, a decision maker forms
beliefs about the likelihood of an event. In addition, the outcomes of such events typically
vary in their desirability. Deciding about which action to take in the face of uncertainty
thus involves the joint assessment of the likelihood and the desirability of associated out-
comes. This dissertation consists of four papers that analyze how individuals decide under
uncertainty and focuses on determinants of such decisions: Preferences, Institutions, and
Social Interaction.
Uncertainty is a catch-all term that comprises various reasons for the variability
in outcomes (e.g., Knight 1921). Two possible sources are relevant for this dissertation.
First, Risk refers to the case in which the randomness that the individual encounters can
be described by exogenous probabilistic information that is objectively known (Machina
2008b). Typically risk results from draws of “nature” (e.g., lotteries) that have an ex-ante
specified distribution. Second, Strategic Uncertainty results from the unpredictability of
human behavior (Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil 1990). The interaction with other people
requires to form an assessment of their behavior and to anticipate how they will react to
one’s own decisions.
Preferences are the primitive of every decision as they rank possible consequences
according to their desirability. Preferences in the canonical model of decision making
under uncertainty are represented by a utility function that assigns each consequence a
real number. The individual then strives to maximize the expected utility (Savage 1954;
Anscombe and Aumann 1963). Institutions determine the general economic environment
and are a set of rules, conventions, and laws that structure, constrain, and enable in-
dividual behavior because they impose rules that create stable expectations about the
choice set of others (Hodgson 2006). For example, markets are institutions that govern
individual interaction through prices (Manski 2000). Economic circumstances such as the
opportunity to work overtime, the organization of the tax system or regulatory entities
such as central banks are further examples. Social Interaction refers to direct interac-
tion with other decision makers and the interdependencies of individual decisions. Social
interaction is sometimes also called “non-market” interaction to emphasize that the inter-
action is not solely governed by the price mechanism but rather represents externalities
imposed by the actions of others that affect individual preferences (Scheinkman 2008).
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This dissertation focuses on how the interplay of these factors shape individual
behavior and influences decisions in the face of uncertainty. Individual decisions create
aggregate economic outcomes and determine how these outcomes vary with policy inter-
ventions. For example, preferences determine the impact of institutions while, in return,
the institutional organization of economic environments constraints the actions that an
individual can choose from to express his or her preferences. Hence, while institutions
constrain individual behavior on the one hand, their effect and specific design is shaped
by individual behavior (Hodgson 2006). Furthermore, social interaction itself influences
the formation of preferences, e.g., by emphasizing the externalities of decisions on others
and thus reinforcing concerns regarding the benefits of others.
1.1 Overview and Main Findings
This section provides an overview of each chapter and presents the main findings. A
detailed account of the co-authors, financial support, and acknowledged comments and
suggestions is provided in Section 1.2.
Chapter 2 entitled “Circumstantial Risk: Impact of Future Tax-Evasion and Labor-
Supply Opportunities on Risk Exposure” is joint work with Philipp Doerrenberg and
Denvil Duncan. We examine whether institutional circumstances to respond to invest-
ment outcomes ex-post changes the willingness to take risks ex-ante. In a laboratory
experiment, subjects can invest earned income in a risky asset and have the opportu-
nity to respond to the outcome of the investment through extra labor effort and/or tax
evasion. These circumstances generally involve two channels: flexibility and background
risk. Flexibility allows to increase income with certainty and is predicted to increase risk
exposure. Background risk stems from uninsurable, risky income in addition to the main
risk of the investment decision and its effect on risk-taking depends on individual risk
attitudes.
We find evidence that ex-post access to labor opportunities decreases ex-ante risk-
taking while access to tax evasion has no effect. Having both opportunities leads to lower
risk-taking, but this effect is not statistically significant. Because labor opportunities
can create both certain and risky income, we explore the channels behind these results
with two additional treatments that eliminate any unintentional income variability. This
allows us to disentangle the role of flexibility from the effect of background risk. We
find that if labor income is risky, subjects who can respond to the lottery outcome by
both providing extra effort and evade taxes, take more risks than subjects who can only
respond with additional labor. However, the former group takes less risk than the latter
if labor income is certain. Our results indicate that the positive effect on risk-taking due
1.1. OVERVIEW AND MAIN FINDINGS 3
to flexibility is not strong enough the overcome the negative effect of background risk in
our setting.
Chapter 3 entitled “Dynamic On-the-Spot Consumption and Portfolio Choice in
the Lab” is co-authored with Michaela Pagel and introduces a novel experimental setting
that allows to test life-cycle consumption and portfolio-choice models with real consump-
tion outcomes. Whereas previous tests of life-cycle models typically rely on monetary
incentives that are paid out at the very end of the experiment and thus do not preserve
the intertemporal structure of these models, we implement on-the-spot consumption. We
use our design to test several implications of the standard life-cycle model of Samuelson
(1969) which is the workhorse model in macroeconomics and finance. Specifically, we
design a four-period dynamic life-cycle environment and test how consumption and port-
folio allocations (i) respond to fluctuations in wealth and (ii) differ from a pre-committed
plan. In a within-subject design, we elicit choices under both pre-commitment (PC) and
non-pre-commitment (NPC) and can thus test if and how subjects deviate from their
ex-ante plan over the course of the experiment.
We find that the standard model is generally a good predictor for consumption and
investment behavior. Under NPC, consumption and investment shares do not systemat-
ically vary in the investment outcome. Furthermore, investment shares do neither vary
over time nor differ significantly between NPC and PC. We observe two inconsistencies
for consumption behavior. First, under PC, subjects plan to increase their consumption
share after a reduction in wealth. Second, subjects show a propensity to underconsume
under NPC relative to their PC plan. We discuss two non-standard preference theories
based on reference dependence that can explain these inconsistencies. However, these al-
ternatives make a series of other predictions for which we do not find empirical support.
We conclude that decisions in our setting are best described by the standard model.
Chapter 4 entitled “Preferences and Decision Support in Competitive Bidding” is
joint work with Nicolas Fugger, Philippe Gillen, and Alexander Rasch. We examine bid-
ding behavior in first-price sealed-bid and Dutch auctions which are strategically equiv-
alent under standard preferences. Empirically, this equivalence typically breaks down.
A prevalent explanation for the non-equivalence concerns asymmetric opportunity costs
due to the different organization of the two formats. We analyze whether the empirical
breakdown of strategic equivalence is due to non-standard preferences or due to the com-
plexity of the two formats holding opportunity costs constant. In a first experiment, we
measure risk and loss attitudes as well as Allais-type preferences. In a second experiment,
we assess the predictive power of the elicited individual preferences in the two auctions.
Further, we manipulate the complexity by varying the degree of decision support.
We find that strategic equivalence only breaks down in the absence of decision
support. Once we provide information about the winning probability associated with
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one’s bid, we find no statistical difference between the two formats. This indicates that
complexity is more important than preferences in explaining the non-equivalence. In a
third treatment, we additionally provide the expected profit of a given bid which does not
alter this finding. We thus rule out probability weighting as an explanation. We assess
the predictive accuracy of the non-standard preference specifications by various goodness-
of-fit measures and find that expectations-based reference dependence with linear utility
best explains observed bids. Furthermore, we find no significant correlation between
observed bids and individual risk attitudes.
Chapter 5 entitled “The Effect of Payoff Equality on Equilibrium Selection” is
joint work with Christoph Feldhaus and Bettina Rockenbach and analyzes the role of
payoff equality as a criterion for equilibrium selection. We focus on coordination games
with Pareto-rankable equilibria. Specifically, we analyze behavior in a minimum-effort
game. The most-efficient equilibrium in this game is Pareto-dominant while the least-
efficient one is “secure” in the sense that individual payoffs are independent of others’
actions. Empirically, subjects frequently converge towards the secure equilibrium de-
spite the presence of an achievable social optimum. We introduce unequal equilibrium
payoffs into the minimum-effort game and ensure that either the Pareto-dominant or
the secure equilibrium is the unique equilibrium featuring equal payoffs. We propose a
social-preference model based on inequality aversion and predict that subjects select the
equilibrium with equal payoffs. We test this prediction utilizing a laboratory experiment.
Our results show that payoff equality indeed serves as an important factor in equilib-
rium selection. Groups generally coordinate less successfully when the secure equilibrium
is the one with equal payoffs. We test the robustness of this result by increasing the degree
of strategic uncertainty which further amplifies the deterioration effect if the secure equi-
librium has equal payoffs. In contrast, the coordination success if the Pareto-dominant
equilibrium has equal payoffs is not affected by the change in strategic uncertainty.
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Chapter 2
CIRCUMSTANTIAL RISK:
IMPACT OF FUTURE TAX-EVASION AND LABOR-SUPPLY
OPPORTUNITIES ON RISK EXPOSURE
2.1 Introduction
Although approximately 94% of households in the United States hold some type of finan-
cial asset, there is significant variation in the type and amount of financial assets held
(Bricker, Kennickell, Moore, and Sabelhaus 2012). For example, 15% of families hold
stocks, 50% hold retirement accounts, 8.7% hold pooled investment accounts and 92.5%
hold transaction accounts.1 Financial asset holdings also vary with individual and house-
hold characteristics. While 24.5% of households headed by self-employed individuals have
stocks in their portfolios, only 13.8% of households headed by employed individuals do.
Additionally, the trends described by Bricker et al. (2012) show evidence of significant
variation in risk exposure. For example, the median amount of money invested in bonds
by an employed household is approximately eight times as much as that invested in
stocks; the comparable ratio for self-employed households is five. An extensive literature
in finance and economics has been devoted to explaining these observed variations in risk
exposure. Two questions that have received a lot of attention are (Heaton and Lucas
2000): (i) how do investors decide how much of their income to invest in risky assets, and
(ii) why do some individuals have greater risk exposure than others?
The theoretical finance literature has provided many insights to these questions.
For example, Heaton and Lucas (2000) point out that if risk decisions are driven by
utility-maximizing behavior then the drivers of risk exposure can be separated into two
broad categories: preferences and ‘circumstances’. It is clearly the case that some indi-
viduals are more risk-averse than others and that this variation in risk preference affects
the amount of risk to which individuals voluntarily expose themselves. Circumstances
generally refer to the future opportunities individuals know they will have access to at
the time of making risky investment decisions. These circumstances usually have two fea-
1These statistics are taken from the Survey of Consumer Finances. Bricker et al. (2012) provides a
detail summary of the results including definitions of the various financial assets. Transactions accounts
include checking, savings, and money market deposit accounts; money market mutual funds; and call or
cash accounts at brokerages. Retirement accounts include personally established individual retirement
accounts (IRAs) or job-based 401(k) accounts. Pooled investment funds exclude money market mutual
funds and indirectly held mutual funds and include all other types of directly held pooled investment
funds, such as traditional open-end and closed-end mutual funds, real estate investment trusts, and hedge
funds.
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tures - flexibility and background risks - that may have opposing effects on risk exposure.
Flexibility acts as a type of insurance against adverse outcomes and is therefore predicted
to increase risk exposure (Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson 1992; Franke, Schlesinger, and
Stapleton 2011). For example, the ability to vary labor hours or take an additional job
may be used as insurance against negative investment outcomes. The opportunity to
adjust future labor supply in response to the investment outcome is advantageous and
therefore increases current risk exposure. On the other hand, future opportunities with
risky and uninsurable income represent background risk. This future risk may cause the
current risk exposure of individuals to increase, decrease or remain unchanged depending
on the form of risk aversion (Gollier and Zeckhauser 2002). As a result, the impact of
background risk on current risk exposure remains an empirical question. Furthermore, be-
cause future circumstances generally include both flexibility and background risk, which
may have opposing effects on risk exposure, the impact of future circumstance on current
risk exposure is ultimately an empirical question. Understanding the impact of the inter-
action of these two characteristics is important, but challenging to determine in existing
theoretical models without additional assumptions.
Empirical efforts to identify the impact of circumstances produce inconclusive re-
sults. For example, Benitez-Silva (2002) tests the theory in the context of labor-supply
flexibility and finds that individuals who have flexible work hours tend to hold signifi-
cantly more (risky) stocks. Although this result is consistent with the theoretical work
of Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992), there remains some identification concerns due
to self-selection. To the extent that individuals with greater labor-supply flexibility also
have greater preference for risk exposure, it is not clear that the identified effect is due to
labor-supply flexibility or risk preferences.2 The empirical efforts to identify the impact
of background risk is more extensive, but the results are mixed. Although a number of
studies find that the presence of background risk reduces risk exposure, the magnitude of
the effect varies (Heaton and Lucas 2000; Klos 2004). More importantly, the results from
the existing literature suggest that the impact of background risk depends on the source
of background risk: labor-income risk seems to reduce risk exposure while investment
income risk seems to have little or no effect on risk exposure.
We contribute to this literature by identifying whether circumstances such as access
to future labor-income and tax-evasion opportunities affect current risk exposure. In
particular, our research question is: Does the opportunity to earn additional labor income
2To our knowledge, Benitez-Silva (2002) is the only paper to study the link between labor-supply
flexibility and portfolio choice empirically. Gneezy and Potters (1997) study a different type of flexibility
in a portfolio-choice experiment. Subjects in one group make their investment decisions for each period
separately and receive feedback after each investment. Subjects in the other group make investment
decisions for multiple periods simultaneously, and they only receive feedback for each block of investment
instead of period-by-period evaluations. Their results show that the first group, which has greater
rebalancing flexibility, expose their wealth to lower risk. Gneezy, Kapteyn, and Potters (2003) find
similar results in an investment market.
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and/or evade taxation affect risky-asset investment? By studying these two circumstances
that feature both flexibility and background risk in the same setting, we are able to cleanly
identify the impact of both circumstances as well as their interaction on risk exposure.
We are also able to determine if the effects depend on the type of circumstance.
As indicated above, answering these questions with observational data leads to
identification problems that are very difficult to overcome. Namely, it can be presumed
that individuals with a high intrinsic willingness to take risks self-select into occupations
with greater access to tax evasion and additional labor supply opportunities such as
self-employment (Cramer et al. 2002; Hartog, Ferrer-i Carbonell, and Jonker 2002). As
a result, a positive empirical correlation between self-employment and risk willingness
is difficult to interpret in a causal manner, and is instead likely to be confounded by
intrinsic, personality-based risk willingness. For clean identification, one would ideally
like to randomly assign labor-supply and tax-evasion opportunities to different workers.
Because this is not feasible in the real world, we design a laboratory experiment where
each subject participates in a labor task and then makes an investment decision. Subjects
are then given an opportunity to respond to the outcome of the investment before paying
taxes. The opportunity to respond to the outcome of the investment depends on the
group to which subjects are randomly assigned: some subjects can evade taxes; some can
supply extra labor; some can both evade taxes and supply extra labor; and some can
neither evade taxes nor supply extra labor.
Our results show that future labor-supply and tax-evasion opportunities have dif-
ferent effects on risk-taking. The baseline group, which lacks opportunities for additional
labor supply or tax evasion, invests 38% of their gross income into the risky asset. Relative
to the baseline group, access to extra labor opportunities reduces the investment share
by approximately eleven percentage points, evasion opportunity by itself has no effect on
investment shares, and access to both labor and evasion reduces the investment share by
3.5 percentage points. The large drop in the labor treatment is both economically and
statistically significant, while the effect of evasion is not distinguishable from zero. These
results confirm that certain circumstances matter for risk exposure; labor opportunities
affect risk-taking while evasion does not. We run two additional treatments that allow us
to identify the relative importance of the two features of circumstances: flexibility and
background risk. In these additional treatments, we eliminate any potential variability
in labor income and, hence, isolate the effect of flexibility from that of background risk.
The results from these treatments indicate that the large negative treatment effect of
future labor income is driven by background risk rather than flexibility. We find that the
flexibility effect is positive.
The findings of our paper are in line with the theoretical and empirical literature
on labor-income background risk and flexibility. There is a negative relationship between
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uninsurable future risks and current risk exposure and a positive relationship between
flexibility and current risk exposure (Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson 1992; Heaton and
Lucas 2000; Gollier 2001; Gollier and Zeckhauser 2002; Franke, Schlesinger, and Stapleton
2011). More importantly, our findings show that the effect of labor-income background
risk is larger than that of flexibility; the estimated flexibility and background-risk effects
are 3.4 and 14.4 percentage points, respectively. Our findings also suggest that the relative
importance of background risk and flexibility depends on the type of circumstance. While
the background-risk effect is larger than the flexibility effect in the labor treatment, the
two effects appear to be of the same magnitude but different sign (or both zero) in the
evasion treatment. The zero tax-evasion effect is in line with Klos (2004) who finds
that current risk exposure is not affected by the presence of future risky investment
opportunities.
In addition to identifying and decomposing the effect of circumstances on risk ex-
posure, our paper makes two further contributions. First, this is the only study we are
aware of to examine the effect of tax evasion on current risk exposure.3 Although the
decision to evade taxes is similar to that of other risky decisions, it may have a different
effect due to cognitive and moral biases on the part of the investor. Furthermore, it is
widely accepted that access to tax-evasion opportunities is heterogeneously distributed
across individuals. For example, employees who are subject to third-party reporting have
less opportunity to evade taxes than their counterparts who are not (Kleven et al. 2011).
This difference in access to tax evasion has been shown to have an effect on other eco-
nomic outcomes that are of interest to policy makers. For example, there is evidence that
tax evasion has both income distributional implications (Alm and Sennoga 2010) and
welfare implications (Chetty 2009; Gorodnichenko, Martinez-Vazquez, and Sabirianova
Peter 2009). Our study contributes to this growing literature by identifying the impact of
tax-evasion opportunities on risk exposure, which is itself an important economic variable
for policy makers.
Second, we are also the first to identify the impact of future labor-supply opportu-
nities on current risk exposure in a laboratory setting.4 Existing studies of both labor
flexibility and labor-income background risk use observational data, which faces iden-
tification issues. Using a laboratory setting allows us to cleanly identify the impact of
future labor-supply opportunities on current risk exposure. Our results also provide some
insights into the possible effect of the current incremental shift toward greater flexibil-
ity in the labor market - flexi-week work schedules and work-from-home initiatives - on
3Wrede (1995) theoretically analyzes the joint problem of risk-taking and tax evasion in a static
economy. He, however, focuses on the effect of taxation on expected utility and does not explicitly
study the dynamic effect of evasion opportunities on initial risk behavior. He concludes that eliminating
evasion is likely to discourage risk-taking.
4Unlike Klos and Weber (2006) who analyze a portfolio-choice setting with exogenous income that
was either certain or risky, we explore a case where labor-income risk is endogenous.
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risk exposure. We find evidence that the added flexibility may increase risk exposure
of affected workers. However, risk exposure is likely to decrease if the added flexibility
is accompanied by greater income background risk. Additionally, we explicitly account
for any possible interaction effects between labor-supply and evasion opportunities in our
empirical design. Understanding this interaction effect is especially important given that
labor flexibility is often bundled with tax-evasion opportunities.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents the experimental design and
the four main treatments that explores the impact of circumstances. We briefly discuss
theoretical considerations in Section 2.3 and present results in Section 2.4. Section 2.5
discusses our results including the findings from two additional treatments that allow us
to distinguish between flexibility and background risk. Section 2.6 concludes the paper.
2.2 The Laboratory Experiment
Considering the empirical challenges and the impracticality of the ideal field experiment,
we employ a laboratory experiment to study the effect of circumstances on risky invest-
ment behavior. The experimental design used to answer our research question is based
on widely accepted experimental designs in the fields of risk behavior (Gneezy and Pot-
ters 1997; Thaler et al. 1997; Klos, Weber, and Weber 2005), tax evasion (Alm 2012)
and labor supply (Charness and Kuhn 2011). Although the laboratory environment is
artificial, we argue that a clean and clear experimental design, such as ours, allows for
causal identification of treatment effects.
2.2.1 Experimental Design
We design a one-shot experiment with between-subject variation to answer our research
question. The experiment has three stages. First, subjects complete a real-effort task
for which they earn experimental currency units (ECU). Second, subjects decide how
much of their labor earnings to invest in a risky asset. Finally, subjects are given an
opportunity to respond to the outcome of the investment before paying taxes on their
income.
The first two stages are identical for all subjects and we solely vary how subjects
can respond to the lottery outcome in the third stage. Depending on which of four
treatment groups a subject is assigned to, she either has (i) no opportunity to respond,
or she has the opportunity to respond through (ii) additional labor effort, (iii) a tax-
reporting decision, or (iv) both extra labor effort and tax reporting. Hence, we cross
two dichotomous factors, “evasion opportunity” and “labor-supply opportunity”, in a
2x2 fully-factorial design. The following section describes each of the three experimental
stages in greater detail and highlights our identification strategy.
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Labor-Task Stage. Every subject first completes a labor task that involves moving a
set of sliders across a computer screen Gill and Prowse (2012).5 The sliders are initially
positioned at zero and can be repositioned to any integer between 0 and 100, inclusive.
Subjects are given two and a half minutes (150 seconds) to align 48 sliders at position 50.
Subjects receive instant feedback on the position of the current slider; this is indicated at
the rightmost end of each slider. We disable the arrow keys on the key board to ensure
the subjects only use the left mouse key to complete the task; use of the arrow keys
makes the task trivial. Additionally “... no two sliders are aligned exactly one under the
other”. This design feature prevents subjects from positioning one slider at 50 and then
visually matching the other sliders at this position. Subjects are paid an exogenously
determined piece rate, which is fixed at 2.5 ECU for each correctly aligned slider. We
used an exchange rate of 5 ECU to 1 EUR. Therefore, each subject earned 0.5 EUR for
each correctly aligned slider.
The slider task has a number of advantages that are described in Gill and Prowse
(2012). It is easy to explain and implement, does not require prior knowledge, does
not allow guessing, and most importantly, is identical across treatments and subjects.
Although the number of correctly aligned sliders has been used as a measure of labor
effort in the labor literature, our primary objective here is to induce a sense of ownership
of income and the possibility to consider labor income as a potential background risk. We
argue that participants are more likely to make reasonable and “realistic” decisions in a
situation with endogenous incomes, relative to a situation with an exogenous endowment.
Furthermore, individual variability in outcomes suggests that labor income may be viewed
as uncertain. Subjects perform one full round of the slider task as an unincentivized
practice round to familiarize themselves with the task.
Investment Stage. Subjects are given an opportunity to invest a share of their labor
earnings in a lottery after completing the labor task.6 They are allowed to invest any
amount between zero and their total labor earnings in the lottery. The lottery is binary
and the amount invested in the lottery is either doubled or halved with equal probability.
The actual outcome of the lottery is determined by the throw of a ten-sided die. One
of the experimenters walks up to each subject’s booth after the investment decision is
complete and throws a ten-sided die. The amount invested in the lottery is doubled if
5See Figure 2.A.3 in the appendix for a screenshot of the task. Gill and Prowse (2013a) provide
details and show how to implement the slider task. It has been used widely since its introduction: Gill
and Prowse (2013b), Riener and Wiederhold (2011), Cettolin and Riedl (2011), Gill and Prowse (2012),
and Hammermann, Mohnen, and Nieken (2012). Djawadi and Fahr (2012) also use the slider task in the
context of tax compliance, but examine a different research question than we do and employ compliance
as the dependent variable.
6The risky asset was framed as an investment opportunity to subjects in the experiment. However,
we use investment and lottery interchangeably in the remainder of the paper.
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the number on the face of the die is less than or equal to five, and halved if the number
on the face of the die is greater than or equal to six. The experimenter enters the number
on the face of the die on the computer and the subject verifies that the number is correct
before hitting enter. The computer then reports the outcome of the lottery to the subject
along with her post-lottery income.7
The lottery is designed such that the expected pay-off is greater than the invested
amount, i.e., the expected return is positive, which implies that a risk-averse person
invests a strictly positive share of his wealth into the lottery. The binary structure and
the conditional investment outcomes are easy to grasp and calculate. However, we also
provided a computerized calculator at every decision stage.
Response to the Lottery Outcome (Treatment Groups). The next stage of the
experiment gives subjects an opportunity to respond to the outcome of the lottery. Recall
that our research objective is to determine whether an individual’s risk exposure today
is affected by future opportunities to respond to the outcome of risky decisions via tax-
evasion and/or labor-supply opportunities. Therefore, we randomly assign subjects to
four groups that are identical in every way except in how they can respond to the outcome
of the lottery. Following the 2x2 crossing, a subject’s ability to respond to the outcome
of the lottery depends on which of the following groups she is randomly assigned to:
• Baseline: Subjects in the baseline group do not have an opportunity to respond to
the outcome of the lottery. After the lottery outcome is realized, their total income
is taxed at a proportional rate of 30 percent, and they are simply informed of their
final payoff (their net income). The tax rate is fixed exogenously, and is the same
for all subjects and all groups. Therefore, subjects in the baseline treatment cannot
respond to the lottery. This group serves as the control treatment.
• Labor: After the outcome of the lottery is determined, subjects in the labor treat-
ment play another period (90 seconds) of the real-effort task and thereby earn
additional income. After this second period of supplying labor effort, their total
income is taxed and subjects are informed of their final payoff (their net income).
Therefore, subjects in the labor treatment can respond to the lottery only through
a second labor-supply choice.
• Evasion: In the evasion treatment, subjects have to make a tax reporting decision.
After they learn the outcome of the lottery, participants are asked how much income
they wish to report for tax purposes. As is standard in the experimental tax-evasion
literature, there is an exogenous probability that the tax-evasion decision is audited,
7Note that the experimenter could at no point see the amount invested by the subject as the feedback
screen was only shown after the experimenter had moved on and the subject clicked the “next” button.
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and a penalty applies in the case of audit and underreporting. After the reporting
decision has been made, the audit status is determined and the payoff (net income)
is paid accordingly. Therefore, subjects in the evasion treatment can respond to
the lottery only through their reporting decision.
• Full: Subjects in the full treatment group have two channels to respond to the
lottery outcome. They play another period of the real effort task (90 seconds), as
in the labor group, and then make an income reporting decision, as in the evasion
group. Their final payoff (net income) is a function of the two periods of labor
supply, the investment decision, the lottery outcome, the reporting decision, and
the audit status. Therefore, subjects in this fourth treatment group have access to
two channels to respond to the lottery outcome: evasion and labor supply.
Subjects are only informed of the set-up of the experiment in their treatment state,
and they receive this information prior to the initial labor-supply and investment decisions
(in the paper based instructions). Therefore, subjects know ex-ante whether and how
they are able to respond to the lottery outcome, and that they can only respond ex-post.
The design described above allows us to identify the impact of future labor or evasion
opportunities on current risk exposure. We run two additional treatments that vary the
structure of the second labor task by eliminating any variability in payoffs from this task.
Hence, future labor income in these treatments is certain. This allows us to disentangle
the relative importance of flexibility and background risk in our findings. These additional
treatments are described in Section 2.5.1.
Tax and Audit Mechanism. As indicated above, all subjects face an exogenously
determined proportional marginal tax rate of 30 percent.8 Additionally, subjects in the
evasion and full treatments face an exogenous audit probability of 10 percent and a
penalty that is equal to twice any evaded taxes due (i.e., a fine rate of 2). The audit
outcome is determined by the throw of a 10-sided die; subjects are audited if the number
one is shown on the face of the die.9 Audit leads to the discovery of true income, and
subjects who underreport their income pay a penalty equal to twice their evaded taxes
8Because subjects in the baseline and the labor treatment do not make an income reporting decision,
they pay 30 percent on their total income in taxes. On the other hand, subjects in the evasion and full
treatment groups pay a tax rate of 30 percent on their reported income because they are able to respond
to the lottery outcome by underreporting income.
9The procedure was as follows: After the reporting decision was complete for the evasion and full
treatment groups, one of the experimenters walked up to each computer booth and threw a 10-sided
die; the experimenter entered the number on the face of the die on the computer; the subject confirmed
this number, which results in a screen with one of the following sentences: You have been audited or
You have not been audited. The subject had to press “NEXT” again to see the screen summarizing the
round’s payment. By this time the experimenter had already moved on to the next subject. Hence, the
experimenter could at no point see subjects’ reported share.
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(i.e., the underreported amount multiplied by twice the tax rate). All other subjects
who either report honestly or underreport but throw a die number between two and ten
receive a net income equal to their true gross income less the tax rate multiplied by the
reported income. This audit and penalty structure is commonly used in the tax-evasion
literature (Alm, Jackson, and McKee 2009). In order to make the tax-reporting decision
as realistic as possible, we include an exogenous audit risk and donate all tax revenues
and fines to the administrative governing body of the City of Cologne, Germany.10
We argue that this is a clean experimental design to answer the research question
posed above: a one-shot game in a between-subject design that produces 180 independent
observations (45 per treatment) on a metric dependent variable. We therefore have
sufficient statistical power to answer our research question. All participants face the same
labor effort, investment decision, and marginal tax rates, and therefore only differ with
respect to the channel that is available to respond to the lottery outcome ex-post. This
allows us to compare the share of income invested in the lottery across the four groups and
attribute any differences to the difference in response opportunities. Additionally, since
subjects know ex-ante whether and how they are able to respond to the lottery outcome,
and that they can only respond ex-post, any treatment effect we identify must be driven
purely by anticipation of the response opportunity. Methodologically, this is achieved by
changing only that part of the instructions governing second-period opportunities; the
first period is identical across instructions.
2.2.2 Organization
The experiment was conducted in the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER),
University of Cologne, Germany (www.lab.uni-koeln.de). A random sample of the lab-
oratory’s subject pool of approximately 4000 persons was invited via email – using the
recruitment software ORSEE (Greiner 2004) – to participate in the experiment. Potential
participants signed up on a first-come-first-serve basis. A total of 180 subjects, mostly
undergraduate students from the University of Cologne, participated in the experiment
(see Section 2.4.1 for summary statistics). Neither the content of the experiment nor the
expected payoff were stated in the invitation email. The computerized experiment was
programmed utilizing z-tree software (Fischbacher 2007).
We conducted twelve sessions over three regular school days in May and June 2013.11
Each session included one practice round, one paying round, 15 subjects, and lasted
approximately 40 minutes on average (including review of instructions and payment of
10Subjects received a copy of the donation receipt (stating the total amount donated) via e-mail after
the experiment has been conducted. This procedure was also explicitly stated in the instructions.
11There are two regular semesters at the tertiary level in Germany; winter semester lasting from Octo-
ber to March and Summer Semester between April and July. Therefore, the experiment was implemented
during the regular lecture season.
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participants). The exchange rate between Experimental Currency Units (ECU) and Euro
was such that five ECU corresponded to one Euro. Random assignment to computer
booths was implemented by asking each subject to draw an ID number out of a box upon
entering the lab. The decisions and payments of the subjects were linked to their ID
and the experimenter had no way of matching this information to their names. Subjects
also received a hard copy of the instructions when they entered the lab (See Appendix
2.C) and were allowed as much time as they needed to familiarize themselves with the
procedure of the experiment. They were then given the opportunity to ask any clarifying
questions in private.
2.3 Theoretical Background
In this section, we discuss the conditions under which the opportunity to react to the in-
vestment outcome in the future affects the current exposure to investment risks. Investors
have direct utility function u which is strictly increasing and strictly concave in wealth z.
Effort causes increasing and convex costs c. Investors are risk-averse and maximize the
expected utility of terminal wealth zT given disutility of effort, i.e., working.
In the baseline treatment, the investor has initial endowment w0 and can work to
gain additional income. Subsequently, he decides on his portfolio composition, i.e., how
much of his total period-two wealth to invest in a risk-free storage and how much to
invest in a risky asset. The risk-free rate is zero. The risky asset has a random return r˜
distributed according to the cumulative distribution function F (r) on R with EF r˜ > 0.
In subsequent periods, the investor learns the realization of r˜. Then, depending on
the treatment, he either has different opportunities to increase his wealth or not. Final
gross wealth is subject to taxation at rate 0 < τ < 1. To increase his wealth, the investor
can either work again for additional income, or he can evade taxes by underreporting his
true final wealth, or both.
2.3.1 Portfolio Choice without Adjustment Opportunities
We begin by characterizing the investor’s optimal action when he has no adjustment
opportunities after the investment stage (the baseline treatment). Hence, the investor
first generates labor income by choosing his effort level and subsequently decides on how
much of his wealth he wants to invest. The remainder is automatically stored safely. After
the realization of investment risks, the investor’s gross income is automatically taxed.
Note that labor income in our experiment is not predictable with certainty. Given
the real-effort task utilized in the experiment, it is difficult for the subjects to perfectly
anticipate their productivity and hence their labor income. As we will show later, subjects
exhibit a large individual variability in their performance. This limits their ability to
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forecast to what extent they will be able to offset potential losses. We capture this
income risk by allowing the investor to tremble, i.e., we add some shock, η˜t ∼ G(ηt), to
his effort choice in periods with a working decision t = {1, 3}.12 This productivity shock
will be of special importance when we discuss those treatments that offer a second labor
decision.
In the baseline treatment, the investor faces the following objective in period two:
vNoAdjust(z2) = max
a
EFu((w0 + wl1 + wη1 − a)(1− τ) + a(1 + r˜)(1− τ))
= max
a
EFu(z2(1− τ) + a(1− τ)r˜), (2.3.1)
where w > 0 is the wage rate per unit of work, lt is the number of units worked
in period t, a ≥ 0 is the absolute amount invested in the risky asset, and ηt ∈ R is the
realization of the productivity shock in period t. We write z2 = w0 + wl1 + wη for the
wealth at the beginning of period two.
It is well known that an investor invests a positive fraction of his wealth in the risky
asset due the positive expectation of excess returns (e.g., Gollier 2001). Call the solution
to the portfolio-choice problem without adjustment opportunities aNoAdjust.
In the first period, the investor chooses an effort level given his optimal investment
decision in period two. The investor’s first-period objective reads:
max
l1
EGv
NoAdjust(w0 + w(l1 + η˜1)). (2.3.2)
We assume that the idiosyncratic productivity shocks are present in all treatments
and orthogonal to the experimental manipulation. Hence, we argue that the randomiza-
tion of subjects into treatments ensures that the average treatment effect is not affected
by the noise in first-period labor. Additionally, we assume that first-period labor effort is
independent of experimental manipulation. Indeed, in our main experiment, labor choice
is not statistically different across treatments. We therefore take the first-period labor
decision as given and, in the following, focus on how the investment level a changes across
treatments.
We now turn to the conditions under which adjustment opportunities in subsequent
periods lead to increased or decreased risk-taking. That is, the conditions under which
adjustment opportunities increase or decrease a. For this, it is sufficient to show that
these opportunities reduce (increase) the investor’s risk aversion, or increase (reduce) his
risk tolerance, respectively, in the portfolio problem. More specifically, the investor’s
objective function in the portfolio problem with adjustment opportunities has to be less
(more) concave than his objective function u without adjustment opportunities in the
sense of Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964).
12In the experiment, this shock causes the number of correctly positioned sliders to be different from
the initially chosen number of sliders.
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2.3.2 Portfolio Choice with Adjustment Opportunities
Consider an investor who faces the same portfolio choice as in the baseline problem but
who additionally knows that he will have an adjustment opportunity in the subsequent
period. The derivation of his optimal investment results from backward induction. In
period three, the investor may now respond to the current realization of wealth, i.e., to
z3 = w0 + wl1 + wη1 + ar. Consequently, the investor decides on units of work, l3 or the
amount of wealth evaded, e, i.e., the amount of non-reported income, or both.
Labor-Supply Opportunity
We first examine how the opportunity to adjust labor supply in the third period affects
risk-taking. The opportunity to supply additional labor represents the ability to respond
to the risky investment outcome by additional effort. For each unit of work, l3, the
investor receives wage w but also suffers costs c(l3).
13
As in the first period, current labor supply is subject to productivity shocks. Fu-
ture income with positive variance may serve as an insurance against adverse current
investment. The investor may base his labor supply on the realization of the investment
risk. Flexibility refers to this deliberate adjustment. However, the additional variability
in wealth can also be seen as a background risk relative to the current investment risk
(Gollier 2001). Hence, it depends on the shape of risk aversion and risk tolerance, respec-
tively, whether first-period risk-taking is actually increased in the presence of adjustment
opportunities or whether the investor chooses to be less exposed to current investment
risk.
With a labor-supply opportunity, the investor has the following value function in
period three:
vLabor(z3) = max
l3
EGu(z3(1− τ) + w(l3 + η˜2)(1− τ))− c(l3). (2.3.3)
The portfolio-choice problem in period two is given by
max
a
EFv
Labor(z2 + ar˜). (2.3.4)
Call the solution to the portfolio choice with labor-supply opportunity aLabor. The dif-
ference between the baseline portfolio choice without adjustment opportunities and the
current portfolio choice is that the investor now maximizes a different objective function.
He will invest more in the risky asset, i.e., aLabor > aNoAdjust, if the value function v
Labor,
which he maximizes in (2.3.4), is less concave than the direct utility function u which he
maximizes in (2.3.1). On the other hand, if the new value function is more concave than
u, the investor will reduce his risk exposure, i.e., aLabor < aNoAdjust.
13We assume that the cost function is the same across periods.
2.3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 19
Recall that we model the productivity shock by adding a risky non-market compo-
nent to the overall income.14 Variable non-market wealth has two effects. First, if the
minimum income is bounded away from zero and the variance of this income is sufficiently
small, investors should invest more in the risky asset (Franke, Schlesinger, and Stapleton
2011), i.e., aLabor > aNoAdjust. This is one likely scenario for the performance in the real-
effort task. The amount of labor income available from second-period performance varies
but can be considered non-negative. However, Franke, Schlesinger, and Stapleton (2011)
also note that this result may not hold if the variance of income is sufficiently large.
Second, consider an investor having problems generating income in the labor task.
He will not only generate very low income but he will also have highly convex costs in
doing so. Combined, this may yield negative overall utility as marginal costs exceed
marginal earnings. Hence, it is possible that for some investors the labor task may
actually bear the risk of achieving negative utility though it has a positive expectation in
general. Franke, Schlesinger, and Stapleton (2011) show that in such cases risk aversion is
range dependent. The more likely a bad performance is, the more risk-averse the investor
becomes as he tries to avoid negative utility.
Evasion Opportunity
We now examine how the opportunity to evade taxes in the subsequent period affects the
investor’s exposure to investment risks. The opportunity to evade taxes represents the
ability to respond to the risky investment outcome by taking an additional exogenous
risk. As such, this adjustment opportunity again features a deliberate reaction to pre-
vious investment outcomes (flexibility) but also increases variability in terminal wealth
(background risk). We write the tax evasion decision as a second portfolio choice in the
spirit of Allingham and Sandmo (1972). This allows us to apply the results of Gollier
(2001) and Gollier and Zeckhauser (2002) to characterize the conditions under which an
additional subsequent risk induces more or less contemporaneous risk-taking.
One unit of evaded taxes yields a random return ˜ distributed according to (p,−ζ; 1−
p, 0), i.e., the tax-reporting decision is audited with probability p > 0 and the fine rate is
ζ > 0. Starting in the third period, the investor has the following value function
vEvasion(z3) = max
e
EPu(z3(1− τ) + eξ˜), (2.3.5)
where ξ˜ ∼ P (ξ) = (p, τ − ζ; 1 − p, τ) is the excess return per unit of evaded taxes and
EP ξ˜ > 0.
14The productivity shock is a random component of wealth that does neither depend on the investor’s
choices nor on the investment return realization.
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By backward induction, in period two, the investor now chooses the amount invested
in the risky asset that solves the following objective
max
a
EFv
Evasion(z2 + ar˜). (2.3.6)
Call the solution to the portfolio-choice problem with tax-evasion opportunity aEvasion.
Again, the investor will invest more in the risky asset, i.e., aEvasion > aNoAdjust if his value
function vEvasion is less concave than his direct utility function u and vice versa.
Gollier and Zeckhauser (2002) show that the opportunity to take an additional risk
ex-post leads to more risk-taking ex-ante if and only if absolute risk tolerance is convex.
Their proposition applies if the second risk has a binary support which holds for our
assumption on the auditing mechanism. Note that it is sufficient to assume that risk
aversion is concave for a tax-evasion opportunity to induce more risk-taking.15
Whether risk tolerance is actually convex or concave is an empirical question. Gol-
lier and Zeckhauser (2002) list several empirical observations leading to arguments for
either form. Hence, it remains an empirical question whether a subsequent risky decision
leads to more initial risk-taking. Note that the standard assumption in macroeconomics
and finance postulates a linear risk tolerance. Given linearity, a future investment risk
does not affect the optimal exposure to initial investment risks. Hence, myopic investment
decisions are optimal (Mossin 1968).
2.3.3 Labor-Supply and Evasion Opportunities
In the full treatment, subjects have both the opportunity to supply additional labor as well
as to evade taxes. Note that the labor-opportunity and evasion-opportunity treatments
are nested in the full treatment. Subjects are not forced to evade taxes. Hence, they
can reduce the full treatment to the labor treatment. Analogously, subjects are not
forced to provide additional real effort. Hence, they can reduce the full treatment to the
evasion treatment. Ultimately, all treatments can, of course, be reduced to the baseline
treatment.
The theoretical results discussed above suggest that the effect of ‘circumstances’ on
risk exposure is ambiguous. This ambiguity extends to the case with both evasion and
labor supply opportunities. We therefore do not write down the full four-period model
formally. The analysis via backward induction proceeds in the same fashion as before and
there is nothing new that provides an additional understanding of the portfolio choice.
The last-period value function is plugged into the third-period objective which itself yields
15Concave risk aversion implies convex risk tolerance and hence increased risk-taking. However, Gollier
and Zeckhauser (2002) state the proposition in terms of risk tolerance as this is more useful because they
note that risk aversion cannot be decreasing, concave, and positive everywhere. As Gollier (2001) notes,
the convexity of risk tolerance is rather a restriction on risk aversion not to be too concave.
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a value function (vFull) that the agent maximizes in period two by choosing aFull. Again,
whether the investor changes his investment exposure relative to the baseline treatment
(aFull R aNoAdjust) depends on the curvature of vFull in relation to the curvature of u.
Therefore, we rely on an empirical analysis to identify the effects of ex-post opportunities
on risk exposure. The results from this analysis are reported in the next section.
2.4 Results
This section describes our results for the effect of circumstances on risk exposure. We
first present summary statistics (Section 2.4.1) and simple non-parametric comparisons
of the four treatment groups (2.4.2), before we proceed to regression results in Section
2.4.3. The results are discussed in Section 2.5 where we present two additional treatments
and pay special attention to the relative importance of flexibility and background risk.
2.4.1 Summary Statistics
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for demographic and attitudinal variables which
were surveyed through a questionnaire at the end of the experiment. The demographic
variables include age, gender, and native language. Because our experiment involves
making investment and evasion decisions, we ask one question on risk aversion and one
on tax morale.16
The summary statistics reported in Table 2.1 show that males and native German
speakers make up 42% and 79% of the sample, respectively, and that the average age
is 24.4 years. Randomization into treatment groups worked well as the variables are
fairly balanced across treatment groups. Since the share of males is about 9 percentage
points lower in the baseline treatment relative to the average share, we provide regression
results that control for demographic variables to ensure that our results are not driven
by differences in gender or other individual characteristics.
16The measure of risk aversion is obtained by asking subjects to choose between a certain pay-off of
$50 and a gamble that pays $100 with probability of 0.5 and $0 with probability of 0.5. The tax-morale
question is adopted from the World Values Survey (Inglehart n.d.). “Please tell me for the following
statement whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between:
‘Cheating on taxes if you have the chance’.” This is the most frequently used question to measure tax
morale in observational studies (e.g., Slemrod 2003, Alm and Torgler 2006, and Halla 2012).
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics by Treatment Status: Demographic and Attitudinal Vari-
ables.
Baseline Treatments
Labor Evasion Full Total
Age 25.22 23.22 24.47 24.64 24.39
(6.842) (2.779) (3.546) (7.371) (5.512)
Male 0.333 0.422 0.467 0.489 0.428
(0.477) (0.499) (0.505) (0.506) (0.496)
German 0.711 0.756 0.889 0.800 0.789
(0.458) (0.435) (0.318) (0.405) (0.409)
Tax Morale 7.711 7.289 6.689 6.800 7.122
(2.427) (2.873) (2.670) (3.005) (2.760)
Risk 1.200 1.244 1.311 1.222 1.244
(0.505) (0.609) (0.668) (0.599) (0.594)
Notes: Reported is the mean of demographic and attitudinal variables by treat-
ment status. Standard deviations in parentheses. N = 180. Subjects in the
Labor and Evasion treatments had the opportunity to supply extra effort and
evade taxes, respectively. Full treatment indicates that both labor and evasion
adjustments were available. Subjects in the Baseline group had no adjustment
opportunities. All information were surveyed through a questionnaire at the
end of the experiment.
2.4.2 Non-parametric Comparisons of Treatment Groups
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics for the choice variables: Labor effort, investment
decision, and compliance behavior. In the following, we compare the treatment groups
with respect to these variables.
Effort Decisions. On average, over all treatment groups, roughly 18 sliders were cor-
rectly positioned in the first payoff-relevant period. Table 2.2 shows that labor effort
is fairly balanced across the four treatment groups. Though slightly higher in the labor
treatment relative to the other groups, this difference in correctly positioned sliders in the
first period is not statistically significant (Mann-Whitney test relative to baseline group:
p = 0.491). The slight difference in period-two effort between the two groups that have
the opportunity to respond to the lottery outcome by working is not significant either.
Compliance Behavior. On average, subjects in the two groups with tax evasion op-
portunities reported 22.5% of their income for tax purposes. However, there are large
differences between the two groups. While subjects in the evasion treatment reported, on
average, 14% of their income, subjects in the full treatment group were more honest and
reported almost 31% of their income. This 17 percentage points difference is statistically
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics by Treatment Status: Choice Variables.
Baseline Treatments
Labor Evasion Full Total
Effort Practice 13.31 13.51 12.69 13.47 13.24
(4.547) (5.968) (4.828) (4.998) (5.081)
Effort Period 1 17.78 18.44 17.51 17.96 17.92
(4.680) (4.429) (4.841) (4.472) (4.583)
Investment Share 0.381 0.271 0.375 0.346 0.343
(0.297) (0.206) (0.267) (0.279) (0.266)
Effort Period 2 . 12.20 . 11.47 11.83
(3.259) (2.951) (3.113)
Compliance Rate . . 0.141 0.309 0.225
(0.248) (0.401) (0.342)
Notes: Reported is the mean of choice variables by treatment status. Stan-
dard deviations in parentheses. N = 180. Subjects in the Labor and Evasion
treatments had the opportunity to supply extra effort and evade taxes, respec-
tively. Full treatment indicates that both labor and evasion adjustments were
available. Subjects in the Baseline group had no adjustment opportunities.
different from zero (p = 0.0871), and raises the possibility of large interaction effects
which we explore below.
Investment Decisions. Our main variable of interest is the share of period-one income
invested in the lottery, which we simply refer to as investment share. This variable is
presented in the third row of Table 2.2 as well as in Figure 2.1. We observe that the share
of period-one income that is invested in the lottery is 38.1% in the baseline, 27.1% in the
labor treatment, 37.5% in the evasion treatment, and 34.6% in the full treatment. The
difference in investment shares between the baseline and evasion treatments is neither
economically nor statistically different from zero (Mann-Whitney test: p = 0.878). On
the other hand, we observe a large treatment effect in the labor treatment; the investment
share is eleven percentage points lower relative to the baseline. This treatment effect is
both economically large and statistical different from zero (p = 0.066). Although the
investment share in the full treatment is 3.5 percentage points lower than the baseline,
this difference is not statistically different from zero (p = 0.660). However, this treatment
effect indicates that the effect of labor opportunity on investment share is substantially
smaller among subjects who also have an evasion opportunity. In other words, access to
evasion reduces the responsiveness of subjects to the labor income circumstance.17 This
17The interaction effect of evasion fits perfectly with the narrative of the public finance literature.
It is generally accepted that tax-shifting responses such as tax evasion reduces the magnitude of real
responses such as investment (Slemrod 1994; Doerrenberg and Duncan 2014).
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interaction effect of 8.1%, which is economically meaningful but not statistically different
from zero (p = 0.297), is estimated using the following formula: (aˆFull−aˆLabor)−(aˆEvasion−
aˆBase) = (0.346− 0.271)− (0.375− 0.381).18
Our results therefore suggest that the opportunity to provide extra labor effort
after learning the outcome of the lottery (ex-post) reduces subjects’ willingness to take
on investment risk (ex-ante).19 This effect is almost fully countered if these subjects
also have an opportunity to evade taxes. Curiously, subjects whose only response to the
investment outcome is to evade taxes are no more or less risky than subjects without
response opportunities. The fact that the investment decisions of subjects in the baseline
and evasion groups are close to each other (given that the choice variable is metric between
0 and 1) shows that the significant difference between the labor and baseline group is
very high and reflects a causal treatment effect.
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Reported is the share of period-one labor income that is invested in the lottery
by treatment status. N = 180. Subjects in Labor and Evasion treatments
had the opportunity to supply extra effort and evade taxes, respectively. Full
treatment indicates that both labor and evasion adjustments were available.
Subjects in the Baseline group had no adjustment opportunities.
Figure 2.1: Investment Share by Treatment Group.
18This interaction effect can also be estimated directly in a parametric OLS regression of investment
share on indicators for evasion, labor as well as an interaction between these two indicators.
19Note that the investment share does not depend on period-one labor income (Spearman’s rank
correlation: p = 0.6192, N = 180).
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2.4.3 Regression Results
This section describes parametric results based on the following regression model:
aig = ψ + β · Treatg + φ ·Xig + ig, (2.4.1)
where subscripts indicate a subject i who is in treatment group g = 0, 1, 2, 3 (with g = 0:
baseline, g = 1: labor treatment, g = 2: evasion treatment, g = 3: full treatment).
The dependent variable aig is the share of contemporaneous income that is invested in
the lottery. Treatg is a categorical indicator variable for a subject’s treatment group
20
and β is the coefficient of interest. The coefficients for each treatment group is relative
to the omitted baseline group with g = 0. Some specifications also control for demo-
graphic and attitudinal variables that are captured in Xig. The error term is ig; we use
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.
Specification (I) of Table 2.3 shows OLS estimates of the effect of treatment sta-
tus on the share of invested income. The estimated treatment effects confirm our non-
parametric analysis. The investment share of subjects who have the opportunity to
provide additional labor effort is 10 to 11 percentage points lower than the baseline
group. This effect is large and statistically significant at the 5% level. On the other
hand, the investment share of subjects in the evasion and full treatment groups is not
statistically different from that of the baseline group. Again, the results from the full
treatment points to large differential effects between subjects with only labor opportunity
and subjects with both labor and evasion opportunities. These results are robust to the
inclusion of demographic and attitudinal variables in specification (II); age, gender, a
dummy indicating German as the native language, and the questionnaire answers to the
risk and tax-morality questions. The results are also robust to estimating two-censored
Tobit regressions (specifications (III) and (IV) ), which account for the fact that subjects
were restricted by borrowing constraints, i.e., they could only invest their total income
but not more, and the fact that they could not short the lottery.
As expected, males and subjects who are characterized as risk-seeking invest a larger
share of income in the lottery. These estimates are in line with the risk literature and
therefore support our claim that the lottery in the experiment captures risk behavior
well. For example, Charness and Gneezy (2012) find that males are more risk-seeking
than women in laboratory experiments. We also find that older subjects invest a larger
share of income in the lottery. Although this estimate is statistically different from zero,
it is economically small.21
20Recall that we employ a between-subjects design where each subject is exclusively in one of the four
treatment groups.
21For details on the measurement of risk and tax morale see footnote 16. The coefficients for all
demographic and attitudinal variables are reported in Table 2.B.4 in the Appendix.
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Table 2.3: Treatment Effects on Investment Behavior: OLS and Tobit Regressions.
Model (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Estimation OLS OLS Tobit Tobit
Labor -0.111∗∗ -0.102∗∗ -0.128∗∗ -0.114∗∗
(0.054) (0.051) (0.063) (0.057)
Evasion -0.007 -0.018 -0.016 -0.027
(0.060) (0.061) (0.071) (0.070)
Full -0.035 -0.041 -0.058 -0.062
(0.061) (0.058) (0.073) (0.069)
Constant 0.381∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.213
(0.044) (0.118) (0.053) (0.144)
Controls No Yes No Yes
N 180 180 180 180
R2 0.028 0.176 0.030 0.219
Notes: OLS and two-censored (at 0 and 1) Tobit regressions based on equation
(2.4.1). Dependent variable is the share of contemporaneous income invested
in the lottery. Treatment effects are relative to the omitted Baseline group
without adjustment opportunities. Subjects in the Labor and Evasion treat-
ments had the opportunity to supply extra effort and evade taxes, respectively.
Full treatment indicates that both labor and evasion adjustments were avail-
able. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimations (II) and (IV) include
a full set of control variables (see Table 2.B.4 for detailed results). ∗ < 0.10,
∗∗< 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
2.5 Discussion
Our empirical analysis confirms that certain circumstances matter for risk exposure. In
particular, future labor-supply opportunities reduce risk exposure while access to only
tax evasion does not. This section of the paper explores our findings more carefully
to determine the channels through which future labor opportunities affect current risk
exposure. We also discuss the internal validity of our design.
2.5.1 Disentangling the Effect of Circumstances
The existing theoretical literature suggests that the impact of circumstances such as labor
opportunity on risk exposure is driven by two channels: flexibility and background risk.
While flexibility induces greater risk exposure, background risks may cause current risk
exposure to increase, decrease or remain unchanged depending on the shape of individual
risk tolerance as discussed in Section 2.3. We highlight the relative importance of these
channels in two steps. We first hypothesize about the relative impact of each channel and
then provide empirical evidence that disentangles the two channels based on additional
experimental treatments.
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Flexibility vs. Background Risk
The future labor opportunity offers both a means of flexibly responding to the outcome
of the lottery and a source of background risk. Flexibility stems from the ability to
offset potential adverse return realizations with additional labor supply. Background risk
stems from the additional variability in terminal wealth. Although subjects in the labor
treatment knew ex-ante that they had an opportunity to supply labor after learning
the outcome of the lottery, the income associated with this labor task was difficult to
predict for two reasons. First, the difficulty of the slider task implies that subjects could
only predict their labor income with large errors. Second, subjects had 150 seconds to
complete both the practice and first labor task and 90 seconds to complete the second
labor task. We argue that this 40% difference in labor time, made it even more difficult
for subjects to accurately predict their future labor income based on the income earned
in the first labor task. The inability to accurately predict future labor income along with
the disutility of completing the labor task suggest that the future labor opportunity acted
as both a source of flexibility and labor-income background risk. Because we find that
subjects in the labor treatment invest a lower share of income in the lottery, our findings
suggest that the background-risk effect dominates the flexibility effect.
Similarly, the opportunity to evade taxes also acts as a source of flexibility and
background risk. In other words, individuals in the evasion treatment who realize an
adverse lottery outcome have the opportunity to underreport income for tax purposes.
This lowers their tax payment, increases their net income and thus allows them to recoup
some of the income lost in the lottery. At the same time, the probability of being caught
and the fine associated with evasion implies a source of background risk as well. Since
the treatment effect is practically zero in the evasion treatment, this suggests that the
two channels are of the same magnitude, but of different sign (or both zero).
While it is useful to draw inference about the relative role of each channel from
existing theory, we also determine the relative role of each channel empirically by run-
ning two additional treatments. Because we find large labor treatment effects and zero
evasion treatment effect, our empirical analysis focuses on disentangling the role of the
two channels in the labor treatments only. These additional treatments and results are
described in the next sections.
Additional Empirical Evidence
Design of Additional Treatments. In order to identify the relative impact of flexibil-
ity, we ran the labor and full treatments without the presence of future labor income risk.
Both treatments are designed to remove background risk from the future labor income.
The only difference between these treatments and their respective counterparts described
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in Section 2.2 is the structure of the second labor task, which we describe below. In fact,
the only difference in the instructions is the boldfaced portions of the following paragraph.
The investment outcome will be determined and displayed on your computer
screen. You will then undertake the same labor task as in stage 1. However,
you will not receive an additional fixed amount this time. In addition, this
second labor task lasts 90 seconds. In addition, this second labor
task has no time constraint. Instead, before the start of the second
labor task, you choose the number of sliders that you want to
position correctly. The maximum number of sliders you can choose
is 15. The slider task ends automatically once you have reached the
chosen number of correctly positioned sliders. The money that you
earn in this labor task will be added to the money that you have earned so
far.
Notice that instead of giving subjects 90 seconds to complete as many sliders as
they intend to in the second labor task, the new treatments allow subjects to preselect the
number of sliders they wish to complete in the second labor task. Subjects are allowed to
select up to 15 sliders and have as much time as needed to complete the selected number
of sliders. Although subjects make this labor-effort decision after learning the outcome
of their investment decision, they know that the they will be able to make this decision
and that they will have as much time as needed to complete their selected number of
sliders before they make their investment decision. This new design of the second labor
task is applied to the labor and full treatments. We henceforth refer to these treatments
as Labor NR and Full NR (where NR indicates no background risk).
Theoretically, Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992) and Franke, Schlesinger, and
Stapleton (2011) show that under non-stochastic positive income, investors increase their
risky investment. Intuitively, a certain way to increase income ex-post serves as a kind
of insurance towards adverse investment outcomes. The investor knows that he will be
able to offset potential losses with certainty. Non-stochastic income substitutes the risk-
free storage and the investor invests a larger fraction of his wealth in the risky asset.
We can model this non-risky labor income by setting η˜ ≡ 0 in the respective second
labor decisions in period three, e.g., in equation (2.3.3). Theoretically, this modification
unambiguously increases the exposure to investment risks.
Our additional treatments allow us to identify the relative importance of flexibility
and background risk by removing the variability in future labor income. We identify
the role of labor-income flexibility by comparing the additional labor treatment to the
baseline, and the role of background risk by comparing the additional labor treatment to
the original labor treatment. We also identify the importance of labor-income flexibility
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and background risk for the evasion interaction effect by comparing the additional labor
treatment to the additional full treatment.
In order to successfully identify these relative effects, it is important that the only
difference between the original and additional treatments is background risk. We ensure
comparability of the number of completed sliders between the original and additional
treatments by setting the maximum number of sliders each subject can preselect to 15,
which is one standard deviation higher than the mean completed sliders in the original
labor and full treatments, respectively.22
We ran two sessions of each treatment with 15 subjects per session for a total of
30 independent observations per additional treatment and 60 new observations in total.
The sessions were conducted in the same lab drawing from the same subject pool (not
the same subjects) as the original experiments. All other details are identical to those
described in Section 2.2.
Results of Additional Treatments. The results presented in Figure 2.2 below show
that the investment share is 41.5% (sd: 22.8%) in Labor NR and 36.2% (sd: 29.4%)
in Full NR. This implies that removing the risk component of future labor income has
an effect on investment shares in the labor treatment but not in the full treatment.23
The investment share in the Labor-NR treatment is 3.4 percentage points higher than
in the baseline and 15 percentage points higher than in the original labor treatment.
Since there is no background risk in the additional labor treatment, we argue that the
3.4 percentage points difference from the baseline is the flexibility effect; access to future
certain labor income increases risky investment today. Although this difference is in
the expected direction, it is not statistically different from zero (Mann-Whitney test:
p = 0.24). The 15 percentage points difference between the additional and original labor
treatments reflects background risk and is both statistically and economically meaningful
(p = 0.002). These results suggest that the background risk effect dominates the flexibility
effect in the original labor treatment and thus explains the significantly smaller investment
share in the original labor treatment.
Investment shares are two percentage points higher in the additional full treatment
(without labor-income background risk) relative to the original full treatment (with labor-
income background risk). Although this difference is not statistically distinguishable from
22The means and standard deviations were 12.20 and 3.26, and 11.47 and 2.95, in the labor and full
treatments, respectively. We argue that the design we implement for the additional treatments removes
background risk while maintaining enough similarities to the original treatments, which is critical for
comparing the results.
23The additional and original treatments are similar in demographic characteristics. The new treat-
ments completed approximately 3 fewer sliders, on average, in the first labor task than the old treatments.
However, we find no evidence that this difference has any effect on the results that are discussed in this
section.
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Figure 2.2: Investment Share by Treatment Group (All Treat-
ments).
zero, it provides suggestive evidence of a negative labor-income background-risk effect.
Furthermore, the treatment effect in the additional full treatment, relative to the baseline,
confirms that the effect of labor is conditional on having access to tax evasion. In other
words, whereas subjects with only certain future labor income increase their investment
share by 3.4 percentage points, subjects who have both labor and evasion opportunity
reduce their investment share by 2 percentage points. This implies a negative interaction
effect of -4.7 percentage points (= (0.362 − 0.415) − (0.375 − 0.381)). That is, if future
labor income is certain, subjects with both evasion and future labor income invest 4.7
percentage points less than subjects who only have access to future labor income. Notice
that this interaction effect is sizably different from the one obtained in Section 2.4.2; 8.1
in original treatments and -4.7 in additional treatments. This difference in estimates can
be attributed to background risk and further supports our conclusion in Section 2.5.1 of
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a dominant negative background risk effect. Although the estimated interaction effects
differ in sign and magnitude, they tell the same story; tax-shifting responses such as tax
evasion reduce the magnitude of real responses such as investment.
2.5.2 Further Discussion
Overall, our findings show that the type of circumstances matter for risk exposure; future
labor income is associated with a very strong negative background-risk effect, while future
evasion opportunity has no effect. While we cannot comment on the relative importance
of flexibility and background risk in explaining the tax-evasion results, we find evidence
that future labor income has a large negative background-risk effect and a relatively
small positive flexibility effect. Our finding that future labor income affects current
risk exposure while evasion does not is consistent with existing empirical evidence. For
example, our evasion result is similar to that of Klos (2004) who finds that having a future
investment opportunity has no effect on current risk exposure. Similarly, the labor supply
result is consistent with Gakidis (1997) who finds that individuals with unpredictable
future labor income have lower risk exposure, and Benitez-Silva (2002) who finds that
labor-income flexibility increases risk exposure.
A seemingly alternative explanation for our results in the original labor treatment is
income targeting. If subjects begin the experiment with a certain target income in mind,
then having an extra labor task would allow them to achieve that target with lower
investment risk. However, this explanation is inconsistent with the findings in the addi-
tional labor treatment where background risk is removed from the future labor income.
Income targeting would imply an even lower level of risk exposure when background risk
is removed. Instead, we find that risk exposure increases. If income targeting was the
explanation, risk exposure would also be lower in the full treatment, relative to the base-
line, because subjects in the full treatment have access to the same labor opportunity
as subjects in the labor treatment. However, risk exposure in the full treatments is not
statistically different from that of the baseline group.
An interesting question raised by our results, is why does the source of circumstances
matter? The existing theoretical literature seems to be mute on this question, and we do
not explore it further here.24
2.5.3 Internal Validity
The results described above are based on data generated in a one-shot experiment using a
between-subject design and six randomly determined groups that are identical except for
24Although we find this question interesting, addressing it requires additional design features that take
us away from the central research question of this paper. We therefore view this question as somewhat
outside the scope of the specific objective of this study, and believe it is best pursued in future work.
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treatment status. Descriptive statistics of observable characteristics show that the groups
are balanced along observables. This suggests that randomization into groups worked,
which is crucial for identification in between-subject designed experiments (Charness,
Gneezy, and Kuhn 2012). Additionally, the experimental instructions for the different
treatment groups were identical in every aspect except for the opportunity to respond to
the lottery. Since investment decisions in all groups are made before subjects proceed to
the adjustment stage, any differences in the outcome variable of interest, risk exposure,
between groups are only driven by the knowledge about and anticipation of future (ex-
post) adjustment possibilities. The number of participants in the experiment is relatively
large and we are able to rely on 30 to 45 independent observations per group because
there is no interaction among participants. We find no evidence that the experimental de-
sign choices and parameterization induced extreme behaviors that conflict with standard
theoretical modeling approaches. For example, the lottery outcomes are not clustered
on extremes (0 or 1), which suggests that the resulting distribution of investment shares
supports the theoretical modeling of an interior solution. Furthermore, labor supply is
strictly positive but not statistically different across treatments. Additionally, the labor
task yielded sufficient variation to support the idea of labor-income background risk.
2.6 Conclusion
While the literature acknowledges that circumstances are likely to affect investment out-
comes, there is little empirical evidence on these relationships. Using a laboratory ex-
periment, we examine if individuals who have the opportunity to (ex-post) respond to
lottery outcomes through evasion and/or labor supply show different (ex-ante) risk ex-
posure than individuals without any response opportunities. The experimental results
show that circumstances matter, but different circumstances can have different effects.
While the opportunity to earn extra labor income affects risk-taking, there is no evidence
that access to evasion alone has an effect, at least not in a statistically significant way.
However, we find evidence of fairly large interaction effects. Relative to subjects with
only future labor income opportunities, subjects with both labor-income and evasion op-
portunities take more risks if labor income is accompanied by background risk and less
risk if labor income is certain.
We identify the channels behind the circumstantial labor effect and find that risk-
taking increases in the presence of income flexibility and decreases in the presence of
background risk. Furthermore, the background-risk effect is much larger than the flexi-
bility effect. This allows us to comment on (Gollier and Zeckhauser, 2002, p. 201) who
state: “The critical question is when can the flexibility effect be assured to overcome (be
weaker than) a potential negative background risk effect.” In our setting, we conclude
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that the flexibility effect is not strong enough to overcome a negative background-risk
effect.
These results contribute one possible answer to questions relating to the lower-
than-expected stock market exposure of individuals. We find that heterogeneous access
to additional labor income, tax-evasion opportunities and their interaction play a non-
trivial role in determining risk exposure. In addition to contributing to the finance
literature on portfolio choice, the paper also speaks to the literatures on tax evasion and
labor economics. While heterogeneous access to tax evasion has been shown to affect
labor-supply elasticities with respect to taxes, income distribution and social welfare, we
know of no other study that examines the effect of tax evasion on current risk exposure.
Our results also provide insights into the possible effect of the current gradual shift
towards greater flexibility in labor markets – e.g., flexi-week work schedules and work-
from-home initiatives – on risk exposure. We find that risk exposure is likely to decrease
if the added flexibility is accompanied by greater income background risk. Additionally,
we explicitly account for any possible interaction effects between labor-supply and evasion
opportunities in our empirical design. Understanding these interaction effects is especially
important given that labor-income flexibility and background risk are often bundled with
tax-evasion opportunities (e.g., among the self-employed). We are also able to speak to
the possible implications of the increased scrutiny of offshore accounts aimed at reducing
tax-evasion opportunities among high-income individuals. Our results suggest that risk-
taking is not hampered by such a change in tax-compliance policy. Therefore, this change
may lead to higher tax revenues without reducing risk-taking in society.
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Appendices
2.A Screens in the Lab Experiment
Notes: Screen showing the slider task which was designed by Gill and Prowse
(2012). In the displayed screen, the subject positioned four sliders correctly
and four falsely. She currently works on positioning the ninth slider. 28 seconds
are left in this round.
Figure 2.A.3: Slider Task.
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Notes: Subjects decide how much of their labor earnings they want to invest
in the risky asset. Choices are confirmed by clicking “Next”.
Figure 2.A.4: Investment Decision.
Notes: Subjects decide how much of their gross income they want to report
for tax purposes. Choices are confirmed by clicking “Next”.
Figure 2.A.5: Evasion Decision.
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2.B Detailed Regression Results
Table 2.B.4: Treatment Effects on Investment Behavior: OLS and Tobit Regressions.
Model (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Estimation OLS OLS Tobit Tobit
Labor -0.111∗∗ -0.102∗∗ -0.128∗∗ -0.114∗∗
(0.054) (0.051) (0.063) (0.057)
Evasion -0.007 -0.018 -0.016 -0.027
(0.060) (0.061) (0.071) (0.070)
Full -0.035 -0.041 -0.058 -0.062
(0.061) (0.058) (0.073) (0.069)
Age 0.009∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004)
Male 0.098∗∗ 0.108∗∗
(0.040) (0.047)
German -0.004 -0.012
(0.042) (0.046)
Tax Morale 0.004 0.004
(0.007) (0.008)
Risk (indiff.) 0.132 0.154
(0.087) (0.097)
Risk (seeking) 0.202∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.065)
Constant 0.381∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.213
(0.044) (0.118) (0.053) (0.144)
N 180 180 180 180
R2 0.028 0.176 0.030 0.219
OLS and two-censored (at 0 and 1) Tobit regressions based on equation (2.4.1) for the original
treatments. Dependent variable is the share of period-one labor income invested in the lottery.
Treatment effects are relative to the omitted control group without adjustment opportunities.
Subjects in the Labor and Evasion treatments had the opportunity to supply extra effort and
evade taxes, respectively. Full treatment indicates that both labor and evasion adjustments
were available. Subjects in the Baseline group had no adjustment opportunities. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Estimations (II) and (IV) include control variables. ∗< 0.10,
∗∗< 0.05, ∗∗∗< 0.01.
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2.C Original Instructions
The following pages display the instructions in German (original) and English (translated)
for the “Full Treatment” Group. The instructions for the other groups are the same but
exclude the parts which were not relevant for the respective group (these are available
upon request). The two sessions that eliminate any income variability (“Labor No Risk”
and “Full No Risk”) only change the paragraph regarding the second labor task. These
changes are reported in parentheses under the respective section in the instructions.
Instruktionen 
 
Herzlich willkommen und vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme an diesem Experiment. Bitte 
kommunizieren Sie ab sofort und bis zum Ende des Experimentes nicht mehr mit den anderen 
Teilnehmern. Sollten Sie sich nicht an diese Regel halten, müssen wir Sie von dem Experiment 
ausschließen. 
Wir bitten Sie, die Instruktionen sehr aufmerksam zu lesen. Wenn Sie nach dem Lesen oder während 
des Experiments noch Fragen haben, heben Sie bitte Ihre Hand. Einer der Experimentleiter wird dann 
zu Ihnen kommen und Ihre Frage persönlich beantworten. Ihre Auszahlung und Ihre Entscheidungen 
werden vertraulich behandelt. Keiner der anderen Teilnehmer erfährt während oder nach dem 
Experiment, welche Entscheidungen Sie getroffen haben oder wie hoch Ihre Auszahlung war. 
Sie können in diesem Experiment Geld verdienen. Wie viel Sie verdienen, hängt von Ihren 
Entscheidungen ab und wird nicht von den Entscheidungen anderer Teilnehmer beeinflusst. Ihre 
Auszahlungen werden im Laufe des Experimentes in virtuellen Geldeinheiten, den Experimental 
Currency Units (ECU), angegeben. 5 ECU entsprechen 1 EUR. Ihre Auszahlung wird nach dem 
Ende des Experimentes in Euro umgerechnet und in bar an Sie ausgezahlt. Zusätzlich erhalten Sie für 
Ihr Erscheinen eine Teilnahmepauschale in Höhe von 2,50 EUR. 
 
Das Experiment 
Überblick 
Das Experiment besteht aus einer Übungsrunde und einer Auszahlungsrunde. Sie können in der 
Übungsrunde kein Geld verdienen.  
Die Auszahlungsrunde hat vier Phasen: 
Phase 1 (Arbeitsaufgabe 1): Sie erledigen eine Arbeitsaufgabe und erhalten dafür, abhängig 
von Ihrer Leistung, Geldeinheiten.  
Phase 2 (Investitionsentscheidung): Sie können Ihr in Phase 1 verdientes Geld entweder in 
eine Anlage mit zufälliger Auszahlung investieren oder aufbewahren. Sie entscheiden in 
dieser zweiten Phase, wie viel Sie investieren möchten. 
Phase 3 (Arbeitsaufgabe 2): Sie wiederholen die Arbeitsaufgabe aus Phase 1 und erhalten 
dafür, abhängig von Ihrer Leistung, zusätzliche Geldeinheiten. 
Phase 4 (Steuererklärung): Auf Ihr gesamtes Einkommen aus den ersten drei Phasen fällt eine 
Steuer an. In dieser vierten Phase des Experiments geben Sie eine Steuererklärung ab.  
Die Übungsrunde zu Beginn des Experiments dient dazu, Sie mit der Arbeitsaufgabe vertraut zu 
machen und umfasst daher nur die Arbeitsaufgabe. Alle Phasen des Experiments werden im 
Folgenden ausführlicher erklärt. 
Phase 1: Arbeitsaufgabe 1 
Sie erledigen an Ihrem Bildschirm eine Arbeitsaufgabe mit Hilfe der Computermaus. Die 
Arbeitsaufgabe dauert 150 Sekunden. Während der Arbeitsaufgabe erscheint ein Bildschirm, auf dem 
48 sogenannte „Schieber“ zu sehen sind. Jeder Schieber ist zunächst auf „0“ (Null) positioniert und 
kann von Ihnen verschoben werden. Sie können den Schieber mit der Computermaus auf jede ganze 
Zahl zwischen „0“ und „100“ verschieben. Sie können jeden Schieber so oft verschieben, wie Sie 
möchten. Sie erhalten 2,50 ECU für jeden Schieber, den Sie innerhalb der 150 Sekunden exakt auf 
der Nummer „50“ positionieren. Oben rechts am Bildschirm können Sie während der 150 Sekunden 
immer ablesen, wie viele Schieber Sie aktuell auf „50“ positioniert haben. Zusätzlich zu Ihrer 
Bezahlung für die korrekt positionierten Schieber erhalten Sie eine fixe Ausstattung von 2,50 ECU. 
 
Phase 2: Investitionsentscheidung 
Sie haben die Wahl, einen Teil Ihres Geldes oder Ihr gesamtes Geld, welches Sie in Phase 1 verdient 
haben, aufzubewahren oder zu investieren. Das aufbewahrte Geld steht Ihnen unverändert im weiteren 
Verlauf des Experiments zur Verfügung. Durch Investieren können Sie zusätzliches Geld gewinnen 
oder einen Teil Ihres Geldes verlieren. Das Geld, das Sie investieren, wird entweder verdoppelt oder 
halbiert. Beide Ergebnisse sind gleich wahrscheinlich.  
Nachdem Sie entschieden haben, wie viel Sie investieren möchten, wird ein Experimentator an Ihren 
Platz kommen und einen 10-seitigen Würfel mitbringen. Der Experimentator wird an Ihrem Platz 
auswürfeln, ob Ihr investiertes Geld verdoppelt oder halbiert wird. Zeigt der 10-seitige Würfel eine 
Zahl zwischen 1 und 5 (also 1, 2, 3, 4 oder 5), dann wird Ihre Investition halbiert. Wird eine Zahl 
zwischen 6 und 10 geworfen (also 6, 7, 8, 9 oder 10), dann wird Ihre Investition verdoppelt. 
Ihr Einkommen, das Ihnen im weiteren Verlauf des Experiments zur Verfügung steht, besteht also aus 
dem aufbewahrten Betrag zuzüglich des entweder verdoppelten oder halbierten Investitionsbetrags. 
Somit gilt abhängig vom Würfelergebnis für Ihr Einkommen: 
- Würfel zeigt eine Zahl zwischen 1 und 5:  
Einkommen = Aufbewahrt + (0,5 x Investition) 
- Würfel zeigt eine Zahl zwischen 6 und 10:  
Einkommen = Aufbewahrt + (2 x Investition) 
 
Phase 3: Arbeitsaufgabe 2 
Das Investitionsergebnis wird bestimmt und auf ihrem Bildschirm angezeigt. Sie erledigen danach die 
gleiche Arbeitsaufgabe wie in Phase 1. Diesmal erhalten Sie jedoch keinen zusätzlichen Fixbetrag. 
Außerdem dauert diese zweite Arbeitsaufgabe 90 Sekunden. Das Geld, das Sie in dieser 
Arbeitsaufgabe verdienen, wird zu Ihrem bisherigen Geld hinzuaddiert. 
[ (No-Risk Treatments) Das Investitionsergebnis wird bestimmt und auf ihrem Bildschirm angezeigt. 
Sie erledigen danach die gleiche Arbeitsaufgabe wie in Phase 1. Diesmal erhalten Sie jedoch keinen 
zusätzlichen Fixbetrag. Außerdem hat diese zweite Arbeitsaufgabe keine Zeitbeschränkung. Bevor die 
zweite Arbeitsaufgabe startet, wählen Sie die Anzahl an Schiebern, die Sie korrekt positionieren 
möchten. Das Maximum, das Sie auswählen können ist 15. Die zweite Arbeitsaufgabe endet 
automatisch, sobald Sie die von Ihnen ausgewählte Anzahl an Schiebern korrekt positioniert haben. 
Das Geld, das Sie in dieser Arbeitsaufgabe verdienen, wird zu Ihrem bisherigen Geld hinzuaddiert. ] 
 
Phase 4: Steuererklärung 
Ihnen wird zunächst Ihr gesamtes aktuelles Einkommen angezeigt. Dieses Einkommen bildet Ihr 
Bruttoeinkommen, auf das eine Steuer von 30% fällig wird. 
Sie sind nun aufgefordert, eine Steuererklärungsentscheidung zu treffen. Dazu benennen Sie einen 
Betrag, der mit dem Steuersatz von 30% besteuert werden soll. Dieser genannte Betrag kann zwischen 
Null und der Höhe Ihres gesamten Bruttoeinkommens liegen. 
Nachdem Sie Ihre Steuererklärungsentscheidung getroffen haben, warten Sie bitte bis einer der 
Experimentatoren an Ihren Platz kommt. Der Experimentator wird einen 10-seitigen Würfel 
mitbringen und an Ihrem Platz werfen.  
Basierend auf dem Ergebnis des Würfelwurfs ergibt sich eines der zwei folgenden Szenarien für Ihr 
Nettoeinkommen, das Ihnen am Ende des Experiments zusammen mit der Teilnahmepauschale 
ausgezahlt wird: 
Szenario a) Der Würfel zeigt eine Zahl zwischen 2 und 10: 
Es wird nicht überprüft, ob Sie in Ihrer Steuererklärungsentscheidung Ihr Bruttoeinkommen 
vollständig angezeigt haben. Ihre Auszahlung (das Nettoeinkommen) setzt sich in diesem Fall aus dem 
Bruttoeinkommen abzüglich der Steuerzahlung zusammen. Dabei ist die Steuerzahlung der Betrag, 
den Sie in der Steuererklärung angegeben haben, multipliziert mit dem Steuersatz von 30%. Also:  
     Nettoeinkommen = Bruttoeinkommen – (angegebener Betrag x 0,30) 
Szenario b)  Der Würfel zeigt die Zahl 1: 
Es wird überprüft, ob Sie in der Steuererklärung Ihr vollständiges Bruttoeinkommen angegeben haben. 
Abhängig von Ihrer vorher getroffenen Steuererklärungsentscheidung, gibt es in diesem Fall für Ihr 
Nettoeinkommen zwei Möglichkeiten: 
- Ist der von Ihnen in der Steuererklärung angegebene Betrag gleich Ihrem gesamten 
Bruttoeinkommen, dann setzt sich Ihr Nettoeinkommen aus dem Bruttoeinkommen minus 
der Steuerverbindlichkeit zusammen. Also:  
                     Nettoeinkommen = Bruttoeinkommen – (Bruttoeinkommen x 0,30) 
- Ist der von Ihnen in der Steuererklärung angegebene Betrag niedriger als Ihr gesamtes 
Bruttoeinkommen, dann müssen Sie die volle Steuerzahlung basierend auf Ihrem 
gesamten Bruttoeinkommen zahlen. Außerdem fällt eine Extrazahlung an. Diese 
Extrazahlung errechnet sich durch den von Ihnen nicht angegebenen Betrag multipliziert 
mit dem Steuersatz von 30%. Also: 
 Nettoeinkommen = Bruttoeinkommen – (Bruttoeinkommen x 0,30)  
                                                                         – [ (Bruttoeinkommen – angegebener Betrag) x 0,30] 
 
Es besteht also eine Wahrscheinlichkeit von 10%, dass Ihre Steuererklärungsentscheidung überprüft 
wird. Dem Experimentator ist es selbstverständlich nicht möglich, einzusehen, ob Sie Ihr 
Bruttoeinkommen in voller Höhe angegeben haben oder nicht.  
Die von allen Teilnehmern insgesamt geleisteten Steuerzahlungen werden an die Verwaltung der 
Stadt Köln als Spende überwiesen. Ein Nachweis über die Gesamtspende wird Ihnen im Laufe der 
nächsten Wochen per Email zugeschickt. 
 
Schlussbemerkungen 
Am Ende des Experiments bitten wir Sie, einen kurzen Fragebogen auszufüllen während wir die 
Auszahlungen vorbereiten. Alle dort angegebenen Informationen, sowie alle während dieses 
Experiments erhobenen Daten, werden selbstverständlich anonymisiert und ausschließlich für 
wissenschaftliche Zwecke verwendet. 
Instructions 
 
 
Welcome and thank you for participating in our experiment. From now on until the end of the experiment, 
please refrain from communicating with other participants. If you do not abide by this rule, we will have to 
exclude you from the experiment. 
We kindly ask you to read the instructions thoroughly. If you have any questions after reading the instructions 
or during the experiment, please raise your hand. One of the instructors will then come to you and answer 
your question in person. Your payment and your decisions throughout the experiment will be treated 
confidentially. None of the other participants is informed, neither during nor after the experiment, about your 
decisions in the experiment or your payment. 
You can earn money in this experiment. How much you earn depends on your decisions and is not affected by 
the decisions of other participants. During the experiment, your payments will be calculated in a virtual 
currency: Experimental Currency Units (ECU). 5 ECU corresponds to 1 EUR. After the experiment, your 
pay-off will be converted to Euro and given to you in cash. Additionally, you will receive a show-up fee of 
2.50 EUR. 
 
 
 
The Experiment 
 
Overview 
 
The experiment consists of one practice round and one payoff round. You cannot earn money in the practice 
round. 
The payoff round has four stages. 
 
Stage 1 (Labor Task 1): You will complete a labor task and, depending on your performance, earn 
money from this labor task. 
Stage 2 (Investment Decision): You can either invest the money that you earned in stage 1 in an asset 
with a random payoff or store it. You decide in this second stage, how much you want to invest. 
Stage 3  (Labor Task  2):  You will  repeat the labor task  from  stage  1  and,  depending  on your 
performance, earn additional money from this labor task. 
Stage 4 (Tax Declaration): You will have to pay taxes on your total income from the first three stages. 
In this fourth stage, you have to file a tax declaration. 
The practice round at the beginning of the experiment is meant to acquaint yourself with the labor task and, 
hence, only involves the labor task. All stages of the experiment will be explained in more detail below. 
 
  
Stage 1: Labor Task 1 
 
You undertake a labor task on the computer screen using the computer mouse. The task will last 150 seconds. 
During the task a screen with 48 so-called “sliders” appears on the screen. Each slider is initially positioned at 
“0” (Zero) and can be moved by you. You can move the slider to every integer between “0” and “100” via the 
computer mouse. You can readjust the position of each slider as many times as you wish. For each slider that 
you position exactly at the number “50” during the 150 seconds, you earn 2.50 ECU. During the 150 seconds of 
the labor task, on the upper right of the screen you are shown how many sliders you have currently positioned at 
“50”. In addition to your result for the correctly positioned sliders, you receive an additional fixed endowment of 
2.50 ECU. 
 
 
Stage 2: Investment Decision 
 
You will be given the choice to store or invest some or all of the money that you earned in stage 1. The money 
that you store will be available unchanged in the future course of the experiment. By investing, you can gain 
additional money or lose some of your money. The money that you invest will be either doubled or halved. 
Both outcomes are equally likely. 
After you have decided how much to invest, an experimenter will come to your booth and bring a 10-sided 
die. At your booth, the experimenter will roll the die to decide if your invested money is doubled or halved. If 
the 10-sided die shows a number between 1 and 5 (i.e., 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5), then your investment will be halved. If 
it shows a number between 6 and 10 (i.e., 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10), then your investment will be doubled. 
Your income that will be available in the future course of the experiment hence consists of the stored amount 
plus the, either halved or doubled, investment amount. Hence, depending on the die roll, your income is: 
- Die shows a number between 1 and 5: 
Income = Stored + (0.5 x Investment) 
- Die shows a number between 6 and 10: 
Income = Stored + (2 x Investment) 
 
 
Stage 3: Labor Task 2 
 
The investment outcome will be determined and displayed on your computer screen. You will then undertake 
the same labor task as in stage 1. However, you will not receive an additional fixed amount this time. In 
addition, this second labor task lasts 90 seconds. The money that you earn in this labor task will be added to 
the money that you have earned so far. 
 
[ (No-Risk Treatments) The investment outcome will be determined and displayed on your computer screen. 
You will then undertake the same labor task as in stage 1. However, you will not receive an additional fixed 
amount this time. In addition, this second labor task has no time constraint. Instead, before the start of the 
second labor task, you choose the number of sliders that you want to position correctly. The maximum number 
of sliders you can choose is 15. The slider task ends automatically once you have reached the chosen number of 
correctly positioned sliders. The money that you earn in this labor task will be added to the money that you 
have earned so far. ] 
Stage 4: Tax Declaration 
 
You will first be shown your full current income. This income is your gross income which is subject to tax of 
30%. 
You will now be asked to make a tax-declaration decision. To make this decision, you specify an amount 
which will be taxed at the tax rate of 30%. This reported amount can be between zero and your full gross 
income. 
After you have completed the tax-declaration decision, please wait until one of the experimenters comes up to 
your booth. The experimenter will bring a 10-sided die and roll it at your booth. 
Depending on the outcome of the die roll, you will face one of the following two scenarios regarding 
your net income which will be paid to you, along with the show-up fee, at the end of the experiment. 
Scenario a) The die shows a number between 2 and 10: 
 
Your tax-declaration decision will not be checked to determine whether you specified your full gross income. 
Your payment (the net income), in this case, consists of your gross income less the tax payment. The tax 
payment is the amount that you reported multiplied with the tax rate of 30%. Hence: 
 Net Income = Gross Income – (Reported Amount x 0.30) 
 
Scenario b) The die shows the number 1: 
 
Your tax-declaration decision will be checked to determine whether you reported your full gross income. 
Depending on your previous tax-declaration decision, there are two possibilities for your net income: 
- If your reported income equals your full gross income, then your net income consists of your 
gross income less your tax liability. Hence: 
 Net Income = Gross Income – (Gross Income x 0.30) 
 
- If your reported income is lower than your full gross income, then you will have to pay the full tax 
liability based on your full gross income. In addition, you have to pay an extra amount. This extra 
amount is equal to the income that you did not report multiplied by the tax rate of 30%. Hence: 
 Net Income = Gross Income – (Gross Income * 0.30) 
 
– [(Gross Income – Reported Income) x 0.30] 
 
Hence, there is a 10% probability that your tax-declaration decision will be checked. The experimenter who 
comes up to your booth with the die, of course, cannot see whether or not you reported your full gross income. 
The total generated tax payments from all participants will be donated to the administration of the City of 
Cologne. A verification of the total donation will be sent to you via e-mail within the next weeks. 
 
 
Final Remarks 
 
At the end of the experiment, you will be asked to complete a short questionnaire while we prepare the 
payments. All information collected through this questionnaire, just like all data gathered during the 
experiment, are anonymous and exclusively used for scientific purposes. 
Chapter 3
DYNAMIC ON-THE-SPOT CONSUMPTION AND
PORTFOLIO CHOICE IN THE LAB
3.1 Introduction
Individual preferences determine how people allocate wealth and plan consumption be-
tween different points in time and over different states of the world. Such consumption
and investment decisions determine the accumulation of capital in a society and are thus
basic factors for economic growth. They are further important for the design of fiscal
policy such as taxation and retirement plans and monetary policy such as interest rate
determination. In the macroeconomic and finance literature following Samuelson (1937;
1969), standard preferences assume that agents (i) draw utility only from consumption,
(ii) have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), and (iii) have constant discount rates
and are thus time-consistent. This preference specification is however inconsistent with
several empirical stylized facts about consumption and portfolio choice such as stock mar-
ket non-participation, high equity risk premia, and the time variation of portfolio and
consumption decisions, specifically in reaction to wealth shocks.1
We design a laboratory experiment that replicates the structure of life-cycle con-
sumption models and utilizes a real consumption good. Our experiment consists of four
consumption and investment periods. In the first period, subjects are endowed with
initial experimental wealth. Consumption corresponds to the purchase of internet time.
While subjects surf the web, they do not have to perform an alternative task which cor-
responds to the monotone closing of pop-up windows. However, subjects need to start
doing this dull task once they have consumed the internet time they purchased in the
current period. Moreover, subjects decide how much experimental wealth to invest in a
risky asset or store safely for consumption in future periods. The investment outcome
generates fluctuations in wealth. In the very last period, subjects automatically consume
all remaining wealth.
The experiment distinguishes allocation plans to which subjects wish to pre-commit
to ex-ante from those that subjects actually chose on-the-fly. For this, subjects first face
a pre-commitment stage and subsequently an allocation-and-consumption stage. In the
pre-commitment stage, subjects have to make a consumption and portfolio plan for every
possible contingency, i.e., they fill out a decision tree that captures all possible paths of
1See for example Heaton and Lucas (1997); Odean (1998); Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007);
Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010); Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002).
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the experiment. Then, we randomly determine whether this initial plan is binding for
each subject in the second stage. If it is binding, a subject has to follow his or her plan.
In this case, we say that a subject is pre-committed (PC). If it is not binding, subjects
have to allocate their initial wealth anew in every period of the second stage. In this
case, we say that a subject is non-pre-committed (NPC).
We use this novel design to explore the following research questions: (i) Do changes
in wealth change consumption and investment behavior? (ii) Does behavior differ from
a possible pre-committed allocation? These question are important for various reasons.
The correlation of consumption with the business cycle determines the impact of counter-
cyclical fiscal policies such as tax rebates and transfer payments. If people massively cut
back their consumption, e.g., in a recession, more extreme measures might be necessary
than if consumption response is sluggish. Furthermore, understanding the changes in
societal risk exposure is important to propose effective and efficient monetary policies
such as the level of interest rates or fiscal policies such as stimulation of entrepreneurship
and self-employment incentives. Regarding the second research question, it is important
to understand the necessity and role of commitment devices for the design of retirement
plans and the decision about mandatory or voluntary enrollment. A recent trend in social
and corporate retirement plans across the US and Europe is directed to grant individuals
more control and responsibility (Mitchell and Utkus 2006). However, time-inconsistent
behavior and the sub-optimal reaction to wealth fluctuations might prevent people from
achieving sufficient retirement provision.
We contribute to the financial and macroeconomic literature in the following ways.
Our main contribution is the design of a joint consumption and portfolio-choice setting
with real on-the-spot consumption rather than monetary payoffs. Such a design closely
mimics the theoretical modeling of life-cycle problems. We use our design to test the
predictions of the workhorse model of Samuelson (1969). Hence, we are the first to analyze
consumption and portfolio decisions with an actual time structure of real consumption
flows. Further, we are not aware of any experimental study that assesses the impact of
wealth changes on consumption choices under pre-commitment. Hence, we are also the
first to analyze the endogenous formation of life-cycle consumption and investment plans
and explore if and how subjects deviate from such an ex-ante plan. Our experiment
provides a controlled testing ground for theories on dynamic allocation problems and the
analysis of policy interventions concerning, e.g., taxation and retirement, which can easily
be implemented in the current design.
Samuelson (1937) established the idea that an agent maximizes the (expected)
discounted sum of future utilities. His assumption of constant discount rates has be-
come the standard modeling assumption in life-cycle models. Furthermore, Samuelson
(1969) augments this discounted-utility model and analyzes intertemporal consumption
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and portfolio decisions in discrete time using a functional form of utility with CRRA.
Under constant investment opportunities, Samuelson (1969) shows that the optimal con-
sumption share only depends on the remaining time horizon and is independent of the
investment outcome. Further, the optimal investment share is constant. Because the
agent is time-consistent, he has no positive demand for a commitment device. That is,
PC and NPC choices do not differ.
Our results are generally consistent with the model of Samuelson (1969). We find
that standard preferences are a good predictor for consumption and investment behavior if
subjects are not committed to an ex-ante plan (NPC). We find no indication that subjects
plan to systematically vary their investment behavior under PC with variations in wealth.
This also holds for NPC choices which is in line with the results in Brunnermeier and Nagel
(2008). In addition, subjects do not significantly vary their investment share over time.
We observe two inconsistencies with standard preferences for consumption. Under pre-
commitment (PC), subjects plan to vary their consumption share with changes in wealth
due to the investment outcome. In particular, subjects plan to increase consumption
in case of a bad investment outcome. Comparing PC and NPC choices, we observe no
difference for the investment share but significant underconsumption relative to the ex-
ante plan. However, underconsumption is not robust against the inclusion of controls
in parametric regressions. Finally, the post-experimental questionnaire confirms the use
of internet as a real consumption good as subjects indicate a positive willingness to pay
even after three hours of experimentation.
We discuss to what extent the deviations from standard preferences can be explained
by two prominent non-standard preference specifications: (i) external-habit preferences
and (ii) expectations-based reference-dependent preferences. Both specifications incorpo-
rate reference points into total current utility and predict that choice variables vary with
changes in wealth. External-habit preferences specify that the reference point is a level
of consumption that the agent must not fall short of (Constantinides 1990; Munk 2008;
Brunnermeier and Nagel 2008). Expectations-based reference dependence specifies that
the reference point is the agent’s rational belief about consumption streams (Ko¨szegi and
Rabin 2006; 2007; 2009; Pagel 2012; 2014). While the subjects’ plan to vary consumption
with the investment outcome under PC is consistent with expectations-based reference
dependence, the difference in commitment can be explained by external habits under the
identifying assumptions that subjects are naive and do not anticipate the formation of
habits (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin 2003; Acland and Levy 2013). However,
both non-standard preference specifications make several other predictions for which we
find no evidence. Hence, we conclude that standard preferences are the best predictor in
our setting.
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The use of real consumption in a life-cycle context has several advantages compared
to analyzing our research questions with observational data. The difference between
theoretical implications and empirical observations can be due to market frictions such as
participation, rebalancing, and monitoring costs or because of non-standard preferences
that rationalize the observed behavior as a result of optimal choices in a discounted
expected-utility framework or a combination of frictions and preferences. In addition,
empirical data sets on individual consumption and portfolio decisions are usually based
on survey data which feature severe measurement and aggregation problems, e.g., in the
definition of consumption and wealth shocks (Campbell and Deaton 1989). The controlled
setting of a laboratory experiment, however, can account for these problems by specifying
the economic environment and exactly observing individual decisions.
Empirically, preferences are typically evaluated using two major data sets: The
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
The CEX is a primary source in the empirical life-cycle consumption literature and con-
sists of two surveys which include consumption information of American consumers, data
on their expenditures and income as well as household characteristics collected by the
U.S. Census Bureau.2 The PSID is a longitudinal household survey used in empirical re-
search on investment behavior but also in the life-cycle consumption and portfolio-choice
literature.3 However, both of these data sets have flaws that impair a clear identification
of the response of consumption and investment behavior to wealth fluctuations. First,
the CEX is no panel but a repeated cross-sectional survey without detailed financial in-
formation. Second, the PSID only has coarse consumption measures that aggregate a
wide range of consumption expenditures. Of course, neither of these data sets allows to
analyze the difference in commitment.
We are not aware of any other study that analyzes both consumption and portfolio
decisions with real consumption. Previous research typically focuses on these two deci-
sions in isolation. Furthermore, the use of real consumption goods in dynamic decisions
is also rare as most experiments use monetary incentives and pay off only at the very
end of the experiment.4 A noteworthy exception is Brown, Chua, and Camerer (2009)
who investigate life-cycle consumption with habit formation by utilizing beverages as
incentives. In one condition, subjects receive the beverage in the same period in which
2See http://www.bls.gov/cex.
3See http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu.
4Experiments analyzing consumption choices with monetary incentives include, for example, Kot-
likoff, Samuelson, and Johnson (1988); Anderhub et al. (2000); Mattei (2000); Fe´vrier and Visser (2004)
and Luhan, Roos, and Scharler (2011). Regarding investment choices, much work has been done on test-
ing the portfolio-choice assumptions underlying asset pricing models (Kroll, Levy, and Rapoport 1988a,b;
Kroll and Levy 1992; Bossaerts, Plott, and Zame 2007), analyzing the effects of ambiguity aversion on
portfolio composition (Charness and Gneezy 2010; Bossaerts et al. 2010; Ahn et al. 2011), or introducing
background risk (Klos and Weber 2006).
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they make a decision, while in another condition they receive the beverage in some fu-
ture period. Consistent with hyperbolic discounting, subjects in the immediate condition
overconsume relative to the delayed condition.5
Augenblick, Niederle, and Sprenger (2013) provide further evidence for time-incon-
sistent behavior under real effort. They analyze both monetary and real-effort choices in
a longitudinal experiment. Subjects have to complete a number of tasks over the course
of seven weeks and can choose when to conduct these tasks. Besides providing real effort,
subjects also have to decide how much work they want to complete at some adjacent
future dates. In a within-subject design, subjects additionally allocate money across
different sooner-and-later options. Augenblick, Niederle, and Sprenger (2013) find that
subjects show little present bias under monetary incentives but a considerable present
bias under real effort. Subjects actually reallocate “unpleasant consumption” (real effort)
to the future instead of doing it today as intended in their initial allocation. Subjects
were also offered a probabilistic commitment device that provides commitment with a
certain probability as in our design. Augenblick, Niederle, and Sprenger (2013) report
that subjects generally show no willingness to pay for commitment.
Houser et al. (2010) propose a design closely related to ours. They test whether
subjects are willing to pay for a commitment device that excludes a tempting alternative
from their choice set. Temptation consists of frequently offering subjects to abandon a
boring task (counting numbers) and to surf the internet instead. When such a tempting
choice screen appears, subjects can either continue counting, stop counting completely
and surf the internet (and therewith forfeit a high payoff), or pay to get rid of the choice
screen completely and therewith commit to the counting task. They find that a significant
number of subjects is willing to pay to eliminate the temptation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the economic envi-
ronment and our experimental implementation. Subsequently, we present the predictions
based on standard preferences in Section 3.3. We then present our results (Section 3.4)
and discuss the two non-standard preference specifications as alternative explanations
(Section 3.5). Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Experiment
We first present our implementation of a multi-period allocation problem with real con-
sumption. We vary the commitment type within-subject to test our predictions on the
difference between PC and NPC choices.
5Sippel (1997) also uses on-the-spot consumption to analyze subjects’ choices from a variety of
consumption bundles to be consumed in the laboratory as an alternative to sit around and do nothing.
Under the variation of prices and income, subjects frequently violate revealed-preference axioms, hence
contradicting the standard model of utility maximization.
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3.2.1 Dynamic Allocation with Real Consumption
Consumption. Life-cycle models are based on utility flows from consumption over mul-
tiple periods. Experimental studies generally proxy consumption via monetary payoffs.
Such payoffs are, however, inappropriate to distinguish different preference theories of
intertemporal consumption choice. This is because standard experimental payment pro-
cedures do not have an intertemporal structure, i.e., they do not pay out at different
points in time over the course of the experiment. Usually, monetary earnings are either
accumulated over all rounds or one round is randomly determined for payment. Both
these procedures pay off at the very end of the experiment. Hence, money has to be
converted into consumption after the completion of the experiment thus only resembling
utility from terminal wealth. We therefore allow for real consumption of an actually con-
sumable good. In addition, we wanted consumption to be on-the-spot, i.e., in the actual
period for which a decision applies. Our experiment consists of four such periods and
hence allows for real utility flows from consumption over time.
Subjects earn a fixed payment and are endowed with an initial wealth of an exper-
imental currency simply named points. They decide each period how much experimental
wealth to consume in that period or to save for consumption in future periods. Specif-
ically, we implement real consumption as follows. There are two alternatives on how
subjects can spent their time in the lab: either they (i) perform a monotone clicking task
or they (ii) surf the internet instead.6 For the clicking task, subjects have to close pop-up
windows that appear randomly at random positions on their computer screen. When and
where a window appears is independent across subjects. On appearance, subjects have
ten seconds to click on a button to close the pop-up. If a subject does not close the pop-up,
it will disappear automatically creating convex costs for this subject.7 The clicking task
is designed to bore subjects and to render surfing the internet as more pleasurable.8 Be-
cause the clicking task only controls subjects attention outside the consumption phase,
we do not want it to interfere with the life-cycle decisions. Hence, we incentivize the
clicking task with money and not with additional consumption consequences by adding
or subtracting points.
Utility. Dynamic consumption models require a certain concavity of the utility
function to induce a preference for consumption smoothing. Following Smith (1976),
6The instructions made clear that we were neither tracking their online behavior nor saving passwords
etc.
7The random appearance (both time and location) of the pop-ups ensures that subjects focus on
the computer screen during the whole experiment. The clicking task is thus basically a pure disciplining
mechanism. Without this task, subjects could just decide to take the otherwise fixed payoff and do
nothing (e.g., sleep). Hence, the clicking task enforces that subjects, in a sense, actively do nothing.
8Comments in the post-experimental questionnaire confirm that subjects perceived this task as ex-
tremely unchallenging and boring.
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it is standard in consumption experiments to induce the period utility function exoge-
nously (e.g., Fehr and Zych 1998; Ballinger, Palumbo, and Wilcox 2003; Brown, Chua,
and Camerer 2009; Carbone and Duffy 2014).9 We follow the literature and implement
concavity by transforming points into internet time according to
Internet Time [Sec.] = f(Points) = k0 − k1/(Points + )θˆ (3.2.1)
with risk-aversion parameter θˆ = 0.1. Scaling factors are k0 = k1 = 2400 and we bound
the utility function from below with  = 1. Without  > 0, the transformation function
would be unbounded from below for θˆ > 0 whenever Ct = 0.
10 Ballinger, Palumbo,
and Wilcox (2003) and Brown, Chua, and Camerer (2009) both use θˆ = 3 and  = 2.7.
However, in our experiment, a too concave utility function would result in too little
variation in outcomes, i.e., seconds to spend online.
Investment. Subjects can save wealth by keeping it in a risk-free asset or investing
it in a risky asset. The risk-free asset yields the gross return Rf = 1 and the risky asset’s
gross return is binary with equal probability to either triple the invested points, Rt = 3,
or dividing them by three, Rt = 1/3. These investment opportunities are constant
throughout the experiment.
Closed Life-Cycle Design. All remaining wealth is automatically transformed
into internet time in the very last period. This is done because subjects may hold an
ex-ante payoff target when participating in an experiment. This may serve as a reference
point from the mere participation in the experiment and run against the endogenous
expectations formed within the experiment and confound our results. We thus ensure
that the expectations which influence subjects’ decisions are formed within the exper-
iment. That is, we control subjects’ expectations regarding the experiment itself and
the monetary payments, respectively. We do so by disentangling monetary payments
from the consumption decisions. The instructions make very clear that points used for
consumption are of no value outside the lab.
3.2.2 The Course of the Experiment
The experiment consists of two parts. In the first part, subjects have to complete the
clicking task for ten minutes. This serves to familiarize them with the task and eliminate
choices out of curiosity in the second part. The second part consists of two stages: The
(2a) pre-commitment stage and the (2b) allocation-and-consumption stage. In each of
9Inducing utility depends on the requirements of monotonicity, salience, and dominance (Smith
1976). Monotonicity says that the real but unknown utility is strictly monotonically increasing in the
incentive (e.g., money or real consumption). Salience means that changes in the incentive stem from
subjects’ actions. Dominance says that changes in subjects’ utility come predominantly from changes in
the incentive.
10See Ballinger, Palumbo, and Wilcox (2003) for a discussion on the role of .
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these stages, subjects have to make decisions for a total of four periods of which each
is 19 minutes long.11 In the pre-commitment stage, subjects have to determine their
consumption and portfolio choices for the entire course of the experiment. It is randomly
determined whether the conditional plan is binding (PC) or not (NPC). In the allocation-
and-consumption stage, PC subjects follow their plan while NPC subjects decide anew
in each period how much to consume and how much to invest. In the following, the two
stages are described in more detail.
The Pre-Commitment Stage
In this initial stage, subjects determine their consumption and investment choices for
every possible contingency. We present a horizontal decision tree in which subjects have
to enter all choices conditional on the realization from the risky asset. We framed this
decision tree neutrally as point manager.
The point manager displays all four rounds and all possible paths resulting from
the investment outcome (see Figure 3.A.5). Choices during the experiment were input to
so called decision boxes (Figure 3.1). In the very first round, subjects are endowed with
an initial wealth of 75 points. Subject have to choose via scrollbars how many points to
transform into internet time and the percentage of remaining wealth to invest in the risky
asset. The remaining points are automatically stored and the resulting internet time is
automatically calculated and displayed according to the transformation function (3.2.1).
No initial values were displayed to avoid framing.12
The risky asset yields two possible paths in round two: Up (U) or Down (D). In
round three, there are four possible paths: (1, U, UU); (1, U, UD); (1, D, DU); and (1,
D, DD) where UU denotes Up Up, UD denotes Up Down etc. Hence, subjects have to
fill out seven decision boxes in total as period four involves no choice. In the following,
we abbreviate paths by their period-three realization, e.g., UD denotes the path (1, U,
UD) starting in period one, going up in period two (R2 = 3) and down in period three
(R3 = 1/3).
The point manager automatically enforces the budget constraint. In addition, the
point manager also updates the wealth at subsequent nodes depending on the investment
decision. If a subject changes a decision in an early decision box, the point manager
11We chose this length such that subjects had a real incentive to fill out the point manager as it may
be binding for 4 x 19 = 76 minutes. In addition, if we had chosen a period length of, e.g., 20 minutes,
subjects may have had the ten-minutes mark as a focal point for their decisions. Thus, we wanted to
make the “half time” less salient.
12Subjects were free to use the built-in computer calculator that is accessible in all decision screens
throughout the entire experiment.
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Notes: Depicted is the decision box used in the point manager to elicit choices
under pre-commitment (PC). The first line displays current wealth WPCt
(“starting wealth”) at the beginning of the period. In line two, subjects
choose their current level of consumption CPCt (“internet time”). The third
line displays the amount of transformed points needed to purchase the chosen
internet time (“transformed points”). Points are transformed according to
Points = (2400/(2400− internet time [sec.])10−1. The fourth line displays the
remaining wealth after consumption WPCt − CPCt (“end wealth”). In line
five, subjects choose their investment share αPCt (“investing”). The sixth
line displays the share kept in the risky asset 1− αPC (“storing”).
Figure 3.1: PC Decision Box.
resets wealth and internet time at later branches to emphasize the dynamic structure of
the decision problem and to prevent unintended changes at later nodes.13
At the end of the pre-commitment stage, after the point manager was completely
filled out and saved, we roll a die for each individual to determine whether the plan is
binding for the entire allocation-and-consumption stage. If a one comes up, the subject
is bound to his or her plan, i.e., pre-committed (PC). If a number between two and six
comes up, the subject is not bound to his or her plan, i.e., non-pre-committed (NPC).14
The Allocation-and-Consumption Stage
This stage consists of four consecutive periods. For the PC subjects, in each period, the
computer displays the conditional choice taken from their point manager. NPC subjects,
on the other hand, decide in each period anew, how much they want to consume. As in
the point manager, the computer transforms all remaining points into internet time for
the NPC subjects in period four.
PC Subjects. If subjects are pre-committed, the computer automatically displays
their choice made in the point manager conditional on the path that has been reached.
13Investment and storing shares were not reset as these are percentages of remaining wealth WPCt −
CPCt . However, their absolute values were, of course, also reset if the according wealth levels were reset.
14We framed pre-commitment (PC) by stating that the point manager “remains active”. We framed
non-pre-commitment (NPC) by stating that the point manager “has been deactivated”.
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The internet browser opens and closes automatically and the clicking task starts auto-
matically after the chosen internet time has been consumed.
NPC Subjects. If subjects are non-pre-committed, they decide anew, in each
period, how much they want to consume in that given period. First, at the beginning of
period t, NPC subjects see a choice box similar to the one used in the pre-commitment
stage but without internet time, transformed points or remaining wealth (see Figure
3.A.6). There, they choose their investment share αNPCt without knowing their remaining
wealth (WNPCt −CNPCt ) in that period because this will only be determined at the end of
the period. NPC subjects have an internet time “test calculator” on their decision screen
which transformed internet time into points. In addition, the instructions include a table
with several examples of time-point pairs.
Second, the internet browser opens and they can surf the internet. After they do
not want to consume internet time any more, they close the internet browser and press
a button to start the clicking task again.15 The time that they spent online corresponds
to CNPCt and is automatically transformed into points according to the transformation
function (3.2.1).16 After the period, subjects receive feedback about their allocation and
are shown the absolute amount invested, i.e., αNPCt (W
NPC
t − CNPCt ).
Feedback and Investment Outcomes. At the beginning of a new period, PC
and NPC subjects are both reminded of their previous-period allocation and the possible
(two) consequences from that decision. Then we determine the investment outcome for
each subject individually via a die roll. Subsequently, PC subjects are informed which
decision node has been reached and are displayed their according decision box from the
point manager while NPC subjects have to choose their investment share for the current
period anew as described before.
For all subjects, the internet browser was slightly shorter than full screen. This scal-
ing allowed the subjects to see the experiment screen in the background which displayed
a counter showing their current level of consumption, i.e., how much internet time has
already been consumed (see Figure 3.A.7).17 As in the PC stage, subjects hence choose
consumption Ct, i.e., internet time, directly. After the 19 minutes had passed, a notifica-
tion tells the subjects to wait for the start of the next period and for an experimenter to
realize their individual investment outcome via a die roll: if a number between one and
three comes up, the low outcome (Rt = 1/3) is realized and if a number between four
and six comes up, the high outcome (Rt = 3) is realized.
15 On the same screen where subjects choose their investment shares, a note reminded them how to
close the internet and start the clicking task.
16If a subject consumed all her wealth, the internet browser closed automatically.
17Tabbing and several other hotkeys had been disabled and the task bar has been hidden. Hence,
subjects did only see the internet browser and the experimental screen in the background.
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3.2.3 Procedural Details
The experiment has been conducted at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research
(CLER), University of Cologne, Germany.18 Subjects were recruited via the online re-
cruitment system ORSEE (Greiner 2004). Subjects could sign up on a first-come-first-
serve basis. In total, 60 subjects from all faculties participated. Neither content nor
expected payments were stated in the invitation e-mail. Decisions were inputs to an
interface computerized via z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). We utilized Mozilla Firefox as the
internet browser with a customized user profile.19 We conducted six sessions in October
2014. Each session lasted for around three hours including payment.
Upon entering the lab, subjects draw a number from an urn determining their com-
puter booth. A set of general instructions was already placed in each booth.20 It was not
possible for subjects to see each other’s computer screens. Each booth was equipped with
an air-cushion envelope. Subjects had to put their mobile phones and other electronic
devices (mp3 players etc.) into this envelope which was then sealed by an experimenter.
This ensured that subjects had no way to substitute the provided internet during the
experiment. In addition, subjects had to deposit their personal belongings (backpacks
etc.) behind them outside their computer booth. Each computer was equipped with a
pair of headphones.
Subsequently, subjects were informed that the experiment consisted of two parts
and received the instructions for part one. After the completion of part one, subjects
received the instructions for part two. At all stages of the experiment, subjects were
allowed as much time as they needed to familiarize themselves with the procedure of the
experiment, to ask questions, and make their choices. After all questions were answered
in private, subjects had to answer some control questions. Subsequently, part two started
with the pre-commitment stage followed by the allocation-and-consumption stage. After
the experiment, subject had to answer a questionnaire in which we elicited demographical
and attitudinal variables as well as a willingness-to-pay (WTP) measure for a hypothetical
additional period of experimentation. Subjects were paid in private. Payoffs consisted of
30 EUR from which the total costs accumulated from the clicking task were deducted.
In addition, subjects received a show-up fee of 2.50 EUR. All subjects received the full
32.50 EUR (approx. 41.39 USD at the time of the experiment).
18http://www.cler.uni-koeln.de.
19http://www.mozilla.org.
20Appendix 3.B contains instructions in both German (original) and English (translated).
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3.3 Theory: Standard Preferences
This section describes the benchmark prediction based on standard preferences and we
call an agent with standard preferences a standard agent. We define standard preferences
in the way that the agent derives utility from the absolute level of current consumption,
Ct, according to the power-utility function
u(Ct) =
C1−θt
1− θ , (3.3.1)
with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) of θ > 1. In addition, the standard agent
is time-consistent and discounts future utility exponentially with the discount factor
δ ∈ [0, 1). Thus, the agent has the same preferences about future plans at every point in
time.
Time is discrete and the agent lives for t = {1, . . . , T} periods and is endowed with
initial wealth W1 > 0. At period t, the agent’s wealth before consumption, is denoted
by Wt. Each period, the agent decides how much to consume out of his wealth and
how to save the remaining wealth, Wt − Ct. The agent has access to a risk-free asset
with gross return Rf > 0 and a risky asset with gross return Rt > 0 that is identically
and independently distributed across periods according to FR with EFRRt > R
f . These
investment opportunities are constant throughout the agent’s life. We will refer to the
realization of Rt as the investment outcome.
We denote the agent’s choice variables in relative terms, i.e., as consumption and
investment shares. The consumption share ρ ∈ [0, 1] is the ratio of absolute consumption
to current wealth and given by ρt := Ct/Wt. The investment share α ∈ [0, 1] is the amount
of remaining wealth that is invested in the risky asset and given by αt := It/(Wt − Ct)
where It ≥ 0 is the absolute amount invested. Hence, the agent’s portfolio (PF) gross
return in period t is a weighted average of the risk-free and the risky gross returns and
given by RPFt = αt−1(Rt−Rf ) +Rf where Rt−Rf is the excess return over the risk-free
rate. Accordingly, the agent’s intertemporal budget constraint at time t can be written
as
Wt+1 = (Wt − Ct)RPFt+1 =
(
Wt(1− ρt)
)
RPFt+1. (3.3.2)
Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1969) derive the optimal consumption and portfo-
lio share in discrete and continuous time, respectively. In each period t, the standard
agent maximizes his remaining life-time expected utility. He conditions his decision on
information available at time t, denoted by Ωt.
21 The associated indirect utility function
21The state variable Ωt contains all information available in period t. It does thus consist of the time
horizon, current wealth, and the (constant) investment opportunities: Ωt = (t, T,Wt, FR, R
f ). However,
current information does not include current or future choice variables because these are assumed to be
chosen optimally via backward induction, i.e., to maximize expected lifetime utility (Brandt 2010).
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given current wealth Wt and remaining horizon T − t conditional on information at time
t contained in the state variable Ωt reads:
Vt = max
{ρs,αs}T−1s=t
{
Et
[
u(Ct) +
T−t∑
τ=1
δτu(Ct+τ )
]}
(3.3.3)
with Ct = ρtWt and subject to the budget constraint (3.3.2), the no-bankruptcy require-
ment Ws ≥ 0 and terminal conditions ρT = 1 and αT = 0. Hence, there is no bequest
motive in this model.
Under CRRA utility, the choice variables are selected sequentially, i.e., the first-
order condition for the investment share αt is independent of the consumption share ρt
(Brandt 2010). Thus, the agent first derives the optimal investment share and subse-
quently derives the optimal consumption share given the investment share. In period t,
the first-order condition for the investment share is given by
Et
[(
αt(Rt+1 −Rf ) +Rf
)−θ
(Rt −Rf )
]
= 0. (3.3.4)
The investment share characterized by (3.3.4) is constant, i.e., αt ≡ α for every t =
1, . . . , T−1 (Samuelson 1969; Brunnermeier and Nagel 2008). Specifically, the investment
share does not depend on the investment outcome, i.e., ∂αt/∂Rt = 0. The reason for the
independence of wealth fluctuations induced by the realization of the investment outcome
is the homotheticity of the power-utility function. Hence, the investment outcome just
scales the agent’s wealth and thus changes the absolute amount invested but it has no
impact on the optimal investment share (Brandt 2010). The time invariance of αt stems
from the independent realization of the investment outcome across time, i.e., the constant
investment opportunities. This independence eliminates any hedging demand in the first-
order condition (3.3.4) which is thus identical to the one-period model.
Given the optimal investment share, the agent now derives the optimal consump-
tion share in period t. The first-order condition equalizes marginal utility from current
consumption and discounted expected marginal utility from the stream of future con-
sumption and yields
ρt =
1
1 + (ψt)
1
θ
(3.3.5)
with ψt = δEt
[
RPFt+1
(
(ρt+1)
1−θ + (1 − ρt+1)1−θψt+1
)]
.22 The function ψt is the expected
discounted value of future consumption flows and depends on period t, the investment
share αt, and future investment outcomes. Specifically, it does not depend on the current
investment outcome. Hence, ∂ρt/∂Rt = 0 for every t = 1, . . . , T − 1 and ρt varies with
time t only. Samuelson (1969) shows that ρt < ρt+1 < . . . < ρT = 1.
Because the standard agent is time-consistent, he is not willing to pay for a com-
mitment device. In particular, the agent would not benefit from such a device because
22See, for example, Pagel (2012).
58 3. CONSUMPTION AND PORTFOLIO CHOICE
neither his consumption nor his investment share differs from a possible pre-committed
contingency-based plan that he could form in some period t = 0. Furthermore, denote
the difference between NPC and PC choice variables by
∆ρt := ρ
NPC
t − ρPCt and ∆αt := αNPCt − αPCt . (3.3.6)
Hence, under standard preferences, it holds that ∆ρt = 0 and ∆αt = 0. Furthermore,
∂∆ρt/∂Rt = 0 and ∂∆αt/∂Rt = 0, i.e., the commitment difference does not depend on
the investment outcome.
3.4 Empirical Analysis
We begin with a more detailed description of the data set. Subsequently, we present
the results in the same order in which subjects made their decisions. First, we analyze
PC choices and subsequently evaluate NPC choices. Second, we compare PC and NPC
choices and differences in commitment.
3.4.1 Data and Descriptives
In total, N = 60 subjects participated in the experiment each making seven choices under
pre-commitment yielding 420 PC choices. N = 52 subjects were not committed to their
consumption and investment plans. These NPC subjects faced only one (realized) path
yielding three observed choices per subjects. However, one of the NPC subjects consumed
her entire wealth in period one.23 This leaves us with 154 NPC choices in total of which
102 are in reaction to realized investment outcomes (rounds two and three).24 Hence, for
the NPC choices, we have a micro-panel data set with a large cross-sectional dimension
(large N) and few time periods (small T ).
The post-experimental questionnaire asked demographics and other individual char-
acteristics (age, sex, faculty, native language, etc.) as well as subjects’ (hypothetical) will-
ingness to pay (WTP) for internet time if there was a further round of experimentation.
We discuss the results of the WTP elicitation in Section 3.5.2. Subjects consisted of 26
(43%) men, were on average approximately 26 years old, and the vast majority (83.3%)
of the sample indicated German as their first language. Subjects were enrolled in all
faculties with a majority of 20 (33%) from management, economics and social sciences.
Most subjects were undergraduates (48%).
23We do not consider the investment choices of this subject in the analyses because they are zero per
definition.
24 Of the 51 NPC subjects, 27 got a good investment outcome in round two and 24 got a bad investment
outcome. In round three, 25 got a good outcome and 26 got a bad outcome. The full distribution of
subjects over the seven paths of interest is given in Table 3.C.4.
3.4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 59
3.4.2 Pre-Committed Choices
Figure 3.2 displays the mean for the two choice variables consumption share, ρPC, and
investment share, αPC, for each possible path.25 We analyze how these variables change
with respect to the expected investment outcome. A high realization of the gross return
(Rt = 3) denotes a “good” investment outcome and a low realization (Rt = 1/3) denotes
a “bad” investment outcome.
Consumption. The consumption share is given by the fraction of current wealth that is
transformed into internet time. On average, over all possible paths, subjects pre-commit
to consume 30.67% of their current wealth. As is standard in the optimal solution of
life-cycle problems, subjects plan to increase the consumption share over time. However,
this is also implied by the closed life-cycle design because subjects have to consume their
entire wealth by the end of the last period. In general, the correlation between average
per-period consumption shares and period is statistically different from zero (Spearman’s
rank correlation = 0.4763, p = 0.0000). In period one, the consumption share starts at
18.3%. In period two, subjects plan to increase the consumption share more strongly after
a bad investment outcome (28.5%) than after a good outcome (22.4%). This corresponds
to a difference of 27% which is economically meaningful and statistically different from
zero (Wilcoxon signed-rank (SR) test, p = 0.0001). In period three, we have to compare
consumption on the UU path (28.3%) with consumption on the UD path (35.8%) and
consumption on the DU path (39.3%) with consumption on the DD path (42.1%). The
26.5% difference between UU and UD is again economically and statistically significant
(SR test p = 0.0056). The 7.1% difference between DU and DD is comparatively small
in magnitude and not significantly different from zero (SR test p = 0.3971).
On all paths, the direction in which subjects plan to adjust their consumption shares
depends on the realization of the investment outcome. A bad investment outcome leads
to an increase in relative consumption. This effect is economically large and statistically
different in two of three possible path-wise comparisons. We therefore reject that the
consumption share does not react to the realization of investment outcomes as implied
by standard preferences.
Investment. The investment share is given by the fraction of remaining wealth after
consumption that is invested in the risky asset. While our research question focuses on
the response to wealth fluctuations, we also control for any time effect because standard
preferences imply that investment shares are constant.
25Table 3.C.1 presents the according standard deviations. We note that there is less heterogeneity
in the consumption share than in the investment share, i.e., for a given period, the consumption share
always has a smaller standard deviation than the consumption share.
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Figure 3.2: Choice Variables under Pre-Commitment.
On average, over all possible paths, subjects pre-commit to invest 39.74% of their
remaining wealth in the risky asset. In period one, the investment share amounts to
38.23%. In period two, this share is not affected by the possible realizations of the
investment outcome. The difference between path U and path D is not significantly
different from zero (SR test, p = 0.1141). In period three, there is a statistical difference
between path UU and path UD (SR test, p = 0.0592) but no statistical difference between
path DU and path DD (SR test, p = 0.3918).
Concerning the prediction of constant investment shares under standard preferences,
we do not find an economically or statistically meaningful trend between periods. The
average investment share in period two over both realized outcomes is 36.93% and not
statistically distinguishable from 38.23% in period one (SR test, p = 0.5310). Further,
the average investment in period three over all four paths is 41.52% which is also not
statistically different form period-one or period-two choices (SR test, p = 0.3861). In gen-
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eral, there is no statistically significant correlation between average per-period investment
shares and period under PC (Spearman’s rank correlation = 0.0941, p = 0.2088).26
We find no indication that the realization of the investment outcomes seems to
influence how subjects plan to invest their remaining wealth. Hence, we cannot reject
that investment shares under PC are constant both over time and investment outcomes
as implied by standard preferences.
Regression Analyses. For robustness, we run parametric regressions of the consump-
tion and investment shares on the investment outcome and additional controls. The
regressions utilize the PC choices for period two and three where subjects anticipate to
experience the realization of investment outcomes when making their decisions in the
point manager. Hence, only the data from these rounds is suitable to test our research
question of the dependence of choice variables on investment outcomes. The variable
Investment Outcome is a dummy taking the value one if Rt = 3 and zero if Rt = 1/3.
As controls we include the demographic variables Age, a dummy indicating male sub-
jects (Male), and a dummy indicating German as the native language as a proxy for the
comprehension of the instructions (German Native). The variable Round 3 is a dummy
taking the value one if the period for which a decision was made is t = 3 and zero if it is
t = 2.
We run the fully specified model both with and without random effects on subjects.
The use of random effects is valid due to the strict exogeneity of controls and the random
sampling of subjects. In addition to OLS specifications, we also estimate two-censored
Tobit models, because subjects in our experiment could neither borrow additional wealth
nor could they short the risky asset. Our results are generally very robust across the
different specifications and estimation methods.
Table 3.C.2 reports the results of these analyses for the consumption share. The
negative effect of the investment outcome on consumption shares is not affected by the
inclusion of control variables. In addition, we find that men consume around 8.5 percent-
age points less than women. This effect is significantly different from zero (p < 0.05).27
Regarding the estimation of Tobit models, the results are virtually unaffected because
only three choices (less than 1%) are clustered on the left boundary of zero and none
are clustered on the right boundary of 100. Table 3.C.3 reports the same regressions for
the investment share. As in the non-parametric analysis, we do not find any effect of
investment outcome on investment shares. In addition, we find no convincing indication
26We observe a positive trend only in period three for the very top path UU. While there is no
statistical difference between path U and period one (SR test, p=0.7679), the 19% increase on path UU
compared to period one, is both economically large and statistically distinguishable from zero (SR test
p = 0.0290). In addition, the investment share increases from U to UU by 20.95% (SR test, p = 0.0369).
27The p-value is based on the t-statistic in OLS and the z-statistic in GLS and Tobit estimation.
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that the PC investment share varies systematically over time (Round 3 is in all but one
specification statistically insignificant). Overall, less than 8% of the observations are cen-
sored at zero and less than 6.4% at 100. We conclude that our non-parametric results
are robust to parametric analyses and controlling for demographics.
Result 1 [PC Choices] Under pre-commitment, subjects plan to increase their consump-
tion shares after a bad investment outcome but do not plan to vary their investment
shares. Further, subjects do not plan to systematically change their investment behavior
over time. These results are robust against different parametric estimations and control-
ling for demographics.
3.4.3 Non-Pre-Committed Choices
Figure 3.3 displays the mean for the two choice variables consumption share, ρNPC, and
investment share, αNPC, for each realized path under NPC.28 We analyze how these
variables change with respect to the realized investment outcome. Each subject only has
one realized path in the experiment and thus, in contrast to pre-commitment, the number
of observations per path decreases each round. The use of rank tests such as the SR for
paired samples and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U-test for independent samples does not
account for the fact that our choice variables are metric and thus these tests generally have
lower statistical power than tests who use this information. The non-parametric Fisher-
Pitman Permutation (FPP) test accounts for the metric scaling of our variables (Kaiser
2007).29 However, if variables are quantitatively small but show a strong separation, the
SR and U-test may detect a significant difference that is not reported under the FPP
test. We therefore base our results on both the SR or U-test, respectively, and the FPP
test. As in the analyses of PC choices, we complement the non-parametric analysis by
assessing the robustness of our results with parametric regression models.
Consumption. On average, over all realized paths, subjects actually consume 21.53%
of their current wealth. As under pre-commitment, consumption shares increase over
time (Spearman’s rank correlation = 0.2968, p = 0.0002). In period one subjects consume
16.5%. In period two, those subjects who experience a bad outcome consume 27.27% more
than subjects who experience a good investment outcome. Although economically large,
this effect is significantly not distinguishable from zero (U-test, p = 0.1462, FPP test, p =
0.2038). In period three, mean consumption shares on path UU are 14.68% larger than
28Table 3.C.5 presents the according standard deviations. As under PC, investment shares have larger
standard deviations than consumption shares.
29For paired samples, we report the one-sample FPP test while we use the two-sample FPP test if we
compare independent observations (Kaiser 2007). In both situations, the FPP test has more statistical
power than either the SR test or the U-test (Siegel and Castellan 1988; Kaiser 2007).
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Figure 3.3: Choice Variables under Non-Pre-Committment.
on path UD (U-test, p = 0.7709, FPP test, p = 0.6251). In period three, subjects on path
DD consume 38.87% more than subjects who experienced a good investment outcome
(path DU). This difference is economically very large but not statistically significant
(U-test, p = 0.2482, FPP test, p = 0.1233).
Investment. On average, over all realized paths, subjects invest 36.78% of their re-
maining wealth in the risky asset. In period one, subjects invest 35.14% and do not
systematically adjust their investment based on the investment outcome in period two
(U-test, p = 0.5131, FPP test, p = 0.5971). In period three, subjects largely increase
their investment share on the up path after experiencing a good investment outcome.
On path UU, the average investment share is 57.64% larger than on path UD (U-test,
p = 0.0682, FPP test, p = 0.0944). On paths DU and DD, however, investment shares
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are virtually identical and not statistically different from each other (U-test, p = 0.8843,
FPP test, p = 0.9792).
Though subjects, on average, seem to increase consumption shares on average after
a bad investment outcome in two out of three pathwise comparisons, we cannot reject
that consumption shares are unaffected by the investment outcome as predicted by stan-
dard preferences. Regarding the investment share, we can also not convincingly reject
standard preferences under NPC. Furthermore, despite the comparatively large variation
in investment shares over time, we find no significant trend across periods (Spearman’s
rank correlation = 0.0698, p = 0.3910). However, as we will see below, this result changes
in the parametric regressions once we control for demographics.
Regression Analyses. Subjects make three decisions under NPC. As with PC choices,
we effectively use the observations of periods two and three. Only in these rounds is it
possible to react to the investment outcome. Tables 3.C.6 and 3.C.7 show that our results
are generally robust against the inclusion of control variables in the parametric regression
models and against different estimation methods. We run the same specifications as for
the PC data.
Consumption shares do not systematically depend on age or speaking German na-
tively. However, men consume significantly less than women in period two and three
(p < 0.01). A pairwise comparison shows that men consume more in later rounds while
women prefer to consume more out of their current wealth in the beginning of the ex-
periment. In period four, men on average have more than twice the wealth that women
have in that final period (U-test, p = 0.0042, FPP test, p = 0.0184).
Regarding the investment share, age, gender, and indicating German as the na-
tive language have no statistically significant effects. As mentioned above, we find that
the investment share increases between period two and period three by approximately
seven percentage points in both OLS and Tobit models (p < 0.01). This leads us to
reject the hypothesis that investment shares are constant over time after controlling for
demographics.
Result 2 [NPC Choices] Under non-pre-commitment, subjects do not significantly vary
their consumption or investment shares with the investment outcome. After controlling
for demographics, subjects increase their investment shares over time.
3.4.4 Differences in Commitment
We analyze the difference of commitment status by comparing the choices of those sub-
jects that have been observed under both conditions, i.e., we utilize the same subjects
as in the NPC analyses in Section 3.4.3. For each subject, we generate the difference
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Figure 3.4: Commitment Differences of Choice Variables.
in consumption shares, ∆ρt := ρ
NPC
t − ρPCt , and the difference in investment shares,
∆αt := α
NPC
t − αPCt . We then perform the same analyses as before where we analyzed
the choices under PC and NPC separately.
Figure 3.4 displays, for each realized path, the mean differences for the two choice
variables.30 We first analyze whether the difference between commitment status is sta-
tistically different from zero. We account for the small sample size, specifically in period
three, by using the SR test and the FPP test.
30Table 3.C.8 presents the according standard deviations. In contrast to the separate analyses of PC
and NPC choices, investment shares do not always vary more strongly than consumption shares.
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Consumption. We observe a general pattern of underconsumption relative to the plan
made in the PC stage. Collapsing the data by subjects yields 52 independent observations
and an average difference of -3.55 which is significantly different from zero (SR test, p =
0.0004, FPP test, p = 0.2303). In period one, subjects consume around two percentage
points less under NPC (SR test, p = 0.0200, FPP test, p = 0.4529). In period two,
underconsumption is not significant on the up path (SR test, p = 0.4004, FPP test,
p = 0.5824) but on the down path (SR test, p = 0.0593, FPP test, p = 0.0433). The
slight positive deviation on path UU is not significant (SR test, p = 0.3109, FPP test,
p = 0.9001). On path UD, average underconsumption is large and amounts to an average
of around 18 percentage points (SR test, p = 0.1094, FPP test, p = 0.0359). Similarly,
subjects underconsume by around eleven percentage points on path DU (SR test, p =
0.1361, FPP test, p = 0.0981). We find no statistical difference on path DD (SR test,
p = 0.3078, FPP test, p = 0.7646). These results indicate that subjects underconsume if
they are not committed to their PC choices.
We analyze whether the commitment difference depends on the investment out-
come by pathwise comparisons between subjects as in Section 3.4.3. Generally, com-
mitment differences in consumption shares do not vary with the investment outcome.
Underconsumption is not significantly different in period two. In period three, only the
seven percentage point difference between UD and DU is significant under the FPP test
(p = 0.0572) but not under the U-test (p = 0.4969).31 Overall, we cannot reject that
differences between PC and NPC consumption behavior is independent of the investment
outcome. The difference in commitment does further not significantly change over time
(Spearman’s rank correlation = -0.0590, p = 0.4675).
Investment. We find no general pattern in the commitment difference regarding invest-
ment behavior. Collapsing over all paths by subjects, the average investment difference
is -0.869 and we cannot reject that investment shares are the same under PC and un-
der NPC (SR test, p = 0.8539, FPP test, p = 0.5609). In period one and two, we
find no statistical difference in commitment.32 In period three, the only difference that
shows an effect that can be statistically distinguished from zero is the approximately ten
percentage-point overinvestment in DD (SR test, p = 0.1293, FPP test, p = 0.0938).33
31U vs D: U-test, p = 0.2821, FPP test, p = 0.3523. DU vs DD: U-test, p = 0.5637, FPP test,
p = 0.1772.
32Period one: SR test, p = 0.3885, FPP test, p = 0.5098. Path U: SR test, p = 0.2658, FPP test,
p = 0.4824. Path D: SR test, p = 0.5815, FPP test, p = 0.9158.
33UU: SR test, p = 0.8885, FP test, p = 1.000. UD: SR test, p = 0.1965, FPP test p = 0.1303. DU:
SR test, p = 0.6658, FPP test, p = 0.8759.
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As with consumption behavior, we also find no indication that commitment dif-
ferences in investment depend systematically on the investment outcome.34 Further, the
difference in investment behavior between NPC and PC does not systematically vary over
time (Spearman’s rank correlation = 0.0484, p = 0.5523).
Tables 3.C.9 and 3.C.10 report the results of the parametric regressions. For the
consumption share, we see that the commitment difference (given by the constant) is
significant when we only control for the investment outcome (p < 0.01). However, if
we include the other control variables, the underconsumption vanishes. This effect does
not differ across estimation techniques. For the investment share, we find no significant
impact of any of the independent variables.
Result 3 [Difference in Commitment] Overall, subjects underconsume under NPC rela-
tive to their PC choices but this effect is not robust against parametric estimation under
the inclusion of control variables. Investment behavior is not distinguishable between PC
and NPC. Commitment differences for both consumption and investment behavior do
neither systematically vary in the investment outcome nor over time.
3.5 Discussion
Standard preferences generally predict behavior well in the experiment. However, the
significantly negative correlation between consumption shares and investment outcomes
under PC and the significant underconsumption relative to the PC path are inconsistent
with the model of Samuelson (1969). Hence, we present two alternative preference spec-
ifications to explain these results. We further discuss the internal validity of our design
and our implementation of real consumption.
3.5.1 Non-Standard Preferences
The theoretical literature on consumption and portfolio choice is vast and there exist
several alternative theories (non-standard preferences, DellaVigna 2009). Two of these
preference specifications are noteworthy as they create variability of the choice variables
with changes in wealth and may explain the two inconsistencies in our data. Expectations-
based reference dependence as proposed by Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006; 2007; 2009) predict
the negative correlation that we find under PC. External-habit preferences (e.g., Con-
stantinides 1990; Brunnermeier and Nagel 2008) may help understand the slight under-
consumption relative to the PC plan. A more detailed presentation of these preferences
is provided in Appendix 3.D.
34U vs D: U-test, p = 0.7147, FPP test, p = 0.6682. UU vs UD: U-test, p = 0.3782, FPP test,
p = 0.3277. DU vs DD: U-test, p = 0.5804, FPP test p = 0.3361.
68 3. CONSUMPTION AND PORTFOLIO CHOICE
Expectations-Based Reference Dependence. Expectations-based reference-depen-
dent preferences have been developed by Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006; 2007; 2009) (hence-
forth, KR preferences). The preferences consist of two components: consumption utility
and gain-loss utility. Consumption utility is based on the level of consumption, as with
standard preferences. Gain-loss utility is based on a comparison of consumption with a
reference point, as in prospect theory, and the agent is loss averse, i.e., losses hurt more
than gains please (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006) introduce a
stochastic reference point that corresponds to the agent’s rational beliefs formed in the
previous period about the entire stream of future consumption. When the agent learns
the investment outcome, he updates his beliefs and compares his previous and updated
beliefs about present and future consumption experiencing gain-loss utility over what he
has just learned in this comparison. Because all modifications from standard preferences
involve psychological factors, KR preferences are directly testable with our experimental
design.
KR preferences have been applied to consumption and asset pricing by Pagel (2012;
2014) who finds that consumption and investment shares are negatively correlated with
the investment outcome. Hence, consumption adjusts only insufficiently to wealth fluc-
tuations. The KR agent is more willing to lower future consumption than to fully adjust
current consumption. This is because, learning that future consumption will be lower
than previously expected is less painful than learning that current consumption is lower
than expected. Furthermore, the reference point will have adjusted in the future, i.e., if
the agent actually decreases his consumption share in some future period, he will by then
have expected to lower it. Thus, expectations will have adjusted “downwards” (Barberis
2013).
Pagel (2012) shows that the agent has a positive demand for pre-commitment al-
though to a different plan than under standard preferences. Because the KR agent’s
beliefs are endogenous, he considers how his choices determine his beliefs and thus his
gain-loss utility when forming a pre-committed plan. Pagel (2012) shows that the agent’s
choice variables are negatively correlated with changes in wealth. In addition, relative
to his pre-committed plan, the KR agent both overconsumes and overinvests and is thus
time-inconsistent.
External Habit. Habit formation assumes that agents compare current absolute con-
sumption to a certain reference level of consumption. Habit formation can be either
external or internal, i.e., based on own past consumption. We follow Brunnermeier and
Nagel (2008) and assume a simple preference specification with a constant external habit
level, X > 0. The period utility function is given by u(Ct, X) = (Ct −X)1−θ/(1− θ).
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The habit level can be interpreted as a reservation consumption level (Brunnermeier
and Nagel 2008) or as cash flow that is put aside for future committed consumption
(Chetty and Szeidl 2014). Both these interpretations are consistent with the use of
internet as our consumption good. In contrast to experiments that induce habit formation
directly (e.g., Brown, Chua, and Camerer 2009; Carbone and Duffy 2014), this is an ex-
post explanation in our setting. However, if we reinterpret the transformation function
(3.2.1) as generating consumption level C˜t = f(Points), the habit agent’s period utility
would be given by u(C˜t −X).
External-Habit (EH) formation implies that relative risk aversion depends on wealth
by introducing an additional precautionary savings motive. The EH agent has to make
sure that he can always meet the habit level of consumption. Hence, he invests the present
value of the habit into the risk free rate (Brunnermeier and Nagel 2008). This lowers
the amount of “surplus wealth” that he can invest in the risky asset. On the one hand,
if wealth is close to the habit level, the agent becomes more risk averse. On the other
hand, if current wealth is much larger than the habit level, the agent becomes less risk
averse. Hence, the investment share is positively correlated with wealth changes while
the reaction of the consumption share depends on how close wealth is to the habit level
(Munk 2008).
EH preferences can explain underconsumption if we make the additional assump-
tions that the agent has a “projection bias” and does not anticipate the formation of
a habit when making a PC plan in period zero (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin
2003; Acland and Levy 2013). Relative to the pre-committed plan that coincides with
the standard agent’s plan, the EH agent underconsumes and underinvests if he is not
pre-committed because now he has to ensure the unanticipated habit level in each period
and has to cut consumption and investment in the risky asset in favor of storing funds in
the risk-free asset.
Assessment. While the two non-standard preference specifications can explain the
two inconsistencies ex-post, they make a series of further predictions for which we find no
evidence in our data. Regarding KR preferences, the result on PC consumption is very
interesting. We are not aware of any other experiment that tests KR preferences in a
life-cycle context. However, Pagel (2012) provides a series of other predictions, e.g., that
consumption and investment shares are decreasing in the investment outcome both under
PC and NPC, that subjects are time-inconsistent, and that the commitment difference
varies with changes in wealth. We find no evidence for these implications. Because our
design allows to jointly test these predictions, we conclude that KR preferences poorly
describe consumption and investment behavior in our setting.
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Regarding EH preferences, we also find no evidence for its main implication that
investment shares vary with the investment outcome. According to Brunnermeier and
Nagel (2008, p. 713), habit formation is the “most popular approach” to model time-
varying relative risk aversion which can explain some “stylized facts about asset returns
and the business cycle” such as the level of risk premia and their negative correlation
with the business cycle (Constantinides 1990; Campbell and Cochrane 1999). However,
as Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) who test the positive correlation of investment behavior
and wealth changes with PSID data, we find no significant correlation between investment
shares and the investment outcome. Furthermore, the assumption of a prediction bias is
rather ad-hoc and we are not aware of any study that tests this idea in an investment
context.
Although not robust, the observed underconsumption is in contrast to a large lit-
erature that shows that people have self-control problems and behave inconsistently over
time in the sense that they prefer immediate gratification (see Frederick, Loewenstein,
and O’Donoghue 2002 for a survey). We are not aware of any other experiment that
compares PC and NPC life-cycle choices. Carbone and Infante (2014) provide a different
explanation for the difference in commitment and argue that ambiguity about changes
in wealth explains underconsumption in a life-cycle experiment. However, in our exper-
iment, probabilities were objectively given both under PC and under NPC. Hence, we
also rule out probability weighting as an alternative explanation.
3.5.2 Internal Validity
Our data stem from the observed choices of two basically metric choice variables in a
within-subject design. Within-subject designs generally have more power than between-
subject designs in which subjects only participate in one condition. This is because each
subject acts as his or her own control. The number of subjects in our setting is also
relatively large such that we can utilize between 51 and 60 independent observations per
period as there is no interaction among subjects. The fact that choice variables were
rarely clustered on the boundaries supports the theoretical result of an interior solution.
We base our experimental design on the assumption that internet is a good con-
sumption proxy which means that subject’s draw utility from internet and that utility
is monotonically increasing in internet time.35 We do not observe subject’s actual utility
but rather induce it in a way that is standard in life-cycle experiments. This section
presents the result of the willingness-to-pay (WTP) measure that we elicited in the post-
experimental questionnaire. We argue that internet is a valid consumption proxy for two
reasons.
35See also footnote 9.
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First, we asked subjects to imagine another 19-minute period of experimentation
in the WTP elicitation. Subjects had to indicate how much of an initial 10-Euro en-
dowment they were willing to spend to buy a certain amount of internet time. Figure
3.C.8 presents an aggregate demand curve for internet time derived from the hypothetical
WTP elicitation. As expected, WTP is significantly increasing in internet time (Spear-
man’s rank correlation = 0.2057, p = 0.0000). Although choices are hypothetical, this
increase indicates that internet is a suitable consumption good fulfilling the requirements
of monotonicity and dominance as required by Smith (1976). We find no indication for
a non-linear relationship by regressing WTP on minutes, squared minutes or cubed min-
utes even after controlling for demographics. Note that the questionnaire was asked after
approximately three hours of experimentation and thus marginal utility could have been
different at the beginning of the experiment. However, we see this as a justification of
our design choice to use internet as an actual consumption good.
Second, in the experiment, internet is always more pleasurable than the alterna-
tive clicking task. At least, subjects do not risk losing money while surfing the web as
the clicking task is deactivated during that time. In addition, comments in the post-
experimental questionnaire pointed out that subjects perceived the task as extremely
boring. Furthermore, we think that our design gains additional reliability from the ex-
periment of Houser et al. (2010) as they find that a significant number of subjects choose
to pay to eliminate the temptation to abandon a boring task and surf the internet instead.
Using the internet as a mean to simulate a pleasurable good is a reasonable choice given
the various opportunities it provides and the student population we sample from.
3.6 Conclusion
How people vary their consumption and investment behavior with fluctuations in wealth
and how they vary their decisions with the passage of time is important for economic pol-
icy and fiscal intervention, e.g., to prevent or recuperate from a recession. Furthermore,
there is a global trend towards granting more self determination in financial planning
and a discussion about how policymakers should help people to achieve economic secu-
rity throughout their lives. Proposals include default enrollment in saving plans, default
investment options, and managed institutional investment to achieve optimal portfolio
allocations (Mitchell and Utkus 2006).
However, analyzing individual choices with observational data sets is subject to
measurement and aggregation errors, problems in the definition of dependent and inde-
pendent variables, and (in terms of panel data) attrition rates. In this paper, we design
an experiment to test the consumption and investment behavior in a life-cycle environ-
ment with on-the-spot consumption of a real consumption good. This allows a direct
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test of the implications of life-cycle theories that model utility from consumption rather
than wealth and that assume that current utility is actually realized in a given period
rather than paid out at the end of the “life cycle”. While our main contribution is pri-
marily methodological, we use our design to analyze the predictive power of the standard
life-cycle consumption and portfolio-choice model of Samuelson (1969).
In the experiment, we differentiate behavior under pre-commitment (PC) and un-
der non-pre-commitment (NPC). Overall, standard preferences predict consumption and
investment behavior well. Under PC, investment plans are unaffected by anticipated
changes in wealth or the passage of time. Actual choices under NPC are also consistent
with these implications based on standard preferences, e.g., investment shares do not
systematically vary over time. These findings are in line with the results in Brunner-
meier and Nagel (2008) who test investment behavior with PSID data. However, as Liu,
Yang, and Cai (2014) point out, empirical investigation may suffer from misidentification
problems if additional income shocks are ignored or misspecified. Hence, we complement
the findings of Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) with the controlled environment of the
lab. However, we report two findings for consumption behavior that are inconsistent with
standard preferences. First, subjects under PC show a significantly negative correlation
between consumption shares and investment outcomes. Second, subjects underconsume
under NPC relative to their previously formed PC plan.
We present two alternative non-standard preference specifications to explain these
findings. Expectations-based reference dependence (Ko¨szegi and Rabin 2006; 2007; 2009;
Pagel 2012; 2014; KR preferences) and external habit (Constantinides 1990; Brunnermeier
and Nagel 2008; EH preferences). While KR preferences can explain the PC consumption
finding, EH preferences can explain underconsumption if we assume that subjects are
naive and do not anticipate the formation of habits. However, this effect is not robust
against controlling for demographics and the naivete´ rests on the assumption of projection
bias (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin 2003). Further research is needed to evaluate
if and how subjects predict habit formation in life-cycle contexts. Furthermore, both
alternative preferences also imply a range of behavioral responses particularly to wealth
changes. We find no evidence for these other predictions and hence conclude that choices
in the experiment are overall best described by standard preferences.
Our results should be interpreted with some caution. We only consider a four-period
environment while our main data is generated by periods two and three where subjects
react to the investment outcome. This is a caveat in our implementation of on-the-spot
consumption and the resulting time restrictions. We think a longer time of experimenta-
tion cannot be imposed on the subjects due to cognitive and physical depletion. Further-
more, while our within-subject design has more power than a between-subjects design,
it may be worthwhile to consider a separation of pre-committed to non-pre-committed
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choices between treatment groups to prevent any carry-over effects. Nevertheless, we
think that the fact that all subjects had to form a possibly pre-committing plan ex-ante
greatly increased the understanding of the dynamic structure of the decision problem.
Subjects learned how their choices map into utility in future rounds and our implemen-
tation automatically enforced the budget constraint. We think that this design greatly
reduces possible decision errors due to myopic behavior (Ballinger, Palumbo, and Wilcox
2003; Carbone and Hey 2004) and the misunderstanding or ignorance of the intertemporal
dependence of choices (Fehr and Zych 1998; Brown, Chua, and Camerer 2009; Carbone
and Hey 2004).
Our design is an important step towards controlled research of dynamic theories
about consumption and portfolio choice. We proxy consumption by utilizing the internet
because the web is likely to generate immediate utility and to fulfill the requirement of
monotonicity, salience, and dominance necessary to be used effectively in economic exper-
iments (Smith 1976). Further, experiments frequently sample from a student population
who generally consume internet time on a daily basis. Our design is easy to implement
and needs little explanation while offering the intertemporal structure of life-cycle mod-
els. Further modifications to test policy interventions such as taxation or nudging ideas
(e.g., automatic enrollment and saving plans) can easily be implemented and tested in
our experimental setting. In addition, the PC stage allows to test proposals such as
delegated portfolio choice by letting subjects choose from a set of pre-specified plans.
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Appendices
3.A Screens in the Lab Experiment
This section shows screen shots of the implementation of the experiment. The point
manager is part of the pre-commitment stage (see Section 3.2.2). The NPC decision
box is part of the consumption-and-allocation stage for those subjects that are not pre-
committed to their decisions made in the point manager (see Section 3.2.2). The browser
size is adjusted such that the consumed internet time is visible.
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Notes: Depicted is the decision box used at the be-
ginning of period one to three to elicit choices un-
der non-pre-commitment (NPC). The first line dis-
plays current wealth WNPCt (“starting wealth”)
at the beginning of the period. In contrast to
the decision box under pre-commitment (PC), line
two (“internet time”), line three (“transformed
points”), and line four (“end wealth”) are left
blank because this information depends on the con-
sumption that the subject chooses after she made
her decisions regarding the investment share. How-
ever, to ease handling for the subjects, PC and NPC
decision boxes are designed to look as similar as
possible. In line five, subjects choose their invest-
ment share αNPCt (“investing”). The sixth line dis-
plays the share kept in the risk-free asset 1− αNPC
(“storing”).
Figure 3.A.6: NPC Decision Box.
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3.B Instructions
The following pages report the instructions in both German (original) and English (trans-
lated). Upon their arrival subjects received the general instructions. Subsequently, they
received the instructions for part one. After part one was finished, they received the
instructions for part two and some comprehension questions.
 
 
 
Allgemeine Instruktionen 
 
Herzlich willkommen und vielen Dank für die Teilnahme an diesem Experiment. Bitte lesen Sie die Instruktionen 
sorgfältig durch. Stellen Sie ab jetzt bitte jegliche Kommunikation ein. Falls Sie Fragen haben, melden Sie sich per 
Handzeichen. Wir kommen dann zu Ihnen und helfen Ihnen weiter.  
 
Es ist bei dem heutigen Experiment nicht erlaubt private Unterlagen (Bücher, Vorlesungsskripte etc.) am Platz zu 
haben oder ein Mobiltelefon oder Ähnliches zu benutzen. Stellen Sie bitte Ihre Taschen und andere Gegenstände 
hinter sich. Schalten Sie Ihr Mobiltelefon aus und achten Sie darauf, dass kein Weckruf eingestellt ist. Bitte legen Sie 
Ihr Mobiltelefon und ähnliche Geräte in den Umschlag, der zu Ihrem Platz gehört. Kleben Sie den Umschlag nicht zu. 
Dies übernimmt ein Experimentator. Der Umschlag bleibt während des gesamten Experiments bei Ihnen am 
Platz und darf nicht geöffnet werden. Bei einem Verstoß gegen diese Regel werden Sie von diesem Experiment und 
allen Auszahlungen ausgeschlossen.  
 
In diesem Experiment können Sie Geld erhalten. Die Höhe Ihrer Auszahlung hängt nur von Ihren eigenen 
Entscheidungen ab und wird nicht durch die Entscheidungen anderer Teilnehmer beeinflusst.  
 
Alle Entscheidungen, die Sie während des Experiments treffen, sind anonym. Ihre Auszahlung wird vertraulich 
behandelt.   
 
Das Experiment besteht aus zwei Teilen. Sie erhalten zunächst die Instruktionen für Teil 1. Danach startet Teil 1. 
Nachdem dieser abgeschlossen ist, erhalten Sie die Instruktionen für Teil 2. Im Anschluss erhalten Sie einige 
Verständnisfragen und Teil 2 startet.  
 
Als Pauschale für Ihr Erscheinen erhalten Sie am Ende des Experiments 2.50 EUR zu Ihrer Auszahlung hinzu. Zu 
Beginn des Experiments erhalten Sie außerdem eine Anfangsausstattung von 30 EUR. Ihre Entscheidungen in 
diesem Experiment bestimmen, wie viel Ihnen am Ende von diesen 30 EUR ausbezahlt wird. In beiden Teilen  (Teil 1 
und Teil 2) kann Ihnen Geld von der Anfangsausstattung abgezogen werden.  
 
Im Anschluss an Teil 2 des Experiments bitten wir Sie, einen Fragebogen auszufüllen, während wir die Auszahlungen 
vorbereiten. Alle dort angegebenen Informationen sowie alle während dieses Experiments erhobenen Daten werden 
anonymisiert und ausschließlich für wissenschaftliche Zwecke verwendet. Nachdem Sie den Fragebogen ausgefüllt 
haben, warten Sie bitte an Ihrem Platz bis Ihre Platznummer  zur Auszahlung aufgerufen wird.  
 
 
 
Instruktionen – Teil 1 
 
In Teil 1 absolvieren Sie eine „Klick-Aufgabe“. Ihre Aufgabe ist es, über eine Dauer von 10 Minuten zufällig 
erscheinende Pop-up-Fenster durch Klicken zu schließen. 
 
Ablauf der Klick-Aufgabe 
Während der Klick-Aufgabe erscheinen auf dem Bildschirm nacheinander Pop-up-Fenster. Wann und wo auf dem 
Bildschirm die Fenster erscheinen ist zufällig. Nach Erscheinen eines Fensters haben Sie 10 Sekunden Zeit, das 
Fenster zu schließen. Sollten Sie es nicht schließen, verschwindet das Fenster nach Ablauf der 10 Sekunden von 
alleine.  
Die Klick-Aufgabe ist Bestandteil von Teil 1 und Teil 2 des Experiments. Alle Fenster, die Sie in Teil 1 und Teil 2 
zusammen nicht geschlossen haben, ergeben Kosten. Diese Kosten verringern Ihre Auszahlung. Ihre Auszahlung 
hängt also von der Gesamtzahl der nicht geschlossenen Fenster ab. Am Ende des Experiments erfahren Sie, wie viele 
Fenster Sie insgesamt nicht geschlossen haben. 
 
Der Zusammenhang zwischen der Gesamtzahl nicht geschlossener Fenster und den zugehörigen Kosten ist in der 
folgenden Tabelle aufgelistet: 
 
Gesamtzahl nicht geschlossener 
Fenster 
(Teil 1 und 2 zusammen) 
Kosten in EUR 
Gesamtauszahlung am Ende des 
Experiments in EUR 
0 0 32.50 
1 1 31.50 
2 4 28.50 
3 9 23.50 
4 16 16.50 
5 25 7.50 
 ab 6 30 2.50 
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Instruktionen –  Teil 2 
 
2.1 Allgemeiner Ablauf 
In Teil 2 gibt es 4 Runden. In jeder dieser Runden gibt es einen Zeitraum von 19 Minuten. Zu Beginn dieser 19 
Minuten können Sie im Internet surfen. Die restliche Zeit müssen Sie die Klick-Aufgabe absolvieren. Die Klick-
Aufgabe startet erst, nachdem Sie nicht mehr im Internet sind. Das heißt, während Sie im Internet surfen erscheinen 
keine Fenster und es kann Ihnen kein Geld abgezogen werden. Wie viel Internetzeit Sie zur Verfügung haben, hängt 
von Ihren Entscheidungen in diesem Teil ab. 
Zu Beginn von Runde 1 erhalten sie einmalig eine Ausstattung von 75 Punkten. Mit diesen Punkten können Sie 
Internetzeit kaufen. Das bedeutet, Internetzeit wird in Punkte umgewandelt und von Ihrem Punktestand abgezogen. 
Punkte, die Sie in einer Runde nicht für Internetzeit nutzen, stehen Ihnen in späteren Runden zur Verfügung. Sie 
können diese Punkte in die nächste Runde überführen, indem Sie die Punkte entweder investieren oder aufbewahren. 
Durch Investieren können Sie mehr Punkte hinzu gewinnen, aber auch Punkte verlieren. Wie genau dies funktioniert, 
wird weiter unten erklärt. Punkte, die Sie aufbewahren, stehen Ihnen unverändert in der nächsten Runde zur 
Verfügung.  
Vor dem Start von Runde 1 erscheint auf dem Computer ein Punkte-Manager. Mit diesem können Sie Ihre 
Punkteaufteilung für alle vier Runden planen. Mit dem Punkte-Manager legen Sie also Ihre Aufteilung für die 
gesamten 76 Minuten (= 4 Runden x 19 Minuten) vor dem Start von Runde 1 fest.  
Nachdem alle Teilnehmer ihren Punkte-Manager vollständig ausgefüllt haben, startet Runde 1 von 4. 
 
Beachten Sie:  
• Die Internetverbindung läuft über das Netzwerk der Universität zu Köln. Wir werden den Verlauf der von Ihnen 
online besuchten Seiten nicht speichern oder auswerten. Es werden keine Passwörter oder Ähnliches gespeichert. 
• Es kann aus technischen Gründen zu Ladezeiten kommen (z.B. beim Öffnen/Schließen des Internet-Browsers). 
• Die Punkte können nicht in Geld umgewandelt werden, sondern dienen dazu, Zeit im Internet zu verbringen. Bei 
der Klick-Aufgabe kann Ihnen weiterhin Geld abgezogen werden, wenn Sie die Fenster nicht schließen. 
• Auf Ihrem Bildschirm werden Zahlen bis auf zwei Nachkommastellen angezeigt. Der Computer rechnet jedoch 
mit den exakten Werten.  
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2.2 Der Inhalt des Punkte-Managers 
Der Punkte-Manager besteht aus einzelnen Entscheidungs-Boxen, in denen Sie Ihre Entscheidung für eine Runde 
treffen. Eine Entscheidungs-Box sieht wie folgt aus: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anfangs-Punktestand:  
Dies sind die Punkte, die Sie am Anfang der Runde zur Verfügung haben. Maximal diese Punkte können Sie als 
Internetzeit nutzen. 
 
Internetzeit und Umgewandelte Punkte 
Hier legen Sie fest, wie viel Zeit Sie in einer Runde im Internet verbringen möchten. Die gewählte Zeit wird vom 
Computer automatisch in Punkte umgerechnet. Die Anzahl umgewandelter Punkte steigt dabei in der Höhe der 
Internetzeit überproportional. Das bedeutet, doppelt so viel Zeit erfordert mehr als doppelt so viele Punkte.1 Sie 
können nicht länger als 19 Minuten pro Runde im Internet verbringen. 
Einige Beispielwerte: 
Internetzeit (Min:Sek) Umgewandelte Punkte 
0:00 0 
2:00 0.67 
4:00 1.87 
6:00 4.08 
8:00 8.31 
10:00 16.76 
12:00 34.40 
14:00 73.28 
16:00 164.38 
18:00 393.80 
 
End-Punktestand: 
Dies sind die Punkte, die Sie am Ende einer Runde noch übrig haben. Diese Punkte errechnen sich wie folgt: End-Punktestand , Anfangs-Punktestand 0 Umgewandelte	Punkte.	 
Ihren End-Punktestand können Sie nun Investieren und/ oder Aufbewahren. 
                                                          
1 Der Computer verwendet zur Umrechnung:  Punkte , 7 89::89::;Internetzeit	 in	Sek."#$: 	0 1.	 
Punkte aufbewahren (%) 
Computer wandelt 
Internetzeit in Punkte um 
Punkte am Anfang der Runde 
Punkte am Ende der Runde 
Internetzeit wählen 
Punkte investieren (%) 
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Investieren 
Hier wählen Sie den Anteil (in %) der Punkte Ihres End-Punktestands, den Sie investieren möchten. Durch Investieren 
können Sie Punkte hinzugewinnen oder verlieren. Die Punkte, die Sie investieren, werden zu Beginn der 
darauffolgenden Runde entweder gedrittelt  : '" oder verdreifacht  x	'". Dies wird für jeden Teilnehmer am Platz 
ausgewürfelt. Beide Möglichkeiten sind dabei gleich wahrscheinlich. 
 
Würfelergebnis Investierte Punkte werden 
1, 2, 3 gedrittelt 
4, 5, 6 verdreifacht 
 
Aufbewahren 
Der Anteil (in %) Ihres End-Punktestands, den Sie nicht investieren, wird automatisch aufbewahrt. Die aufbewahrten 
Punkte stehen Ihnen in der nachfolgenden Runde unverändert zur Verfügung.  
 
2.3 Punkte-Manager ausfüllen 
Investierte Punkte werden entweder gedrittelt oder verdreifacht. Somit gibt es in der nachfolgenden Runde mehrere 
mögliche Punktestände. Der Punkte-Manager stellt all diese möglichen Rundenverläufe und die jeweils dazu 
gehörenden Entscheidungs-Boxen dar. In Runde 4 wandelt der Punkte-Manager alle verbleibenden Punkte 
automatisch in Internetzeit um. Im Punkte-Manager teilen Sie also – bevor Runde 1 startet – die Punkte für jeden 
möglichen Verlauf des Experiments auf. 
Bitte nehmen Sie Abbildung 1 (Punkte-Manager) auf dem Zusatzblatt zur Hand.  
 
Der Punkte-Manager ist wie folgt zu lesen: 
• Runde 1: Dies ist die erste Runde. Somit gibt es nur eine Entscheidungs-Box. 
• Runde 2:  Für die investierten Punkte in Entscheidungs-Box 1 gibt es zwei Möglichkeiten: dritteln oder 
verdreifachen. Somit gibt es in Runde 2 insgesamt zwei Entscheidungs-Boxen. 
• Runde 3: Jede Entscheidungs-Box aus Runde 2 hat wieder zwei Möglichkeiten für die dort investierten 
Punkte. Somit gibt es in Runde 3 insgesamt vier Entscheidungs-Boxen. 
• Runde 4:  Nach dem gleichen Prinzip gibt es in Runde 4 insgesamt acht Möglichkeiten. Da dies die letzte 
Runde ist, müssen Sie keine Entscheidung mehr treffen. Der Computer wandelt automatisch alle 
verbleibenden Punkte in Internetzeit um. 
  
Wenn Sie den Punkte-Manager vollständig ausgefüllt haben und nichts mehr ändern möchten, bestätigen Sie Ihre 
Wahl mit einem Klick auf „Punkte-Manager speichern“.  
 
Beachten Sie: Wenn Sie die Aufteilung der Punkte in einer Entscheidungs-Box ändern, so ändern sich auch die 
Aufteilungen in den nachfolgenden Entscheidungs-Boxen. Überprüfen Sie daher bitte, bevor Sie auf „Punkte-Manager 
speichern“ klicken, dass die Punkte an allen Stellen des Punkte-Managers so verteilt sind, wie Sie es wollen. Sie 
können in einer Runde nicht mehr Punkte aufteilen, als zur Verfügung stehen.  
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2.4 Auswürfeln, ob Punkte-Manager aktiv bleibt 
Nachdem Sie den Punkte-Manager ausgefüllt haben, wird ausgewürfelt, ob dieser für alle vier Runden aktiv bleibt, 
oder ob er deaktiviert wird. Ob der Punkte-Manager aktiv bleibt, wird für jeden Teilnehmer am Platz ausgewürfelt. 
 
Würfelergebnis Punkte-Manager 
1 aktiv 
2, 3, 4, 5, 6 deaktiviert 
 
 
a) Punkte-Manager bleibt aktiv: 
Bleibt Ihr Punkte-Manager aktiv, durchlaufen Sie das gesamte Experiment nach dem dort von Ihnen gewählten 
Schema. Sie können den Punkte-Manager im Nachhinein nicht mehr verändern. Er gilt für die vollen 76 Minuten. 
Je nach Investitionsergebnis (dritteln/ verdreifachen) wählt der Computer die entsprechende Entscheidungs-Box aus 
Ihrem Punkte-Manager automatisch aus. Zuerst verbringen Sie die von Ihnen gewählte Zeit im Internet, anschließend 
startet für den Rest der 19 Minuten die Klick-Aufgabe. Der Computer öffnet und schließt den Internet-Browser 
automatisch und startet die Klick-Aufgabe ebenfalls automatisch. 
 
b) Punkte-Manager wird deaktiviert: 
Wird der Punkte-Manager deaktiviert, treffen Sie in jeder Runde eine neue Aufteilung. Zu Beginn jeder Runde sehen 
Sie eine Entscheidungs-Box. In dieser sehen Sie Ihren Anfangs-Punktestand mit dem Sie in dieser Runde starten. 
Allerdings wählen Sie in der Entscheidungs-Box keine Internetzeit. Stattdessen startet nach der Entscheidungs-Box 
der Internet-Browser und Sie entscheiden, wie viel Zeit Sie im Internet verbringen möchten.  
Wenn Sie das Internet beenden möchten, schließen Sie einfach den Internet-Browser. Sie gelangen dann zurück auf 
den Experimentbildschirm. Ihre Internetzeit wird jedoch erst dann gestoppt, wenn Sie dort auf "Internetzeit 
stoppen/Klick-Aufgabe starten" klicken. Anschließend machen Sie für den Rest der 19 Minuten mit der Klick-
Aufgabe weiter. Der Computer wandelt die gestoppte Internetzeit automatisch in Punkte um. Sollte Ihr Anfangs-
Punktestand zwischendurch aufgebraucht sein, wird der Internet-Browser automatisch geschlossen. 
Da Sie erst nach der Entscheidungs-Box im Internet surfen, ist zu Beginn einer Runde also noch nicht bekannt, wie 
viele Punkte umgewandelt werden. Deshalb werden in der Entscheidungs-Box auch keine Internetzeit oder 
umgewandelten Punkte angezeigt. Ebenso kann auch noch kein End-Punktestand berechnet werden. Sie wählen in der 
Entscheidungs-Box also nur den Anteil (in %) Ihres End-Punktestands, den Sie investieren möchten.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Wird erst am Ende der Runde 
berechnet 
Wird erst am Ende der 
Runde berechnet 
Punkte aufbewahren (%) 
Punkte investieren (%) 
Punkte am Anfang der Runde 
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Zusammenfassung/ Ablauf  
 
• Punkte-Manager für alle möglichen Verläufe ausfüllen 
• Auswürfeln, ob Punkte-Manager aktiv bleibt  
a. Punkte-Manager aktiv:  
Ihre Punkte werden in jeder Runde automatisch so aufgeteilt, wie Sie dies im Punkte-Manager  angegeben 
haben. Der Internet-Browser öffnet und schließt automatisch. Die Klick-Aufgabe startet automatisch. 
b. Punkte-Manager deaktiviert:  
Zu Beginn jeder Runde erscheint eine neue Entscheidungs-Box und Sie teilen Ihren  (zu dem Zeitpunkt 
noch nicht berechneten) End-Punktestand für diese Runde auf. Der Internet-Browser öffnet automatisch. 
Um die Internetzeit zu stoppen und mit der Klick-Aufgabe weiter zu machen, schließen Sie den Internet-
Browser und klicken auf „Internetzeit stoppen/Klick-Aufgabe starten“. 
 
• Runde 1  
a. Punkte Manager aktiv: Entscheidungs-Box 1 gilt 
Punkte-Manager deaktiviert: Entscheidungs-Box für Runde 1 ausfüllen 
b. 19 Minuten starten (zuerst Internet, danach Klick-Aufgabe) 
 
• Runde 2  
a. In Runde 1 investierte Punkte werden entweder gedrittelt oder verdreifacht (Würfel)  
b. Punkte-Manager aktiv: Entscheidungs-Box 2a oder 2b gilt (siehe Abbildung 1) 
Punkte-Manager deaktiviert: Entscheidungs-Box für Runde 2 ausfüllen 
c. 19 Minuten starten (zuerst Internet, danach Klick-Aufgabe) 
 
• Runde 3  
a. In Runde 2 investierte Punkte werden entweder gedrittelt oder verdreifacht (Würfel) 
b. Punkte-Manager aktiv: Entscheidungs-Box 3a, 3b, 3c oder 3d gilt (siehe Abbildung 1) 
Punkte-Manager deaktiviert: Entscheidungs-Box für Runde 3 ausfüllen 
c. 19 Minuten starten (zuerst Internet, danach Klick-Aufgabe) 
 
• Runde 4  
a. In Runde 3 investierte Punkte werden entweder gedrittelt oder verdreifacht (Würfel) 
b.  Punkte-Manager aktiv: Entscheidungs-Box 4a, 4b, 4c, 4d, 4e, 4f, 4g oder 4h gilt (siehe Abbildung 1) 
Punkte-Manager deaktiviert: Verbleibender Punktestand wird automatisch in Internetzeit umgewandelt. 
Internet-Browser öffnet und schließt in dieser Runde automatisch. Die Klick-Aufgabe startet in dieser 
Runde automatisch. 
c. 19 Minuten starten (zuerst Internet, danach Klick-Aufgabe) 
 
Zur Erinnerung: Punkte werden nicht in Geld umgewandelt. Bei der Klick-Aufgabe kann Ihnen jedoch weiterhin 
Geld abgezogen werden. 
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Verständnisfragen 
 
Bitte füllen Sie die folgenden neun Verständnisfragen aus. Diese sollen Ihnen helfen, die Instruktionen richtig zu 
verstehen. Nachdem alle Teilnehmer die Verständnisfragen richtig beantwortet haben, startet der Punkte-Manager. 
Sollten Sie Fragen haben, heben Sie bitte die Hand. 
 
1. Fenster, die Sie im Laufe des gesamten Experiments nicht geschlossen haben, werden addiert und verursachen 
Kosten, die Ihre Auszahlung verringern.  
Nehmen Sie an, Sie haben in Teil 1 des Experiments ein Fenster nicht geschlossen. In Teil 2 haben Sie in Runde 2 
ebenfalls ein Fenster nicht geschlossen und in Runde 4 haben Sie zwei Fenster nicht geschlossen. 
Wie viele Fenster haben Sie insgesamt nicht geschlossen? 
_______________ Fenster 
Wie hoch sind die Kosten, die dadurch entstehen? 
_______________ EUR 
Wie viel Geld wird Ihnen abgezogen, wenn Sie insgesamt fünf Fenster nicht geschlossen haben? 
_______________ EUR 
 
2. Die Punkte, die Sie investieren, werden in der nächsten Runde gedrittelt oder verdreifacht.   
Wenn eine 3 gewürfelt wird, werden die investierten Punkte _______________________ 
Wenn eine 4 gewürfelt wird, werden die investierten Punkte _______________________ 
 
3. Wenn Sie 12:00 Minuten im Internet verbringen möchten, wie viele Punkte würde der Computer dann von Ihrem 
Anfangs-Punktestand in dieser Runde abziehen?  
_______________ Punkte 
Nachdem diese Internetzeit aufgebraucht wurde, absolvieren Sie für die restliche Zeit die Klick-Aufgabe. Wie  
lange dauert diese nun an?  
_____  Min _____ Sek. 
 
4. Nehmen Sie an, Sie haben in einer Runde einen Anfangs-Punktestand von 100 Punkten und Sie verbrauchen 40 
Punkte für Internetzeit. Wie hoch ist Ihr End-Punktestand in dieser Runde? 
_______________Punkte 
Von diesem End-Punktestand investieren Sie 50% und bewahren 50% auf. 
Wie viele Punkte investieren Sie somit?  _______________Punkte 
Wie viele Punkte bewahren Sie somit auf? _______________Punkte 
Wie hoch ist Ihr Anfangs-Punktestand in der nächsten Runde, wenn eine 2 gewürfelt wird?  
_______________Punkte 
Wie hoch ist Ihr Anfangs-Punktestand in der nächsten Runde, wenn eine 5 gewürfelt wird? 
_______________Punkte 
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5. Wie viele Möglichkeiten und damit Entscheidungs-Boxen ergeben sich in Runde 3?  
_____ Entscheidungs-Boxen 
 
6. Nehmen Sie an, Ihr Punkte-Manager bleibt aktiv. 
Sie befinden sich in Runde 3. Die investierten Punkte aus Runde 1 wurden verdreifacht. Die investieren Punkte 
aus Runde 2 wurden gedrittelt.  
Welche Entscheidungs-Box ist nun erreicht worden?  (siehe Abbildung 1: Punkte-Manager) 
Nr. _____ 
 
7. Nehmen Sie an, Ihr Punkte-Manager bleibt aktiv. 
Sie befinden sich in Runde 4. Die investierten Punkte aus Runde 1 wurden gedrittelt. Die investieren Punkte aus 
Runde 2 wurden verdreifacht. Die investierten Punkte aus Runde 3 wurden gedrittelt.  
Welche Entscheidungs-Box ist nun erreicht worden? (siehe Abbildung 1: Punkte-Manager)  
Nr. _____ 
 
8. Nehmen Sie an, Ihr Punkte-Manager wurde deaktiviert. 
Sie befinden sich in Runde 3 und haben einen Anfangs-Punktestand von 50 Punkten. Zu Beginn müssen Sie die 
Entscheidungs-Box für diese Runde ausfüllen. Sie investieren 50% Ihres End-Punktestands und bewahren 50% 
auf. Anschließend klicken Sie auf „Weiter“ und der Internet-Browser wird geöffnet. Nachdem Sie den Internet-
Browser geschlossen haben, klicken Sie auf „Internetzeit stoppen/Klick-Aufgabe starten“. Die Internetzeit wird 
dann gestoppt. Nehmen Sie an, die gestoppte Internetzeit würde umgerechnet 20 Punkte betragen. 
Wie hoch wäre Ihr End-Punktestand am Ende der Runde 3? 
_______________Punkte 
Wie viele Punkte hätten Sie nun investiert und wie viele aufbewahrt? 
_______________Punkte investiert und _______________Punkte aufbewahrt. 
Wie lautet Ihr Anfangs-Punktestand in Runde 4, wenn eine 1 gewürfelt wird? 
_______________Punkte 
Wie lautet Ihr Anfangs-Punktestand in Runde 4, wenn eine 6 gewürfelt wird? 
_______________Punkte 
 
9. Nehmen Sie an, Ihr Punkte Manager wurde deaktiviert.  
Sie befinden sich in Runde 3 und müssen die Entscheidungs-Box für diese Runde ausfüllen. In Runde 4 werden 
alle verbleibenden Punkte automatisch in Internetzeit umgewandelt. Ihr End-Punktestand am Ende von Runde 3 
beträgt 73.28 Punkte.  
Wie viel Internetzeit ergibt Ihre Wahl in Runde 4?     
_____  Min _____ Sek. 
Wie lange dauert dann die Klick-Aufgabe in Runde 4?    
 _____  Min _____ Sek 
 
 
 
General Instructions 
 
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. Please read these instructions thoroughly. Please stop any 
conversations now. If you have any questions please raise your hand. We will then come to help you.  
 
In today’s experiment, it is not allowed to have private reading materials (books, lecture notes etc.) close by or to use 
your cell phone or similar devices. Please put all your personal belongings behind you. Please switch off your cell 
phone and please check that no alarm is set. Please put your cell phone and similar devices into the envelope that 
belongs to your desk. Please do not seal the envelope. This will be done by an experimenter. The envelope will stay 
on your desk throughout the experiment but you are not allowed to open it. If you do not abide by this rule you 
will be excluded from this experiment and all payments. 
 
You can earn money in this experiment. How much you earn depends on your decisions and is not affected by the 
decisions of other participants.  
 
All decisions made by you during the experiments are anonymous. Your payment will be treated confidentially.   
 
The experiment consists of two parts. You first receive the instructions for part 1. Afterwards part 1 will start. After 
this is completed, you will receive the instructions for part 2. In turn you will receive a couple of comprehension 
questions and part 2 will start. 
  
After the experiment, you will receive a show-up fee of 2.50 EUR in addition to your payoff. In the beginning of the 
experiment, you receive an endowment of 30 EUR. Your decisions in the experiment determine how much of these 
30 EUR you will actually receive at the end of the experiment. In both parts (part 1 and part 2), money can be 
subtracted from your endowment.  
 
After completion of part 2 of the experiment, we would kindly ask you to fill out a questionnaire while we prepare 
your payments. All information in the questionnaire and all the data collected in the experiment will be de-identified 
and used for scientific purposes exclusively. After filling-out the questionnaire, please wait at your desk until your 
number is called to receive your payment.  
 
 
 
Instructions – Part 1 
 
In part 1, you complete a „clicking task“.  Your task is to click and close randomly appearing pop-up windows for 10 
minutes. 
 
Course of the clicking task 
During the clicking task, pop-up-windows appear subsequently on the computer screen. When and where on the 
screen the windows appear is randomly determined. After a window appears, you have 10 seconds to close the 
window. If you happen to not close it, the window will disappear on its own after the ten seconds.  
The clicking task is part of both part 1 and part 2 of the experiment. All windows that you have not closed in both 
part 1 and part 2 of the experiment create costs. These costs reduce your payment. Your payment thus depends on the 
total number of windows that you have not closed. In the end of the experiment, you will learn how many windows 
you have not closed in total. 
 
The relationship of the total number of windows you have not closed and the corresponding costs are listed in the 
following table: 
 
Total number of windows you 
have not closed 
 (part 1 and part 2 together) 
Costs in EUR 
Total payment at the end of the 
experiment in EUR 
0 0 32.50 
1 1 31.50 
2 4 28.50 
3 9 23.50 
4 16 16.50 
5 25 7.50 
 6 and more 30 2.50 
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Instructions – Part 2 
 
2.1 General Course 
In part 2, there are 4 rounds. In each of these rounds, there is a period of 19 minutes. At the beginning of these 19 
minutes, you can surf the internet. The remaining time, you have to perform the clicking task. The clicking task just 
starts, after you are no longer surfing the internet. That means that while you are surfing the internet, there appear no 
windows and no money can be subtracted from your account. How much internet time you have available, depends on 
your decisions in this part. 
At the beginning of round 1, you receive a one-time endowment of 75 points. You can use these points to buy internet 
time. That means, internet time is transformed into point and subtracted from your points.  
Points that you do not use for internet time in a given round are available in later rounds. You can carry these points 
over to the next round by either investing the points or storing them. By investing, you can gain additional points but 
you can also lose points. How this works exactly will be explained below. Points that you store are available 
unchanged in the next round.  
Before round 1 starts, you will see a point manager on your computer. You can use this to plan your point allocation 
for all four rounds. With the point manager, you thus determine your allocation for the whole 76 minutes (= 4 
rounds x 19 minutes) before round 1 starts. 
After all participants completely filled out their point manager, round 1 of 4 starts. 
 
Please note:  
• The internet connection uses the network of the University of Cologne. We will not save or evaluate those pages 
you decide to visit online. No Passwords or the like will be saved.  
• Due to technical reasons, there may be loading times (e.g., when opening/closing the internet browser). 
• The points cannot be transformed into money but serve to spend time in the internet. During the clicking task, 
money can still be subtracted from your account if you do not close the windows. 
•  On your screen, numbers are shown up to two decimal places. The computer, however, calculates with the exact 
values. 
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2.2 Content of the Point Manager 
The point manager consists of several decision boxes in which you can make your decision for a given round. A 
decision box looks as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Starting Points:  
These are the points that you have available at the beginning of the round. You can use at most these points for 
internet time.  
 
Internet Time and Transformed Points 
Here you determine how much time you want to spend in the internet in a given round. The chosen time is 
automatically transformed into points by the computer. The number of transformed points increases more than 
proportionally in the amount of internet time. This means that double the amount of time requires more than double 
the amount of points.1 You cannot spend more than 19 minutes per round in the internet.  
Some Examples: 
Internet time (min:sec) Transformed points 
0:00 0 
2:00 0.67 
4:00 1.87 
6:00 4.08 
8:00 8.31 
10:00 16.76 
12:00 34.40 
14:00 73.28 
16:00 164.38 
18:00 393.80 
 
End points: 
These are the points that remain at the end of a round. These points are calculated as follows: End	Points * Starting	Points / Transformed	Points.	 
You can now invest and/or store your end points. 
  
                                                 
1 The computer uses for transformation:  Points * 5 678867889internet	time	:in	sec.<=>8 	/ 1.	 
Store Points (%) 
Choose internet time 
Invest Points (%) 
Computer transforms internet 
time into points 
Points at beginning of round 
Points at end of round 
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Investing 
Here you choose the share (in %) of your end points that you want to invest. By investing, you can gain additional 
points or lose points. Those points that you invest will be either divided by three (:3) or multiplied by three (x3) at 
the beginning of the next round. This will be determined via a die roll for each participant at his disk. Both outcomes 
are equally probable. 
Result of the die roll Invested points will be 
1, 2, 3 divided by three 
4, 5, 6 multiplied by three 
 
Storing 
The share (in %) of your end points that you do not invest is automatically stored. Stored points are available to you in 
the next round unchanged.  
 
2.3 Filling out the Point Manager 
Invested points will be either divided by three or multiplied by three. Hence, there are several possible amounts of 
points in the subsequent round. The point manager displays all these possible round outcomes and the according 
decision boxes. In round 4, the point manager automatically transforms all remaining points into internet time. 
In the point manager, you thus allocate – before round 1 starts – the points for each possible course of the experiment.  
Please see Figure 1 (point manager) on the supplementary sheet.  
 
You read the point manager as follows: 
• Round 1:  This is the first round. Hence, there is only one decision box. 
• Round 2: There are two possible outcomes for the invested points in decision box 1: dividing by three or 
multiplying by three. Hence, there are two decision boxes in total in round 2. 
• Round 3: Every decision box from round 2 has again two possible outcomes for the invested points. Hence, 
there are four decision boxes in total in round three. 
• Round 4:  Following the same principle, there are eight possible outcomes in round 4. Because this is the last 
round, you do not have to make a decision. The computer automatically transforms all remaining points into 
internet time.  
When you completely filled out the point manager and do not want to change anything anymore, confirm your 
decision by clicking on “save point manager”. 
 
Please note: If you change the allocation of points in one decision box, the allocations in all subsequent decision 
boxes also change. Hence, please make sure that all points at all nodes of the point manager are allocated as you want 
them to be before you click on “save point manager”. You cannot allocate more points in a round than you have 
available. 
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2.4 Determining  whether Point Manager remains active 
After you filled out the point manager, a die roll determines whether it remains active for all four periods or whether it 
will be deactivated. Whether the point manager remains active will be determined via a die roll for each participant at 
his desk. 
Result of the die roll Point manager 
1 active 
2, 3, 4, 5, 6 deactivated 
 
 
a) Point manager remains active: 
If your point manager remains active, you will run through the experiment according to the scheme that you chose 
there. You cannot change the point manager afterwards. It holds for the entire 76 minutes. 
Depending on the investment outcome (dividing by three/ multiplying by three), the computer automatically chooses 
the according decision box from your point manager. First, you spend your chosen time in the internet. Subsequently, 
the clicking task starts for the remainder of the 19 minutes. The computer automatically opens and closes the internet 
browser and also starts the clicking task automatically. 
 
b) Point manager gets deactivated: 
If the point manager gets deactivated, you choose a new allocation in every round. At the beginning of each round, 
you see a decision box. There you see the starting points of this round. However, you do not choose internet time in 
this decision box. Rather the internet browser starts after the decision box and you decide how much time you want to 
spend in the internet.  
When you want to close the internet, just close the internet browser. You will then return to the experiment screen. 
However, your internet time will only then be stopped, when you click on “Stop internet time/Start clicking task”. 
Subsequently, you continue with the clicking task for the remainder of the 19 minutes. The computer automatically 
transforms the stopped internet time into points. If your starting points are depleted in the meantime, the internet 
browser closes automatically. 
Because you surf the internet only after the decision box, you do not know at the beginning of a round how many 
points will be transformed. Hence, the decision box does not display internet time or transformed points. Further, no 
end points can be calculated by then. In the decision box, you thus only choose the share (in %) of your end points that 
you want to invest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Store points (%) 
Invest points (%) 
Points at beginning of round 
t am Ende der Will be calculated at the end of the round 
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Summary/ Course of the Experiment 
 
• Fill out point manager for all possible courses of the experiment  
• Determining whether point manager remains active 
a. Point manager active:  
Your points are allocated the way you chose in the point manager in every period. The internet browser 
opens and closes automatically. The clicking task starts automatically. 
b. Point manager deactivated:  
At the beginning of each period, there is a decision box and you allocate your (by then not yet calculated) 
end points for this round. The internet browser opens automatically. To stop the internet time and to 
continue with the clicking task, close the internet browser and click on “Stop internet time/Start clicking 
task”. 
 
• Round 1  
a. Point manager active: Decision box 1 holds 
Point manager deactivated: Fill out decision box for round 1 
b. 19 minutes start  (Internet first, then clicking task) 
 
• Round 2  
a. Points invested in round 1 are either divided by three or multiplied by three (die roll) 
b. Point manager active: Decision box 2a or 2b holds (see Figure 1) 
Point manager deactivated: fill out decision box for round 2  
c. 19 minutes start  (Internet first, then clicking task) 
 
• Round 3  
a. Points invested in round 2 are either divided by three or multiplied by three (die roll) 
b. Point manager active: Decision box 3a, 3b, 3c or 3d holds (see Figure 1) 
Point manager deactivated: fill out decision box for round 3 
c. 19 minutes start  (Internet first, then clicking task) 
 
• Runde 4  
a. Points invested in round 3 are either divided by three or multiplied by three (die roll) 
b.  Point manager active: Decision box 4a, 4b, 4c, 4d, 4e, 4f, 4g or 4h holds (see Figure 1) 
Point manager deactivated: Remaining points are automatically transformed into internet time.  The 
internet browser opens and closes automatically in this round. The clicking task starts automatically in this 
round. 
c. 19 minutes start  (Internet first, then clicking task) 
As a reminder: Points cannot be transformed into money. However, during the clicking task, money can still be 
subtracted from your account. 
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Comprehension Questions 
 
Please answer the following nine comprehension questions. These shall help you to understand the instructions 
correctly. After all participants have answered the comprehension questions correctly, the point manager will start. If 
you have any questions, please raise your hand. 
 
1. Windows that you did not close during the entire experiment will be summed up and create costs that will reduce 
your payment.  
Please assume that you have not closed one window in part 1 of the experiment. In part 2 you then also missed to 
close one window in round 2 and you missed to close two windows in round 4. 
How many windows did you not close in total? 
_______________ windows 
How high are the costs that you incur? 
_______________ EUR 
How much money will be subtracted from your final payment if you happen to not close five windows in total? 
_______________ EUR 
 
2. The points you invest will be either divided by three or multiplied by three in the next round.   
If the die comes up as a 3, the invested points will be _______________________ 
If the die comes up as a 4, the invested points will be _______________________ 
 
3. If you want to spend 12:00 minutes in the internet, how many points would the computer subtract from your 
starting points in this round? 
_______________ points 
After this internet time has run out, you perform the clicking task for the remaining time. How long does this last? 
_____  min _____ sec. 
 
4. Please assume that you have 100 starting points and you use 40 points for internet time. How many end points do 
you have this round? 
_______________points 
From these end points, you invest 50% and store 50%. 
How many points do you thus invest?_______________points 
How many points do you thus store? _______________points 
How many starting points do you have in the next round if the die comes up a 2? 
_______________points 
How many starting points do you have in the next round if the die comes up a 5? 
_______________points 
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5. How many outcomes and thus decision boxes are there in round 3?  
_____ decision boxes 
 
6. Please assume that your point manager remains active. 
You are currently in round 3. The invested points from round 1 have been multiplied by three. The invested points 
from round 2 have been divided by three. 
Which decision box has now been reached? (See Figure 1: Point Manager) 
Nr. _____ 
 
7. Please assume that your point manager remains active. 
You are currently in round 4. The invested points from round 1 have been divided by three. The invested points 
from round 2 have been multiplied by three. The invested points from round 3 have been divided by three.  
Which decision box has now been reached? (See Figure 1: Point Manager) 
Nr. _____ 
 
8. Please assume that your point manager has been deactivated. 
You are currently in round 3 and have 50 starting points. At the beginning, you have to fill out the decision box 
for this round. You invest 50% of your end points and store 50%. Subsequently, you click on “next” and the 
internet browser starts. After you closed the internet browser, you click on “Stop internet time/Start clicking task”. 
The internet time will be stopped then. Assume that the stopped internet time would be transformed into 20 points. 
How much end points would you have at the end of round 3? 
_______________points 
How many points would you thus have invested and how many stored? 
_______________points invested and _______________points stored.  
How many starting points do you have in round 4 if the die comes up a 1? 
_______________points 
How many starting points do you have in round 4 if the die comes up a 6? 
_______________points 
 
9. Please assume that your point manager has been deactivated. 
You are currently in round 3 and have to fill out the decision box for this round. In round 4, all remaining points 
will be automatically transformed into internet time. You have 73.28 end points at the end of round 3.  
How much internet time does your choice yield in round 4? 
 _____  min _____ sec. 
How long is the clicking task in round 4? 
 _____  min _____ sec 
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3.C Empirical Appendix
Summary Statistics of Choices under Pre-Commitment
Table 3.C.1: Summary Statistics: Choice Variables under Pre-Commitment.
1 U D UU UU DD DD Total
Consumption Share 18.26 22.42 28.49 28.26 35.81 39.29 42.13 30.67
(12.52) (17.33) (18.77) (19.87) (20.53) (21.09) (21.25) (20.54)
Investment Share 38.23 37.72 36.13 45.58 41.05 40.42 39.02 39.74
(24.51) (22.65) (24.79) (27.90) (27.26) (24.88) (28.80) (25.88)
Notes: Reported is the mean of choice variables under pre-commitment in
percent. Standard deviations in parentheses. N = 60. Consumption Share
is the fraction of current wealth transformed into internet time. Investment
share is the fraction of remaining wealth after consumption that is invested in
the risky asset.
Detailed Regression Analyses: Pre-Commitment
Table 3.C.2: Consumption Choice under Pre-Commitment: Regressions.
Model (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Estimation OLS OLS GLS Tobit Tobit Tobit
Investment Outcome -5.484∗∗∗ -5.484∗∗∗ -5.484∗∗∗ -5.441∗∗∗ -5.438∗∗∗ -5.455∗∗∗
(1.363) (1.371) (1.371) (1.366) (1.367) (1.622)
Round 3 10.916∗∗∗ 10.916∗∗∗ 11.168∗∗∗ 11.110∗∗∗
(2.111) (2.111) (2.163) (1.722)
Age 0.438 0.438 0.446 0.444
(0.362) (0.362) (0.359) (0.425)
Male -8.483∗∗ -8.483∗∗ -8.685∗∗∗ -8.640∗∗
(3.302) (3.302) (3.296) (3.793)
German Native 1.909 1.909 1.868 1.878
(5.779) (5.779) (5.736) (4.918)
Constant 35.477∗∗∗ 18.976∗ 18.976∗ 35.382∗∗∗ 18.627∗ 18.696
(2.033) (10.667) (10.667) (2.034) (10.590) (11.891)
Random Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Clustered Std. Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Observations 360 360 360 360 360 360
Clusters 60 60 60 60 60 60
Left-censored Obs. 3 3 3
Right-censored Obs. 0 0 0
Notes: Reported are OLS/GLS and two-censored (at 0 and 100) Tobit regres-
sions. Dependent variable is the consumption share under pre-commitment in
percent. Standard errors in parentheses. N = 60 subjects (cluster) and T = 7
decisions per subject. ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
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Table 3.C.3: Investment Choice under Pre-Commitment: Regressions.
Model (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Estimation OLS OLS GLS Tobit Tobit Tobit
Investment Outcome 2.506 2.506 2.506 2.401 2.390 2.475
(2.173) (2.185) (2.185) (2.489) (2.488) (2.253)
Round 3 4.592 4.592 4.822 4.683∗∗
(3.043) (3.043) (3.628) (2.385)
Age 0.324 0.324 0.434 0.490
(0.890) (0.890) (1.107) (0.728)
Male 8.223 8.223 9.202 10.226
(5.320) (5.320) (6.312) (6.425)
German Native 0.310 0.310 -0.234 -0.722
(7.036) (7.036) (7.528) (8.297)
Constant 38.733∗∗∗ 23.486 23.486 38.408∗∗∗ 20.272 18.582
(2.916) (23.693) (23.693) (3.365) (29.178) (20.296)
Random Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Clustered Std. Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Observations 360 360 360 360 360 360
Clusters 60 60 60 60 60 60
Left-censored Obs. 28 28 28
Right-censored Obs. 23 23 23
Notes: Reported are OLS/GLS and two-censored (at 0 and 100) Tobit regres-
sions. Dependent variable is the investment share under pre-commitment in
percent. Standard errors in parentheses. N = 60 subjects (cluster) and T = 7
decisions per subject. ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
Summary Statistics of Choices under Non-Pre-Commitment
Table 3.C.4: Distribution of NPC Subjects.
Path t = 1
t = 2 t = 3
U D UU UD DU DD
Subjects 52 27 24 13 14 12 12
Notes: Reported is the distribution of subjects over paths under non-pre-
commitment. One subject consumed all her wealth in period one.
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Table 3.C.5: Summary Statistics: Choice Variables under Non-Pre-Committment.
1 U D UU UD DU DD Total
Consumption Share 16.46 17.57 22.41 25.03 21.77 28.31 39.78 21.53
(15.23) (13.02) (13.66) (18.31) (15.49) (20.65) (13.77) (16.36)
N 52 27 24 13 14 12 12
Investment Share 35.14 35.89 32.67 49.54 31.43 41.75 41.42 36.78
(20.17) (20.40) (21.47) (26.17) (27.39) (21.83) (28.75) (22.61)
N 51 27 24 13 14 12 12
Notes: Reported is the mean of choice variables under non-pre-commitment
in percent. Standard deviations in parentheses. Consumption Share is the
fraction of current wealth transformed into internet time. Investment share is
the fraction of remaining wealth after consumption that is invested in the risky
asset. One subject consumed all her wealth in period one and we thus discard
the investment choices for this subject.
Detailed Regression Analyses: Non-Pre-Commitment
Table 3.C.6: Consumption Choice under Non-Pre-Commitment: Regressions.
Model (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Estimation OLS OLS GLS Tobit Tobit Tobit
Investment Outcome -4.487 -2.595 -0.237 -4.487 -2.595 -0.278
(3.306) (2.963) (2.483) (3.290) (2.889) (2.202)
Round 3 8.426∗∗∗ 8.518∗∗∗ 8.426∗∗∗ 8.517∗∗∗
(1.787) (1.751) (1.742) (1.695)
Age -0.173 -0.176 -0.173 -0.176
(0.437) (0.443) (0.426) (0.425)
Male -10.192∗∗∗ -10.592∗∗∗ -10.192∗∗∗ -10.585∗∗∗
(3.641) (3.689) (3.550) (4.047)
German Native 0.618 0.987 0.618 0.980
(5.465) (5.517) (5.328) (4.891)
Constant 26.402∗∗∗ 29.405∗∗ 28.101∗∗ 26.402∗∗∗ 29.405∗∗ 28.123∗∗
(2.437) (12.409) (12.582) (2.425) (12.098) (11.856)
Random Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Clustered Std. Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Observations 102 102 102 102 102 102
Clusters 51 51 51 51 51 51
Left-censored Obs. 0 0 0
Right-censored Obs. 0 0 0
Notes: Reported are OLS/GLS and two-censored (at 0 and 100) Tobit re-
gressions. Dependent variable is the consumption share under non-pre-
commitment in percent. Standard errors in parentheses. N = 51 subjects
(cluster) and T = 4 decisions per subject. ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
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Table 3.C.7: Investment Choice under Non-Pre-Commitment: Regressions.
Model (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Estimation OLS OLS GLS Tobit Tobit Tobit
Investment Outcome 6.234 4.848 4.620∗ 6.942 5.343 5.038
(4.295) (4.293) (2.745) (4.602) (4.520) (3.416)
Round 3 6.641∗∗∗ 6.632∗∗∗ 6.740∗∗ 6.743∗∗∗
(2.417) (2.410) (2.700) (2.568)
Age 0.271 0.272 0.261 0.277
(0.955) (0.955) (1.109) (0.761)
Male 7.600 7.638 8.675 9.157
(6.777) (6.815) (7.567) (7.174)
German Native -6.322 -6.358 -6.375 -6.493
(6.665) (6.748) (6.971) (8.635)
Constant 34.420∗∗∗ 26.738 26.864 34.189∗∗∗ 26.461 26.120
(3.968) (25.179) (25.464) (4.360) (29.001) (21.160)
Random Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Clustered Std. Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Observations 102 102 102 102 102 102
Clusters 51 51 51 51 51 51
Left-censored Obs. 4 4 4
Right-censored Obs. 7 7 7
Notes: Reported are OLS/GLS and two-censored (at 0 and 100) Tobit regres-
sions. Dependent variable is the investment share under non-pre-commitment
in perecent. Standard errors in parentheses. N = 51 subjects (cluster) and
T = 4 decisions per subject. ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
Summary Statistics of Differences between Non-Pre-Commitment and Pre-
Commitment
Table 3.C.8: Summary Statistics: Differences between Commitment.
1 U D UU UD DU DD Total
Consumption Share -2.02 -1.83 -6.01 1.36 -18.32 -11.36 -1.03 -4.46
(16.89) (17.10) (13.74) (21.43) (29.52) (22.81) (11.04) (18.92)
Investment Share -1.00 -1.52 -0.25 -0.08 -11.93 1.25 9.83 -0.87
(9.55) (10.71) (9.52) (35.39) (24.97) (24.47) (17.28) (17.36)
Notes: Reported are the mean differences of the choice variables between
non-pre-commitment (NPC) and pre-commitment (PC). Standard deviation
in parentheses. For the consumption share: N = 52 in period one and N = 51
in periods two and three, respectively. For the investment share: N = 51.
Consumption Share is the fraction of current wealth transformed into internet
time. Investment share is the fraction of remaining wealth after consumption
that is invested in the risky asset. Differences are computed by subtracting
PC values from NPC values for each subject.
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Detailed Regression Analyses: Difference in Commitment
Table 3.C.9: Difference in Commitment on Consumption Choice: Regressions.
Model (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Estimation OLS OLS GLS Tobit Tobit Tobit
Investment Outcome 5.025 5.188 5.365 5.025 5.188 5.347
(4.296) (4.032) (4.106) (4.274) (3.931) (3.753)
Round 3 -3.596 -3.589 -3.596 -3.590
(3.398) (3.390) (3.312) (3.313)
Age -0.509 -0.509 -0.509 -0.509
(0.460) (0.461) (0.449) (0.483)
Male -0.289 -0.319 -0.289 -0.316
(3.638) (3.589) (3.547) (4.632)
German Native 0.285 0.312 0.285 0.310
(8.203) (8.273) (7.997) (5.587)
Constant -8.260∗∗∗ 6.514 6.416 -8.260∗∗∗ 6.514 6.426
(2.642) (12.780) (13.001) (2.629) (12.459) (13.655)
Random Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Clustered Std. Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Observations 102 102 102 102 102 102
Clusters 51 51 51 51 51 51
Left-censored Obs. 0 0 0
Right-censored Obs. 0 0 0
Notes: Reported are OLS/GLS and two-censored (at -100 and 100) Tobit
regressions. Dependent variable is the difference between consumption shares
under non-pre-commitment (NPC) and under pre-commitment (PC). Standard
errors in parentheses. N = 51 subjects (cluster) and T = 4 decisions per
subject. ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
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Table 3.C.10: Difference in Commitment on Investment Choice: Regressions.
Model (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Estimation OLS OLS GLS Tobit Tobit Tobit
Investment Outcome 0.581 0.091 0.972 0.581 0.091 0.874
(3.824) (3.624) (3.512) (3.805) (3.533) (3.936)
Round 3 0.239 0.273 0.239 0.270
(3.680) (3.667) (3.588) (3.498)
Age 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004
(0.444) (0.444) (0.433) (0.491)
Male 0.329 0.180 0.329 0.197
(5.407) (5.424) (5.272) (4.708)
German Native -6.361 -6.223 -6.361 -6.239
(6.782) (6.802) (6.612) (5.676)
Constant -1.100 3.883 3.395 -1.100 3.883 3.450
(2.506) (13.031) (13.341) (2.493) (12.704) (13.887)
Random Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Clustered Std. Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Observations 102 102 102 102 102 102
Clusters 51 51 51 51 51 51
Left-censored Obs. 0 0 0
Right-censored Obs. 0 0 0
Notes: Reported are OLS/GLS and two-censored (at -100 and 100) Tobit
regressions. Dependent variable is the difference between investment shares
under non-pre-commitment (NPC) and under pre-commitment (PC). Standard
errors in parentheses. N = 51 subjects (cluster) and T = 4 decisions per
subject. ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
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Willingness-To-Pay for Internet Time
Figure 3.C.8: Aggregated Willingness-To-Pay (WTP) Curve.
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Notes: Reported is the willingness to pay (WTP) for a hypothetical additional
period of experimentation. The solid line represents a linear fit. We do not
find any indication for a non-linear realtionship by regressing WTP on min-
utes, squared minutes, or cubed minutes and clustering standard errors on the
subject level. The effect is robust to the inclusion of demographics.
Instructions: Please imagine the following situation. There exists another pe-
riod which again lasts for 19 minutes. During this time you can, as before, surf
the internet or perform the clicking task. If you spend the full 19 minutes per-
forming the clicking task, you receive 10 EUR. However, you can spend some
of these 10 EUR to acquire internet time. While you are surfing the internet,
the clicking task is deactivated as before. Please declare in the following table,
how much you are willing to dispense in order to spend the according number
of minutes in the internet.
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3.D Theoretical Appendix
Following the classification of DellaVigna (2009), we contrast standard preferences with
two non-standard preference specifications: (i) expectations-based reference-dependent
preferences and (ii) external-habit preferences.
3.D.1 Expectations-Based Reference-Dependent Preferences
Expectations-based reference-dependent preferences have been developed by Ko¨szegi and
Rabin (KR; 2006; 2007; 2009) and have since been shown to be consistent with real-world
behavior in a variety of domains, including taxicab drivers labor supply, expectations-
driven endowment effects, and real-effort experiments.36 KR preferences have been ap-
plied to consumption and asset pricing by Pagel (2012; 2014) and we follow her presenta-
tion of KR preferences and accordingly call an agent with such preferences a KR agent.
The KR agent’s period utility is given by
UKRt = u(Ct) + n(Ct, F
t−1
Ct
) + γ
∞∑
τ=1
δτn(F t,t−1Ct+τ ). (3.D.1)
First, consumption utility, u(Ct), corresponds to the utility from absolute con-
sumption as under standard preferences. Second, contemporaneous gain-loss utility,
n(Ct, F
t−1
Ct
), corresponds to the idea of prospect theory comparing current consumption,
Ct, with a reference point (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006)
make the reference point stochastic and Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2009) assume that in life-
cycle decisions, it corresponds to the rational expectations, F t−1Ct , that the agent forms
in the previous period t− 1 about current consumption in period t.37 In the comparison
with his reference point, the agent is loss averse, i.e., losses hurt him more than equally
sized gains please him.
Finally, the third term corresponds to prospective gain-loss utility and accounts for
the gain-loss feelings over the entire stream of future consumption. That is, in the previous
period t − 1, the KR agent forms beliefs about the entire future consumption stream.
Then, in period t, he learns the investment outcome and experiences gains-loss feelings
about future consumption prospects relative to what he has expected in the previous
36Mas (2006), Pope and Schweitzer (2011), and Card and Dahl (2011) provide field-data evidence
for adjustment of police performance after wage arbitration, expectation-based performance of golfers,
and increase in domestic violence after unexpected football outcomes, respectively. Taxi drivers’ daily
income and work load targeting is shown to be accordant to a forward looking reference point by Doran
(2010) and Crawford and Meng (2011).
37Specifically, n(Ct, F
t−1
Ct
) =
∫∞
0
µ
(
u(Ct) − u(c)
)
dF t−1Ct (c). Gain-loss utility is given by a two-piece
linear function µ(x) with η > 0 and a coefficient of loss aversion λ > 1. Hence, for gains, we have x > 0
and thus µ(x) = ηx. For losses, we have x ≤ 0 and thus µ(x) = ηλx.
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period.38 F t,t−1Ct+τ corresponds to the updated distribution of future consumption Ct+τ
based on the prior beliefs formed in period t− 1 and updated by the learned investment
outcome in period t. Furthermore, contemporaneous gain-loss feelings are more important
than prospective gain-loss feelings which are discounted by γ ≤ 1.
Pagel (2012) derives the optimal choice variables in a standard asset-pricing and
life-cycle consumption model which can be adapted to our economic environment. The
KR agent’s consumption share has the same structure as with standard preferences.
However, the expected discounted value of future consumption, ψKRt now varies with the
investment outcome. The KR agent’s response is negatively correlated with fluctuations
in wealth. That is, the consumption share decreases in the return realization. Hence, in
the event of a bad investment outcome, the agent consumes relatively more out of his
wealth than the standard agent does, i.e., ∂ρKRt /∂Rt < 0. This is because decreasing
consumption below the expected level is more painful than decreasing consumption in
future periods at which point the reference level will have adjusted to the decrease in
wealth and hence a lower consumption level is expected by that time (Barberis 2013).
The negative correlation with wealth innovations also holds for the investment share. In
case of a bad investment outcome, the KR agent experiences loss feelings over the entire
stream of future consumption. The agent is thus willing to increase the investment share
to not encounter all of the loss feelings, i.e., ∂αKRt /∂Rt < 0.
Pagel (2012; 2014) shows that the KR agent has a positive demand for pre-commitment
because he has a self-control problem. However, the PC plan that the KR agent wants to
pre-commit to differs from the one under standard preferences because the agent consid-
ers that his rational expectations depend on his optimal choice variables.39 Pagel (2012)
shows that under NPC, the KR agent is inclined to increase consumption above his be-
liefs and thus overconsumes relative to the pre-commitment plan, i.e., ρKR,PCt < ρ
KR,NPC
t .
Analogously, the KR agent is inclined to increase his risk exposure by choosing a higher
investment share, i.e., αKR,PCt < α
KR,NPC
t . Hereby, he enjoys the gain sensations of higher
consumption prospects, which outweigh the increase in consumption volatility. In addi-
tion, the choice variables under pre-commitment respond stronger in magnitude to wealth
fluctuations than under NPC. Hence, the amount of overconsumption and overinvestment
relative to the PC path is reference-dependent and increasing in the return realization:
∂∆ρKRt /∂Rt > 0 and ∂∆α
KR
t /∂Rt > 0
38Specifically, n(F t,t−1Ct+τ ) =
∫∞
0
∫∞
0
µ
(
u(c)− u(r))F t,t−1Ct+τ (c, r), where generally F t,t−1Ct+τ 6= F tCt+τ · F t−1Ct+τ
because the realization of future investment outcomes is contained in both the lagged beliefs and the
current beliefs.
39Under NPC, the KR agent is assumed to take his expectations formed in the previous period as
given in each period and to optimize relative to these expectations. This idea corresponds to the preferred
personal equilibrium (PPE) concept of Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2009). However, under PC, the KR agent
considers how his plan determines his beliefs instead of taking his expectations as given in any period.
This idea corresponds to the choice-acclimating personal equilibrium (CPE) of Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2009).
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3.D.2 External-Habit Preferences
The habit agent’s period utility function is given by u(Ct, X) = (Ct −X)1−θ/(1− θ). If
X = 0, EH preferences coincide with standard preferences and particularly have CRRA.
If X > 0, the agent’s relative risk aversion is given by θCt/(Ct −X) and thus decreasing
in the “surplus consumption” St := (Ct − X) (Campbell and Cochrane 1999).40 The
variation of relative risk aversion with variations in wealth generates the prediction that
the two choice variables are wealth dependent (Munk 2008, Brunnermeier and Nagel
2008).41
The habit agent’s increased risk aversion makes him invest less in the risky asset
than under standard preferences (Brunnermeier and Nagel 2008). A bad investment out-
come decreases wealth and the increase in risk aversion makes the habit agent reduce his
investment share, i.e., ∂αEH/∂R > 0. The effect of wealth fluctuations on the consump-
tion share depends on the level of surplus consumption. A bad investment outcome brings
current wealth closer to the habit level and increases the local concavity of the utility
function thus increasing marginal utility from consumption. Hence, the agent is likely to
increase his consumption share to stay above his habit. However, if surplus consumption
is large and there is no risk of falling short of the habit level, the agent consumes relatively
less in case of a bad investment outcome because local marginal utility of consumption
is low.
How the habit agent differs his choice variables based on the commitment status
depends on whether or not he anticipates the formation of a habit. If the habit agent is
naive in the sense that he does not anticipate his habit formation in period t = 0, he has
the same PC plan as under standard preferences. If the habit agent is sophisticated, his
behavior does not differ between PC and NPC. Whether the agent anticipates his level of
habit or not is arguable. Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2003) argue that people
have a projection bias and believe that future preferences resemble current preferences.
Specifically, people fail to predict how consumption habits form. Charness and Gneezy
(2009) conduct a field experiment on gym attendance and find that participants form
a habit to exercise that persists even after the completion of the experiment. Acland
and Levy (2013) conduct a similar field experiment and find that such habit formation
is not anticipated, i.e., participants indeed exhibit a projection bias. In our experiment,
subjects make a plan for the entire experiment before the very first round but after having
experienced the alternative monotone clicking task. Hence, we think that both the idea
of sophisticated anticipation as well as a projection bias is valid in our setting.
40The modeling of habit preferences in terms of differences between current consumption and a ref-
erence level is crucial for the time variation of relative risk aversion. Alternative models based on
“ratio habits” imply CRRA (e.g., Abel 1990). External ratio habits can be modeled as u(Ct, Xt) =
(Ct/Xt)
1−θ/(1− θ) yielding a coefficient of relative risk aversion of θX > 0.
41See also Constantinides (1990), Detemple and Zapatero (1991), and de Jong and Zhou (2013).
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Under the assumption of a projection bias, the habit agent has a time-inconsistency
problem because he builds up a habit that forces him to put some of his wealth aside in
order to sustain the habit level that he has not anticipated in his PC plan. Because the
habit agent invests most of his wealth in the risk-free asset to self-insure the stream of
future habit, he has a lower investment share under NPC than under PC (Brunnermeier
and Nagel 2008). In addition, his expected wealth is smaller under external habit than
under standard preferences. If the naive habit agent wants to accumulate the same
expected wealth as the standard agent, he has to have a lower consumption share. Hence,
under naive habit formation, the habit agent consumes less and has a lower investment
share under NPC than under PC because he has to make sure that he stays above his
habit level over all periods. Hence, ∆ρEH < 0 and ∆αEH < 0.42
42However, if the projection-bias assumption does not hold and the habit agent is sophisticated in
the sense that he anticipates his habit level, there is no difference between pre-committed and non-pre-
committed choices.

Chapter 4
PREFERENCES AND DECISION SUPPORT IN
COMPETITIVE BIDDING
4.1 Introduction
First-price sealed-bid auctions (FPSBA) and Dutch auctions (DA) yield the same revenue
as both formats are strategically equivalent. However, this strong theoretical result breaks
down empirically. Previous research suggests three possible explanations: opportunity
costs (Carare and Rothkopf 2005; Katok and Kwasnica 2007), preferences (Weber 1982;
Nakajima 2011; Lange and Ratan 2010; Belica and Ehrhart 2013; Ehrhart and Ott 2014),
and complexity of the decision (Cox, Smith, and Walker 1983). We analyze the role of
preferences and complexity while controlling for opportunity costs. Our results indicate
that the non-equivalence is driven by the complexity of competitive bidding rather than
by preferences.
Both the FPSBA and the DA, with slight variations, generate billions of dollar
in revenue each year.1 Governments and private firms frequently use the FPSBA for
procurement in construction and to subcontract with suppliers. Federal banks and firms
use variants of the DA to sell securities and refinance credit. The DA is also used in initial
public offerings (e.g., Google Inc.) as an alternative to classical valuation by investment
banks.2 Furthermore, the DA can be found on fish and fresh-produce markets (e.g.,
Cassady 1967). Thus, auctions as a mean to sell or procure goods and services have seen
a drastic increase in the last two decades.
The breakdown of strategic equivalence is a robust observation but the direction of
the deviation is non-conclusive. On the one hand, Coppinger, Smith, and Titus (1980)
and Cox, Roberson, and Smith (1982) find that the FPSBA yields higher revenue than
the DA in a controlled laboratory setting. On the other hand, in a field experiment on
an internet auction platform, Lucking-Reiley (1999) finds that the DA generates higher
revenue than the FPSBA. Differences in opportunity costs can explain these findings. A
DA arguably increases bidders’ opportunity costs as they have to frequently monitor the
price clock or even have to physically return to the auction site to check for updates in
1In an FPSBA, bidders simultaneously submit “sealed” bids to the seller and the highest bidder
receives the object and pays his bid. In a DA, the seller starts at a high initial ask price and gradually
decreases the ask price until the first bidder stops the auction, receives the item, and pays the stop price.
2Note, however, that these examples typically auction off multiple units and that the auctions are
then modified such that they usually do not discriminate between different bidders but apply a uniform-
pricing rule.
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prices. An FPSBA, on the other hand, can be ended immediately after the simultaneous
submission of bids.
Carare and Rothkopf (2005) show theoretically that such increased opportunity
costs increase the optimal bid. In a DA, Cox, Smith, and Walker (1983) and Katok and
Kwasnica (2007) analyze the trade-off between opportunity costs and additional utility
from suspense, i.e., from a joy to gamble. Both articles provide evidence that increasing
opportunity costs by increasing payoffs or by increasing the clock time, respectively,
increases bids in a DA. Our goal is to assess the predictive power of different preference-
based theories for observed bidding and to analyze the effect of complexity. Hence, we
eliminate this confound by holding the time per auction format and thus the opportunity
costs from participation constant. In addition, we hold the action set, i.e., the set of
feasible bids, constant across the two formats which allows a direct comparison of the
two auctions.
Preference theories assume Bayesian rationality in the sense that bidders derive and
process probabilities correctly. However, bidding in auctions is a demanding problem. In
deriving the optimal bid, the bidder faces a trade-off between increasing his winning
probability by submitting a higher bid and increasing his winning profit by submitting a
lower bid. Individual preferences determine the optimal bid that balances these diametric
effects. However, this optimization requires a certain level of mathematical sophistication.
It is thus possible that the complexity of bidding interferes with the effect of preferences.
In other words, bidders can make mistakes, e.g., in deriving the winning probability
associated with their bid. Therefore, we design a decision support system (DSS) to
reduce the complexity and assist bidders in deriving the optimal bid that corresponds to
their preferences.
The increase in the use of auctions has led to a rise in the demand for expert ser-
vices. While our implementation of decision support is primarily a mean of reducing
measurement noise, the design of such DSS is of also of interest in itself. Several patents
have been filed for (automated) bid-advising systems that account for, e.g., the auction
structure and risk attitudes of rival bidders based on historical data.3 Our DSS imple-
mentation resembles such automated bidding advice that estimates competitors’ bidding
behavior in a given auction format. In addition, there are more and more consulting firms
specializing in auctions (e.g., Market Design Inc.) and major economic consulting com-
panies offer services regarding auctions and bidding (e.g., The Brattle Group, NERA).
These services typically include all aspects relevant for setting up and participating in
auctions (e.g., bid tracking, bidding strategy, auction rules and design, training, provision
of input to regulators).
3See, for example, Guler et al. (2002), Guler, Liu, and Tang (2003; 2009), Zhang and Guler (2013).
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Strategic equivalence rests on the assumption that bidders have standard prefer-
ences, i.e., they derive utility only from realized payoffs. Regarding the departures from
standard preferences, we study expectations-based reference-dependent and Allais-type
preferences. We focus on these two specifications because they are frequently used to
explain decision making under uncertainty.4 Under reference dependence, the bidder
compares gains and losses in wealth relative to a reference point (Kahneman and Tver-
sky 1979). In this comparison, the bidder is assumed to be loss averse and puts more
weight on negative deviations from this reference point (losses) than on equivalent pos-
itive deviations (gains). Loss aversion contradicts the global-utility assumption of stan-
dard preferences because the bidder considers changes in wealth with respect to a local
reference point. However, the specification of the reference point is subject to debate.
Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006) propose expectations-based reference dependence, i.e., the ref-
erence point is stochastic and given by the rational expectations that the individual holds
over the outcomes of a risky decision.5 In the following, we will denote expectations-based
reference-dependent preferences as KR preferences.
Individuals with Allais-type preferences prefer outcomes that are generated with
certainty to the same outcomes that are generated by a risky lottery (e.g., Andreoni and
Sprenger 2010). This difference is most prevalent in the Allais paradox (Allais 1953).
Here, subjects prefer a degenerate lottery over a risky one with a higher expected value
but reverse their choice if both lotteries are monotonically transformed and become both
risky. This reversal is inconsistent with standard preferences as it violates the crucial
independence axiom of EUT (Savage 1954; Anscombe and Aumann 1963). According to
this axiom, decisions between lotteries should not depend on consequences that do not
differ between the lotteries.
Our experiment consists of two stages: (i) preference elicitation and (ii) competi-
tive bidding. First, we elicit individuals’ preferences in a fully non-parametric procedure,
i.e., without imposing any assumption on the functional form of utility (Abdellaoui, Ble-
ichrodt, and Paraschiv 2007). We elicit the utility function for both the gain domain and
the loss domain. This gives us a measure for risk and loss attitudes, respectively. Risk
attitudes correspond to the curvature of the utility function in the gain domain. Loss atti-
tudes correspond to the ratio of the slope of the utility function in the gain relative to the
slope in the loss domain. Subsequently, we measure to what extent participants exhibit
Allais-type preferences. For this, we measure the disposition toward the common-ratio
4Reference dependence as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is the most cited theory on
risky decision making (Kim, Morse, and Zingales 2006). Allais-type preferences are an early critique
of expected utility theory (EUT) (Allais 1953) and are empirically very robust in explaining deviations
from predictions under standard preferences (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Camerer 1989; Weber 2007).
5This modification has recently been successful in describing various empirical observations (e.g.,
Sprenger 2010; Ericson and Fuster 2011; Crawford and Meng 2011).
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effect, i.e., if subjects reverse their preference order if the probabilities of two prospects
are scaled by the same ratio.
Second, we record bidding behavior under the two mechanisms and alter the deci-
sion support. We vary the mechanism within-subject and the level of decision support
between-subject. Further, we randomly assign participants to one of three treatments.
Either they have medium (Medium DSS ) or full decision support (Full DSS ) to assist
bidding, or they do not have such a system (No DSS ). The decision support system is an
overlay displaying additional information. Medium DSS shows the winning probability
while Full DSS additionally provides expected profits. Although this information is re-
dundant for fully rational decision makers, it is non-trivial to derive and providing such
information greatly reduces the complexity of optimal bidding.
In line with the literature, we find significant differences between auction formats
if decision support is absent. However, differences vanish between participants once we
provide decision support regarding the winning probability. The additional provision of
expected profits does not change this result which indicates that probability weighting
is not an appropriate explanation (e.g., Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey 2002). Regarding the
prediction accuracy of preferences, expectations-based reference-dependent preferences
with linear utility (Linear KR) best predict individual bidding behavior. The predic-
tion accuracy is neither affected by the level of decision support nor by controlling for
demographics or numeracy.
Our contributions are twofold. First, we test individual bidding predictions under
both standard and non-standard preferences based on a non-parametric elicitation of
utility. Second, we design and test a decision support system (DSS) to mitigate the
complexity of bidding decisions using different levels of decision support. It is important
to note that we predict behavior based on actually measured individual parameters and
do not merely fit model parameters to ex-post rationalize bidding behavior as calibration
procedures do. We are not aware of any other work that either elicits preferences to assess
bidding predictions in the two auction formats or analyzes how bidding varies with the
availability of decision support.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the model environment
and theoretically analyzes the effect of preferences on optimal bidding in both formats.
Section 4.3 presents our experimental elicitation of preferences. We discuss the results
of this elicitation in Section 4.4. Subsequently, we present our auction environment and
the implementation of the DSS and further derive individual bidding predictions (Section
4.5). Section 4.6 reports the observed bidding behavior. We discuss the validity of the
preference elicitation in Section 4.7 and Section 4.8 concludes.
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4.2 Theory
In this section, we first describe the two auction mechanisms. We then characterize the
equilibria in both setups for standard preferences (SP), Ko¨szegi-Rabin (KR) preferences,
and Allais-type (AT) preferences.
4.2.1 Auction Formats
In each auction, there are three players: one seller and two buyers. The seller has one
indivisible item for sale. Bidder i has a valuation vi for the item where valuations are
private information and independently and identically drawn according to a distribution
function F (v) on [v, v]. Without loss of generality, we normalize v = 0 and v = 1.
Moreover, we normalize u(0) = 0. We define the following terms. Bids are bidders’
price offers in an FPSBA at which they are willing to buy the item. Asks are seller’s
price offers in a DA for which she is willing to sell the item. Prices, in both formats,
correspond to the accepted price offer. Price offers (bids and asks) are discrete. In the
FPSBA, bidders can choose bids from the set of possible prices B = {b1, . . . , bn−1, bn}
where 0 = b1 < . . . < bn−1 < bn. In the DA, the seller’s ask starts at the highest
possible price p1 and is subsequently replaced by the next smaller price from the set
P = {p1, . . . , pn−1, pn} where p1 > . . . > pn−1 > pn = 0 until the auction ends.6
In the FPSBA, the bidder who places the highest bid wins the auction. Similarly,
in the DA, the bidder who is the first to accept a standing ask wins the auction. The
winning bidder receives the item and pays the price. If the bidder does not win the
auction, he does not receive the item and pays nothing. Ties are broken at random with
equal probability to receive the item.
4.2.2 Standard Preferences
This section derives the equilibrium bidding strategy under standard preferences. Stan-
dard preferences are outcome-based, i.e., they consider only realized payoff outcomes.
Furthermore, bidders only consider their own payoff and are consistent with EUT, imply-
ing Bayesian rationality. In addition, under standard preferences, the bidder has a global
utility function (DellaVigna 2009). Hence, standard preferences are represented by the
following monotone utility function
uSP(x) = u(x) (4.2.1)
for every x ∈ R. A bidder’s risk attitude is characterized by the curvature of his utility
function. A bidder is risk-averse if and only if his utility function is concave; he is risk-
6Note that B and P have the same elements where b1 = pn, b2 = pn−1, . . . , bn = p1.
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seeking if and only if his utility function is convex (Gollier 2001). The specific bidding
function depends on the functional form of expression (4.2.1). We focus on standard
preferences represented by a power-utility function of the form u(x) = xβ in deriving the
bidding function.
First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction
In the FPSBA, bidder i decides on his bid bi ∈ P facing the following trade-off. On the
one hand, a higher bid makes winning more likely as it increases the chance to exceed
the other bidder’s bid bj. On the other hand, the payoff in case of winning is smaller
the higher the bid. The optimal bid bi,∗ that balances this trade-off and maximizes the
bidder’s expected utility is given by
bi,∗ = arg max
bi∈P
uSP(vi − bi) Pr{bj < bi}+ uSP(vi − bi) 1
2
Pr{bj = bi}. (4.2.2)
The first term on the right-hand side corresponds to the utility in case that bidder
i wins. The second term on the right-hand side is the expected utility in case of a tie,
which is broken with equal probability. In case that bidder i loses the auction, he does not
receive the item and pays nothing. In Proposition 2, FP denotes the first-price sealed-bid
auction.
Proposition 1 [Equilibrium FPSBA – SP] There exists a sequence {zSPk }k∈{1,...,n} such
that
βSP,FP(v) =
b1 for vi ∈ [0, zSP1 ]bk for vi ∈ (zSPk−1, zSPk ] with k ≥ 2, (4.2.3)
where bk+1 = bk + δ and b1 = 0, constitutes an equilibrium bidding strategy.
The proof is relegated to Appendix 4.A.1. The outline of the proof is as follows.
Following Chwe (1989) and Cai, Wurman, and Gong (2010), we first construct the se-
quence {zSPk }k∈N ⊂ [0, 1] that partitions the type space into intervals. We then use this
sequence to apply the bidding strategy (4.2.6). The sequence {zSPk }k∈N is derived by as-
suming that the bidder bids bk in equilibrium, i.e., no other bid should be a better choice
for the bidder. Since the winning probability and the utility function are both monotonic
in b, it suffices to compare bk−1 and bk+1 with bk. This gives us the inequalities needed
to recursively compute the sequence {zSPk }k∈N. With these, the bidding strategy from
Proposition 2 constitutes an equilibrium bidding strategy.
Dutch Auction
For the dynamic course of the DA, we adopt the modeling approach of Bose and Daripa
(2009). In the DA, the seller starts the auction with the highest ask p1. She then
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approaches each bidder sequentially asking whether or not the bidder accepts that ask.
Which bidder is asked first is randomly determined at the beginning of each offer. Each
bidder has the same chance to be asked first. In case that the bidder who is asked first
rejects the offer, the seller offers the same ask to the other bidder.
Facing the current ask, bidder i has the following trade-off. On the one hand, he
can accept the offer and stop the auction. In this case, he receives the item with certainty.
On the other hand, he can reject the offer hoping for a better one. In this case, he could
make a greater payoff but also faces the risk that the other bidder stops the auction
before he is asked again. At each ask pk, bidder i decides whether to accept or to wait
for the next offer.
We begin by comparing the utility the bidder earns if he accepts now in period k,
i.e.,
uSP(vi − pk), (4.2.4)
to the expected utility if he waits for the next price, that is,
E[uSP(vi − pk+1)] = H ik · uSP(vi − pk+1), (4.2.5)
where H ik is the probability given distribution F (v) that bidder i receives the item at
price pk+1 given that he refuses the price pk. The probability H
i
k consists of two parts:
the probability φik under F that i obtains the item at the next price pk+1 given that it is
still available at that price, i.e., that it has not been sold at price pk; and the probability
ρik under F that the item is actually available at price pk+1 given that bidder i refused
price pk. Consequently, we have H
i
k = φ
i
k · ρik.
Proceeding with this comparison for all prices, we obtain the inequalities needed
to construct the same sequence {zSPk }k∈N ⊂ [0, 1] as in the FPSBA that determines the
following equilibrium bidding strategy.
Proposition 2 [Equilibrium DA– SP] There exists a sequence {zSPk }k∈{1,...,n} such that
βSP,DA(v) =
p1 for vi ∈ [zSP1 , 1]pk for vi ∈ [zSPk , zSPk−1) with k ≥ 2, (4.2.6)
where pk+1 = pk − δ and pn = 0, constitutes an equilibrium bidding strategy.
The detailed proof is relegated to Appendix 4.A.2. While the bidding strategies of
the FPSBA and the DA look a bit different, they yield the same equilibrium bids for all
valuations under standard preferences. Hence, the two formats are strategically equivalent
(Vickrey 1961). This implies that both formats yield the same realized revenue.7
7Note that the revenue equivalence theorem only yields the same expected revenue; and this is
true only under very restrictive assumptions. Hence, strategic equivalence is stronger because not only
expected but actually realized revenues are the same.
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4.2.3 Expectations-Based Reference Dependence: KR Preferences
This section derives the equilibrium bidding strategy under expectations-based reference-
dependent preferences as proposed by Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006, KR). KR preferences
are given by a utility function uKR consisting of the following two parts. First, the term
u(x) corresponds to utility of payoff x as under standard preferences. Second, the term
n(x, r) = µ(u(x) − u(r)) corresponds to gain-loss utility that evaluates wealth against a
reference level r (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Gain-loss utility is defined piecewise as
n(x, r) =
η(u(x)− u(r)) if x > rηλ(u(x)− u(r)) if x ≤ r, (4.2.7)
where η > 0 determines how important the gain-loss utility component is relative to
the standard utility. Furthermore, λ represents the level of loss aversion which weighs
negative deviation from the reference point (losses) relative to positive deviations (gains).
If λ > 1, the bidder is loss averse, i.e., losses hurt him more than equally sized gains please
him. If λ = 1, the agent is loss-neutral and if λ < 1 the agent is gain-seeking. Total
utility is the sum of both parts and given by
uKR(x, r) = u(x) + n(x, r). (4.2.8)
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose the piecewise specification of gain-loss util-
ity. Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006) augment this idea by assuming that the reference point
is stochastic and formed by the rational expectations of the bidder. Specifically, they
propose that the bidder evaluates each possible outcome x under the winning probabil-
ity Pr{x|b} against all other possible outcomes under this distribution. In our auction
environment, x can take two values: v− b in case of winning and 0 else. Thus, stochastic
gain-loss utility is given by
n(x, r) =
∑
x∈{v−b,0}
∑
r∈{v−b,0}
Pr{x|b} Pr{r|b} µ(u(x)− u(r)). (4.2.9)
We follow the literature and focus on the effect of loss aversion by assuming that utility
of payoff u(x) is linear and set η = 1. Hence, gain-loss utility n(x, r) is a two-piece linear
function.
First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction
The optimization problem is equal to maximizing the expected total utility given by
E[uKR(vi, bi)] = Pr{win|bi}(vi − bi) + Pr{win|bi}(vi − bi)(1− Pr{win|bi})
− λ(1− Pr{win|bi})(vi − bi) Pr{win|bi}. (4.2.10)
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In contrast to the optimization problem under standard preferences given in (4.2.2), the
bidder now considers two more terms as he compares the actual outcome to all possible
outcomes induced by his bid. The bidder experiences gain-loss utility in each of the two
possible comparisons: winning the auction but having expected to lose it and losing the
auction but having expected to win it. Because the agent is rational, Pr{win|bi} is his
belief to win the auction generating the reference point rwin = vi− bi. With the converse
probability 1− Pr{win|bi}, he expects to lose the auction generating the reference point
rlose = 0.
Hence, in case of winning, his total utility is given by
uKR,win = vi − bi + Pr{win|bi}λ
= 0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(vi − bi − (vi − bi)) +(1− Pr{win|bi})(vi − bi − 0)
(4.2.11)
consisting of payoff utility vi−pi and the gain feeling of having won the auction although
he expected to lose it. Gain-loss utility in case of winning is zero because the agent
expected to win the auction with probability Pr{win|bi} in which case the outcome co-
incides with the reference point. The third term is the gain feeling against the reference
point rlose = 0 weighted with the rational belief of losing the auction.
If the bidder actually loses the auction, total utility is given by
uKR,lose = 0 + Pr{win|bi}λ(0− (vi − bi)) + (1− Pr{win|bi})(0− 0). (4.2.12)
Now, payoff utility is augmented by the loss feeling of actually receiving zero although
expecting rwin = vi − bi with the probability of winning the auction. Because the agent
is loss averse, the loss feeling is additionally weighted by λ > 1.
The derivation of the equilibrium bidding strategy under KR preferences has the
same structure as under standard preferences.
Proposition 3 [Equilibrium FPSBA – KR] For a sufficiently fine price grid, there exists
an equilibrium bidding strategy under KR preferences in the FPSBA. For λ > 1, the
bidder bids more aggressively whereas for λ < 1, he bids less aggressively than with linear
standard preferences.
The proof of Proposition 3 is relegated to Appendix 4.A.1.
Dutch Auction
Deriving the equilibrium bidding strategy in the DA with KR preferences follows the
same logic as with standard preferences. As accepting the current price pk yields a
certain payoff, total current utility is given by
ui,KRk = v
i − pk. (4.2.13)
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The expected payoff from waiting for the next better price pk+1 incorporates the an-
ticipation of gain-loss feelings following the same logic as in the FPSBA and is given
by
E[ui,KRk+1 ] = H
i
k (v
i−pk+1)+H ik(1−H ik) (vi−pk+1−0)+(1−H ik)H ikλ(0−vi+pk+1). (4.2.14)
With probability H ik, the bidder expects to be offered and to accept the next price
pk+1 generating the reference point v − pk+1. With the converse probability 1 − H ik, he
expects that the other bidder stops the auction before he is offered pk+1 generating the
reference point zero. The equilibrium bidding function under KR preferences is stated in
the following proposition.
Proposition 4 [Equilibrium DA – KR] There exists an equilibrium bidding strategy for
KR preferences in the DA. For λ > 1, the bidder bids more aggressively whereas for λ < 1,
he bids less aggressively than with linear standard preferences.
The proof of Proposition 4 is relegated to Appendix 4.A.2.
4.2.4 Allais-Type Preferences
Allais-type preferences violate the independence (or substitution) axiom, which is essen-
tial for EUT (Allais 1953; Savage 1954; Anscombe and Aumann 1963). We illustrate
Allais-type preferences by the common-ratio effect (CRE). Let L = (x, ξ; 0) denote a
lottery that yields a payoff of x > 0 with probability ξ and with probability 1 − ξ, the
payoff is zero. Participants face two pairs of lotteries: a scaled-up pair and a scaled-down
pair (Cubitt, Starmer, and Sugden 1998). In the scaled-up pair, individuals compare a
degenerate lottery L D1 = (x1, 1; 0) and a risky lottery L
R
2 = (x2, ξ2; 0) with x2 > x1 > 0.
In the scaled-down pair, the probabilities are scaled by a common ratio ρ < 1 which turns
the first lottery risky. The individual now compares L D,ρ1 = L
R
1 = (x1, ρ; 0) and lottery
L R,ρ2 = (x2, ρ · ξ2; 0). The independence axiom states that an individual who is indif-
ferent between the scaled-up lotteries should also be indifferent between the scaled-down
lotteries for any ρ ∈ (0, 1]. That is, if one scales the probabilities of both lotteries by a
common ratio, the preference ordering is not affected under EUT.
However, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) report that subjects have a preference
for certainty, i.e., outcomes in a degenerate lottery. In their experiment, a majority of
individuals reveals L D1  L R2 but L R1 ≺ L R2 thus violating independence. This so
called “Allais paradox” (Allais 1953) is empirically very robust although reverse Allais-
type preferences, i.e., a preference for risky outcomes if a certain outcome is available,
have also been observed experimentally (Camerer 1989; Weber 2007).
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Similar to Andreoni and Sprenger (2010) and Nakajima (2011), we argue that Allais-
type preferences can be modeled by assigning a different utility function for certain out-
comes than for risky outcomes:
uAT(x) =
uD(x) if x ∈ XDuR(x) if x ∈ XR, (4.2.15)
where XD is the set of outcomes of degenerate lotteries and XR is the set of outcomes of
risky lotteries. In EUT, it holds that uD(x) = uR(x). If uD(x) > uR(x), the individual
has Allais-type preferences; if uD(x) < uR(x), the individual has reverse Allais-type
preferences.
Bidding Behavior
For the FPSBA, Allais-type preferences do not change bidding behavior compared to
standard preferences since all outcomes are risky. Therefore, the same bidding function
applies.
In the DA, the situation changes because accepting the current price yields a certain
payoff which is evaluated by uD whereas waiting for the next price is risky and outcomes
are thus evaluated by uR. We can derive the bidding function in the same way as under
standard and KR preferences if we assume that
uAT(x) =
u(x) if x ∈ XDαAT · u(x) if x ∈ XR, (4.2.16)
where α ∈ R+.
Proposition 5 [Equilibrium DA - AT] There exists an equilibrium bidding strategy for
AT preferences in the DA. For αAT > 1, the bidders bid more aggressively than with
standard preferences.
The proof is relegated to Appendix 4.A.2
Proposition 6 [Bidding Allais-type preferences] Allais-type preferences lead to overbid-
ding in the DA relative to the FPSBA if and only if αAT > 1.
The proof directly follows from the proof of Proposition 5. Intuitively, the current price
pk is augmented by a psychological premium for certainty. Thus, in the DA, a buyer
accepts higher prices since he overvalues a certain outcome in comparison to the risky
expected outcome if he waits for the next price. The certainty premium, however, is
absent in the FPSBA.8
8We note that the overbidding only works given our organization of the DA as we resolve the order in
which the seller approaches the two bidders at the beginning of a period. If we had broken ties at random
after each round, which is frequently done in DA implementations, the current price would actually be
risky as well and Allais-type preferences would coincide with standard preferences.
122 4. PREFERENCES AND DECISION SUPPORT IN BIDDING
The CRE violates the independence axiom which is a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for strategic equivalence between the FPSBA and the DA (Grimm and Schmidt
2000). Note that the direction of bidding differences between the two formats depends
on the direction of Allais-type preferences. Weber (1982) discusses a particular class of
reverse Allais-type preferences and theoretically shows that the FPSBA yields higher rev-
enues than the DA. In a more general setup, Nakajima (2011) considers both Allais-type
and reverse Allais-type preferences and theoretically shows that Allais-type preferences
imply overbidding in the DA compared to the FPSBA. Our model of Allais-type pref-
erences represented by utility function (4.2.16) is flexible enough to account for both
Allais-type and reverse Allais-type preferences.
4.3 Experiment 1: Preferences and Characteristics
We start by presenting the elicitation of the utility function and the measurement of
decision biases. Subsequently, we present our results for Experiment 1. Appendix 4.D
provides screenshots of the experimental implementation.
4.3.1 Experimental Design
In Experiment 1, we measure (i) risk aversion, (ii) loss aversion, (iii) Allais-type prefer-
ences, and (iv) numeracy. We first discuss the general measurement procedure for the
first three aspects. We then present the respective measures for risk and loss aversion as
well as for Allais-type preferences. Last, we discuss how we measure individual numeracy.
Pairwise Comparison of Lotteries
The measurement of risk and loss aversion as well as Allais-type preferences is based
on pairwise comparisons of lotteries. This lottery trade-off method was developed by
Wakker and Deneffe (1996) and estimates the utility function via a sequence of indif-
ference values.9 Participants are presented with two lotteries generically named A and
B, respectively, and have to decide which lottery they prefer. For example, consider
the lotteries Ax1 = (x
∗
1, p;xA) and Bx0 = (x0, p;xB) with xA < xB < x0 and a fixed
probability p > 0. The value x∗1 is elicited such that the participant shows Ax1 ∼ Bx0 .
Once an indifferent value has been elicited, it is used as an input for later lotteries
to elicit further indifferent points. In the example, the participant now chooses be-
tween the lotteries Ax2 = (x
∗
2, p;xA) and Bx1 = (x
∗
1, p;xB) to determine x
∗
2 yielding
u(x∗2) − u(x∗1) = u(x∗1) − u(x0) (Wakker and Deneffe 1996). In the experiment, sub-
9See Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2008) for a survey on different measurement procedures.
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jects had to wait for ten seconds before they were allowed to choose a lottery to prevent
accidental misclicks.
Ultimately, the trade-off method derives a sequence of monetary values that are
equally spaced in terms of utility. Using lotteries with negative outcomes, we get a
sequence of losses {lr}r=0,...,rL with l0 < . . . < lrL such that u(lr) − u(lr+1) = u(lr+1) −
u(lr+2). Analogously, using lotteries with positive outcomes, we get a sequence of gains
{gr}r=0,...,rG with g0 < . . . < grG such that u(gr) − u(gr+1) = u(gr+1) − u(gr+2). For a
pre-specified range, we can thus approximate the actual utility function by interpolating
between these values. That is, while the vertical utility axis is partitioned equally, the
according values on the horizontal money axis vary depending on individual preferences.
Finally, we can normalize the entire utility function by assuming that u(0) = 0 and
setting u(l0) = −1.
As in Abdellaoui (2000), we derive indifference values as midpoints between choices
using an iterative bisection algorithm. Hence, directly stating indifference between lottery
A and lottery B is not allowed/possible. Subsequent lotteries are rather adjusted in the
direction of the previous choice to narrow down the interval in which the indifference value
lies. The trade-off method does not make any assumptions concerning the functional form
of utility or probability weighting and is hence robust against any deviation from linear
probability weighting. In contrast, the certainty-equivalent method or the probability-
equivalent method, which are frequently used in experimental work, crucially assume
that participants do not distort probabilities (Harrison and Rutstro¨m 2008). The former
method elicits a certain amount that makes the participant indifferent to a lottery while
the latter asks for a probability of a lottery that makes the participant indifferent to a
certain amount.10
While the trade-off method can measure utility non-parametrically both on the gain
and on the loss domain, it cannot measure loss aversion, i.e., the relation of the slope of
utility in gains to the slope of utility in losses, without assumptions about the probability-
weighting function (Abdellaoui et al. 2008). The coefficient of loss aversion λ crucially
depends on the way an individual weighs probability.11 We therefore elicit risk and loss
aversion via the procedure of Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007) who augment
10In later steps of the procedure by Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007), one lottery is
degenerate and certainty equivalents are elicited. However, these steps allow for arbitrary probability
weighting because the first step of the procedure measures the degree of probability weighting non-
parametrically.
11To see this, consider two lotteries A = (x, p; 0) and B = (0, p; y) with x > 0 > y. Under prospect
theory, an individual i is indifferent between A andB if and only if Eu(A ) = Eu(B) which is equivalent
to wG(p)u(x) = wL(1 − p)λu(y). Solving for the coefficient of loss aversion, we get λ = wG(p)/wL(1 −
p) · u(x)/u(y). Hence, λ depends on the degree of probability weighting. We underline the strength of
the non-parametric measurement as we do not have to make functional assumptions regarding w(·) or
u(·).
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the trade-off method by a non-parametric elicitation of loss aversion.12 Specifically, Ab-
dellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007) construct a sequence of monetary values that
runs through the reference point of zero, i.e., {l0, l1, ..., lkL , 0, g0, g1, ...gkG}. They achieve
this by linking the loss and gain domain with mixed gambles, i.e., gambles that involve
both gains and losses.
Structure and Incentives
In general, the measurement of utility functions over gains and losses is performed using
hypothetical payoffs or, if real incentives are used, only lotteries in the gain domain
are played out due to potential ethical issues with real monetary losses (Abdellaoui 2000;
Harrison and Rutstro¨m 2008). Cerroni, Notaro, and Shaw (2012) show that real monetary
incentives yield better estimates under chained elicitation than hypothetical payoffs do.
Etchart-Vincent and l’Haridon (2011) find that hypothetical and real monetary incentives
yield significant differences in the gain domain but not on the loss domain. We use actual
monetary incentives for each participant in all elicitations by randomly choosing one
pairwise lottery comparison and playing out the chosen alternative for real.
As subjects could win and lose substantial amounts of money in our lottery stage,
we protected our participants in two ways. First, each subject was endowed with a large
initial amount in that stage. This way we could guarantee that conservative subjects
could select lotteries in a way that the highest possible loss was still smaller than the
endowment. Second, participants knew that they could declare the lottery stage as non-
payoff-relevant after they made all lottery choices but before they knew the outcome of the
lottery stage.13 We include this no-pay option for three reasons. First, in the instructions,
subjects have only limited information about the magnitude of the lotteries subsequently
presented to them. Hence, from an ethical point of view, we cannot force them to ex-
ante agree to bear monetary losses whose magnitude would only be revealed during the
elicitation itself. Second, subjects could doubt that we actually enforce the payment of
losses beyond the initial endowment. This would increase the noise of measurements
based on lotteries involving high-magnitude losses. By declaring their choices to be
payoff-relevant, we gain additional credibility in enforcing financial liability. Third, the
no-pay option works as a check for response errors. In case subjects accidentally click
on the non-preferred lottery, the bisection algorithm yields a biased estimate. However,
error checks that rely on re-running parts of the elicitation procedure (as in Abdellaoui,
Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv 2007) suffer from other problems: they give away the chained
12Furthermore, Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007) note that their procedure satisfies the
theoretical criteria for optimal efficiency derived by Blavatskyy (2006) in the sense that, relative to other
procedures, it has the smallest effect of error on the inferred utility function.
13In case that a participant decides that the lottery stage is not payoff relevant, he also loses the
lottery-stage endowment. However, that participant still takes part in all other parts of the experiment.
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structure of the elicitation and the instructions cannot state how many choices have to
be made in total. The latter point, however, is a relevant payoff information necessary
to evaluate the expected payoff per individual choice. Conclusively, subjects who find
themselves on a lottery path they are not comfortable with can use the no-pay option.
This leaves us with estimates that actually represent a subject’s preferences. In total,
only one subject chose the no-pay option and did not return to Experiment 2.
4.3.2 Preferences
In this section, we discuss for each preference specification how we classify subjects based
on non-parametric measures. We use this classification to describe our sample in Section
4.4. We also state our parametric implementation of the respective utility functions that
we will use as input in Section 4.5.3 to predict bidding behavior in Experiment 2.
Risk Attitudes
We follow Abdellaoui et al. (2008) and measure utility curvature both non-parametrically
and parametrically. The non-parametric measure is the area under the curve (AUC),
i.e., the integral of the utility function on the gain domain (AUCG) and the loss domain
(AUCL), respectively. We normalize the domain of utility to [0, 1] by dividing each elicited
gain by the maximum gain and each elicited loss by the maximum loss. We interpolate
linearly between the elicited points and use a geometric approach to calculate the area.
On the gain domain, an individual is risk-averse if AUCG > 0.5, risk-neutral if AUCG =
0.5, and risk-seeking if AUCG < 0.5. On the loss domain, risk aversion corresponds to
AUCL < 0.5, risk neutrality to AUCL = 0.5, and risk seeking to AUCL > 0.5.
As a parametric measure, we fit a power utility function with constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) of the form αxβ to the elicited monetary values for each individual via
a non-linear least-squares estimation. The parameter α ∈ R scales the utility and the
parameter β ∈ R is a direct estimate of the utility curvature. When estimating the CRRA
utility, we distinguish between gains and losses, i.e., we fit a two-piece power function
given by
uCRRA(x) =
αG · xβG if x ≥ 0αL · (−x)βL if x < 0. (4.3.1)
On the gain domain, βG < 1 implies a concave utility and thus risk aversion. Risk
neutrality and risk seeking correspond to βG = 1 and βG > 1, respectively. On the loss
domain, βL > 1 corresponds to risk aversion whereas βL = 1 and βL < 1 imply risk
neutrality and risk seeking.
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Loss Aversion
Loss aversion relates the slope of utility in the gain domain to its slope in the loss domain.
At what point the slopes are evaluated is subject to debate and there exist several compet-
ing definitions. Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007) discuss several alternative
measures and while their method allows to estimate each of them, they conclude that the
definitions by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Ko¨bberling and Wakker (2005) were
empirically most useful in classifying subjects.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) define loss aversion by −u(−x) > u(x) for every
x > 0. We measure the coefficient of loss aversion as the mean of −u(−x)/u(x) for all
elicited values x ∈ {l0, l1, . . . , lkL , g0, g1, . . . , gkG}:
λKT79 = mean
(−u(−x)
u(x)
)
. (4.3.2)
In general, however, we do not observe u(−lr) and u(−gr) and use linear interpolation to
derive these values (Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and L’Haridon 2008). Given the definition
of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), an individual is loss averse if the coefficient of loss
aversion is greater than one.
As proposed by Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Ko¨bberling and Wakker (2005) define
the coefficient of loss aversion as
λ =
u′↑(0)
u′↓(0)
, (4.3.3)
where u′↑(0) is the right derivative and u
′
↓(0) is the left derivative of u at the reference
point of zero. In the statistical analyses, we estimate this value for individual i by the
ratio u(lkL)/u(g0) · g0/lkL (Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv 2007; Booij and Van de
Kuilen 2009). Note that u(lr) = −u(gr) by construction which means that the ratio
reduces to −g0/lkL .
Allais-Type Preferences
We utilize a metric measure of the common-ratio effect (CRE ) to assess the preference
reversal due to violations of the independence axiom. Our design is standard in eliciting
the degree to which participants exhibit the Allais paradox (e.g., Beattie and Loomes
1997; Dean and Ortoleva 2014; Schmidt and Seidl 2014). We elicit indifference points via
the same bisection algorithm as with risk and loss aversion.
Participants face two pairs of lotteries. With the scaled-up pair, we find the indif-
ference point ci,D such that participant i reveals A D = (x, 1; 0) ∼ BR = (ci,D, 0.8; 0).
With the scaled-down pair, we find the indifference point ci,R such that the participant
reveals A R = (x, 0.25; 0) ∼ BR,ρ = (ci,R, 0.2; 0). Note that A R and BR,ρ are based on
A D and BR where the probabilities are scaled by the common ratio ρ = 1/4. In other
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words, in both comparisons, the participant chooses a value in a risky lottery. In the
first comparison, the alternative is degenerate while it is risky in the second comparison.
Hence, ci,D is the compensation that the participant demands to be indifferent between
a risky and a degenerate lottery. Further, ci,R is the compensation that the participant
demands to be indifferent between two risky lotteries.
Under expected utility theory, the first indifference implies Eu(A ) = Eu(B) ⇔
u(x)/0.8 = u(ci,D). The second indifference implies Eu(A R) = Eu(BR,ρ)⇔ u(x)/0.8 =
u(ci,R). Taken together, we obtain ci,D = ci,R. Participants exhibiting the common-ratio
effect show a preference reversal such that ci,D > ci,R (Dean and Ortoleva 2014). That
is, they have a preference for certain outcomes. Conclusively, we measure the strength of
the Allais paradox by
CREi = ci,D − ci,R. (4.3.4)
Participants who show CREi = 0 are consistent with expected utility theory. Participants
with CREi > 0 show Allais-type preferences and are classified as such (Allais 1953;
Kahneman and Tversky 1979). These subjects demand more compensation for the risky
lottery BR in the scaled-up comparison than they demand for BR,ρ in the scaled-down
comparison. Participants with CREi < 0 are analogously classified as having reverse
Allais-type preferences (Weber 1982; Camerer 1989; Weber 2007).
We model Allais-type preferences by the two-piece utility function (4.3.5) that as-
signs larger utility for certain outcomes than for outcomes from risky lotteries. Based on
the indifference conditions between the scaled-up pair and the scaled-down pair, respec-
tively, we estimate a two-piece power utility with CRRA of the form
uAT(x) =
 1βAT · xβAT if x ∈ XDαAT
βAT
· xβAT if x ∈ XR,
(4.3.5)
where XD is the set of outcomes of degenerate lotteries and XR is the set of outcomes of
risky lotteries. If αAT = 1, the utility function (4.3.5) expresses standard preferences. If
CREi > 0, then αAT < 1 and the individual has Allais-type preferences.
4.3.3 Numeracy
In Section 4.6.2, we relate the predictive power of preferences to individual numeracy. In
deriving the optimal bid, it is crucial to have a certain mathematical sophistication. We
will thus consider statistical numeracy and probabilistic literacy (Numeracy) as a proxy
for a decision bias in terms of errors due to deficiencies in mathematical sophistication.
That is, participants lack some abilities that are crucial to derive the optimal bid such
as the derivation and processing of (conditional) probabilities.
We assess numeracy via an incentivized open-ended seven-item test. This test is a
combination of the Schwartz et al. (1997) Numeracy Test (SNT 1 to 3) and the Berlin
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Numeracy Test (BNT 4 to 7). The SNT items are standard in the numeracy literature
and assess the understanding of fundamental concepts of probability, e.g., the toss of a
fair coin or the conversion of percentages into absolute numbers. The BNT items assess
advanced concepts of statistical computation and conditional probability, i.e., the ability
to apply Bayes’ theorem. These harder items were specifically created for the assessment
of highly educated populations such as college students who are generally more familiar
with advanced mathematical concepts (Cokely et al. 2012).
Given that we sample from a student population, we think that the BNT is the
preferred choice. However, depending on the specific sample, the test may be too hard
resulting in a positively skewed distribution of correct answers. Cokely et al. (2012) note
that a combination of both the BNT and the SNT, on the other hand, resulted in a
normal distribution of correct answers with no indication of skewness.14 We therefore
follow this approach and use the combined test (SNT + BNT). We measure Numeracy
by the test score, i.e., the number of correct answers across all seven items. A list of all
items and respective answers is provided in Appendix 4.B.
For each item, participants have at most 120 seconds to provide their answer. If
they do not enter their answer in time, the item counts as falsely answered and the next
question comes up. We incentivize all seven items by paying 0.50 EUR per correct answer.
4.3.4 Organization
Both parts of the experiment were conducted in the Cologne Laboratory for Economic
Research (CLER) at the University of Cologne, Germany.15 Using the recruiting system
ORSEE (Greiner 2004), we invited a random sample of the CLER’s subject pool via
email. The email did neither mention the content of the experiment nor the expected
compensation. However, it made clear that payment was conditional on the participa-
tion in both experiments and that payment occurred after the completion of Experiment
2. Participants signed up on a first-come-first-serve basis. The whole experiment was
computerized using the programming environment z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). In both ex-
periments, participants received a hard copy of the instructions (see Appendix 4.C) and
an additional blank sheet of paper for notes. Furthermore, in Experiment 1, participants
had access to a calculator. Participants were given as much time as they needed to fa-
miliarize themselves with the respective part and the experimental procedure. Clarifying
questions were answered in private. Upon their arrival for Experiment 1, participants
were randomly assigned to computer terminals by drawing an ID number from a box.
14Cokely et al. (2012) used the combined test (SNT + BNT) on Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk with
a sample of n = 206 participants. They cannot reject a normal distribution of correct answers and find
no evidence of skew.
15www.lab.uni-koeln.de.
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All decisions and payments over the course of the entire experiment were linked to this
ID number, which was the same for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.
Experiment 1 was conducted on Friday, December 5, 2014, and consisted of two
sessions distributed over three rooms. Each session lasted approximately 1.5 hours on
average including the distribution and review of instructions and a post-experimental
questionnaire. Experiment 1 was the same for all participants. At the end of part one,
one lottery (in the gain or loss domain) was randomly selected for payment. However,
participants were neither told which lottery was selected nor how many correct answers
they had in the numeracy test until the very end of the entire experiment, i.e., after they
completed Experiment 2.
Experiment 2 was conducted on Friday, December 12, 2014, at the same time slots
and locations. We utilized three separate rooms in the laboratory simultaneously. This
allowed us to run all three DSS conditions simultaneously. Participants in room A faced
the No DSS condition, participants in room B faced the Medium DSS condition, and
participants in room C faced the Full DSS condition. Hence, we hold all exogenous
factors between the three DSS conditions constant. Upon their arrival for Experiment
2, participants were randomly assigned to these treatments depending on their ID num-
ber. Each session lasted approximately two hours. One round of each mechanism was
randomly selected for payoff.
In both experiments, payoffs were stated in Euros (EUR). Participants were paid
out in private for the entire course of experimentation after Experiment 2. This was made
clear in the invitation email as well as at the beginning of Experiment 1. At the very
end of Experiment 2, participants learned which lottery outcome had been realized from
Experiment 1. Participants were further informed about their earnings from the numeracy
test. All participants were paid their total net earnings, i.e., their earnings from the
auctions and their earnings from the numeracy test increased or decreased by the lottery
realization. Average payoff for the entire experiment was 36.63 EUR corresponding to
approx. 45.54 USD at the time of the payment. Payoffs range from −3.00 EUR (−3.73
USD) to 98.45 EUR (122.41 USD). The one subject who accumulated negative payoffs
paid in cash at the end of Experiment 2.
4.4 Results: Experiment 1
From the initial 90 participants in Experiment 1, 83 participants also showed up for Ex-
periment 2.16 However, one participant dropped out of Experiment 2 because of computer
problems. She was paid her earnings from Experiment 1 but was dropped from Experi-
16We do not find any indication that these seven participants where systematically different from the
remaining participants based on the non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U-test.
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ment 2. Hence, our data set consists of N = 83 independent and incentivized observations
for Experiment 1.17 The average age is 24.16 years and 45.8% of the participants were
male. Accordingly, Experiment 2 consists of N = 82 independent observations.
4.4.1 Preferences
We start with an analysis of standard preferences characterized by the shape of utility.
Subsequently, we report our measurements for the behavioral theories.
Utility Curvature
Figure 4.1 shows the elicited utility function for the aggregate data.18 For robustness and
comparability with Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007), we report both mean
and median of our results. Per construction, utility is equally separated and individual
curvature comes from variations of money for a given level of utility. In the aggregate, the
figure shows no indication of loss aversion around the reference point zero. Both mean
and median are concave in losses and slightly convex to linear in gains. Hence, we see a
first indication of a kink around zero which is more pronounced with the mean data.
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Note: Depicted is the aggregate utility for gains and losses based on the mean and median
data. N = 83.
Figure 4.1: Shape of Utility.
17Table 4.E.6 reports summary statistics for each treatment.
18Individual utility functions are depicted in Appendix 4.E.2.
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Risk Attitudes
First, we analyze risk attitudes with the non-parametric area under the curve (AUC).
On average, we measure AUCG to be 0.49 (std. dev. 0.13, median 0.49) which is not
significantly different from 0.5 (Wilcoxon signed-rank [SR] test, p = 0.5550). On the loss
domain, we measure an average AUCL of 0.3891 (std. dev. 0.182, median 0.3811) which
is significantly different from 0.5 (SR test, p = 0.0000). Hence, in the aggregate, based
on our non-parametric measure, we cannot reject risk neutrality on the gain domain but
we can reject risk neutrality on the loss domain in favor of risk aversion. Regarding our
parametric estimation of the utility function (4.3.1), we estimate an average βG of 1.74
(std. dev. 4.76, median 1.04) which is significantly different from 1 (SR test, p = 0.0708).
We estimate an average βL of 3.97 (std. dev. 7.21, median 1.74). These estimates are
statistically different (SR test, p = 0.0000).
If we look at the individual data, it is impossible for a subject to be exactly risk-
neutral according to AUC due to the precision of the bisection algorithm and the clearcut
definition of the AUC measure. We also classify subjects according to our parametric
power-utility estimation. Table 4.1 shows the classification of utility based on AUC and,
in parentheses, based on βG and βL. We find that 29% (37%) of our sample are risk-averse
both in gains and losses. Only 19% (12%) show a shape of utility that corresponds to
prospect-theory utility, i.e., concave utility for gains and convex utility for losses. The
majority of subjects, 42% (47%), are risk-seeking in gains but risk-averse in losses. Only
a small proportion of 10% (4%) are risk-seeking in both domains. The non-parametric
classification is significantly different for both domains (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.000).
Table 4.1: Classification of Risk Attitudes.
Losses
Gains Concave Convex Total
Concave 24 (31) 16 (10) 40 (41)
Convex 35 (39) 8 (3) 43 (42)
Total 59 (70) 24 (13) 83
Notes: Reported is the classification of participants based on the area under
the curve of the elicited utility function for gains and losses. In parentheses:
classification based on parametric estimates of βG and βL.
Compared to Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007), we find a larger pro-
portion of subjects with standard preferences of concave utility for both gains and losses
and a smaller proportion of subjects with prospect-theory preferences of concave utility
in gains and convex utility in losses. However, the idea that utility is convex for losses
is less empirically established than the concavity for gains. Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and
Paraschiv (2007, p. 1661) discuss previous studies which found that around 40% of the
participants exhibit standard preferences. Furthermore, they argue that these studies
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overestimate the proportion of subjects with convex loss utility by assuming EUT (i.e.,
they ignore probability weighting) which leads to a bias towards convexity for losses.19
Loss Attitudes
Table 4.2 shows the distribution of loss aversion and the classification of participants
according to the two definitions of Kahneman and Tversky (1979, KT79) and Ko¨bberling
and Wakker (2005, KW05). In the aggregate, we have mixed evidence for loss aversion.
Both measures exceed on average the loss neutral level of one. However, the KW05
measure has a large standard deviation in relation to its mean. A more detailed look at
the distribution of loss aversion shows that the KT79 measure indicates loss aversion for
the entire interquartile range (IQR) whereas the KW05 measure reveals that 50% of the
participants fall far short of loss neutrality. The KT79 measure is significantly different
from one (SR test, p = 0.0000) but the KW05 measure is not (SR test, p = 0.2640).
Hence, we can reject loss neutrality given the former measure but not if we consider the
latter.
Table 4.2: Loss Attitudes.
Measure Mean Median
(Std. Dev.) [IQR]
KT79 1.637 1.323
(0.703) [1.070–2.127]
KW05 5.662 0.465
(24.774) [0.187–1.515]
Notes: Reported are the summary statistics of loss-aversion measures. KT79
stands for the measure according to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), KW05
stands for the measure according to Ko¨bberling and Wakker (2005), IQR stands
for interquartile range. N = 83.
On the individual level, we can classify the vast majority of participants to be loss-
averse according to KT79. However, given KW05’s definition, only 31.33% of the sample
are loss-averse. This difference in classification is statistically significant (Fisher’s exact
test, p = 0.010). Table 4.3 cross tabulates both classifications. In total, 22 subjects
are classified consistently across the two measures. The KW05 measure classifies 55
participants as gain-seeking who are considered loss-averse according to KT79. None of
the two measures classifies a participant to be loss-neutral.20
19This is because these studies use risky loss prospects with probabilities exceeding 1/3. However,
under probability weighting, such larger probabilities are underweighted and, thus, the risky prospects
become more attractive.
20Note that the classification of most subjects as loss-averse based on the definition of Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) does not contradict the classification under risk aversion. The large number of loss-
averse subjects indicates that losses generally have a larger slope for smaller monetary values and thus
−u(−x) > u(x) on average.
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Table 4.3: Classification of Loss Attitudes.
KT79
KW05 Loss Averse Gain Seeking Total
Loss Averse 20 6 26
Gain Seeking 55 2 57
Total 75 8 83
Notes: Reported is the classification of participants based on their coefficient
of loss aversion. KT79 stands for the measure according to Kahneman and
Tversky (1979), KW05 stands for the measure according to Ko¨bberling and
Wakker (2005).
Allais-Type Preferences
We measure the Allais paradox via the common-ratio effect (CRE). On average, we
measure a CRE of 3.13 (std. dev. 10.61, median 2.00). Hence, participants demand on
average around three EUR more to be indifferent between both scaled-up lotteries (mean
cD = 15.36, std. dev. 8.51, median 13.00) than between both scaled-down lotteries (mean
cR = 12.23, std. dev. 8.01, median 11.00). Hence, they are more willing to choose the
riskier alternative if both lotteries involve risk (i.e., no lottery is degenerate). The CRE
is statistically different from zero (SR test, p = 0.0000). Based on their individual CRE,
we are able to classify 57 subjects (69%) to have Allais-type preferences, 18 subjects
(22%) to be consistent with EUT, and seven subjects (8%) to show reverse Allais-type
preferences.21
Numeracy
Participants answer, on average, 4.43 (std. dev. 1.48, median 5) questions correctly. We
can construct a Bayes sub-score which is based on questions BNT 2 and BNT 4 and
tests the understanding of conditional probability. This sub-score can take three possible
values: 0, 1, and 2. The median is zero and only six participants (7%) achieve a test score
of 2. Thus, the majority of subjects had difficulties dealing with conditional probabilities
which is crucial in deriving the optimal bidding strategy in the DA.
4.5 Experiment 2: Mechanisms and Decision Support System
In part two, we record individual bidding behavior in the two mechanisms. We first discuss
how we control for external factors. We then describe the actual bidding environment in
the lab. Subsequently, we present our implementation of the DSS. Appendix 4.D provides
21One subject could not be classified because ci,R < x in the scaled-down lotteries implying non-
montone preferences in this comparison.
134 4. PREFERENCES AND DECISION SUPPORT IN BIDDING
screenshots of the experimental implementation. Based on the data from Experiment 1,
we predict the optimal bidding function in Experiment 2 and present our results regarding
the accuracy of this prediction.
4.5.1 Mechanisms
As explained in Section 4.4, we utilize N = 82 independent observations. We vary the
mechanism within-subject and counterbalance the order, i.e., half of the participants first
play the FPSBA followed by the DA. The other half faced the reversed order.
Possible Confounds
Previous research argues that differences between the two mechanisms come from the
heterogeneous organization of the two auctions. The FPSBA is faster as it only requires
to place simultaneous bids and the winner can be announced immediately after all bids
are collected. The DA, on the other hand, requires a certain time interval for the clock to
reach the desired price level of an individual bidder. Hence, this bidder faces substantial
waiting costs. Carare and Rothkopf (2005) analyze the effect of transaction costs that
accrue from the necessity to return to the auction site to check whether the desired price
level has been reached. Not surprisingly, facing these additional costs, a bidder is willing
to stop the auction at a higher price so as not to need to return to the auction site
anymore.
Cox, Smith, and Walker (1983) and Katok and Kwasnica (2007) analyze the follow-
ing trade-off experimentally. Though bidders face transaction and/or opportunity costs
from slow DAs, they also enjoy the “waiting game” as it implies a certain level of sus-
pense. Cox, Smith, and Walker (1983) do not find that tripling payoffs, and therewith
increasing the opportunity costs of playing the waiting game, significantly increases bids
in a DA. Hence, they reject the hypothesis of “suspense utility”. Katok and Kwasnica
(2007) find that increasing the clock time, i.e., the time between consecutive price ticks,
significantly increases bids in a DA. Slow clocks increase opportunity costs which have to
be paid no matter if the bidder wins the auction or not. Katok and Kwasnica (2007) note
that, in the laboratory, these opportunity costs correspond most likely to participants’
value of leaving the laboratory earlier. Hence, a bidder is willing to accept a higher ask
to reduce the time to complete the experiment and save opportunity costs.
We account for this possible confound in two ways. First, we hold opportunity costs
constant across the two mechanisms. We follow Turocy, Watson, and Battalio (2007) and
keep the time per mechanism constant. That is, we fix the absolute time per mechanism
irrespective of how fast participants decide (FPSBA) or how early they stop (DA). One
4.5. EXPERIMENT 2: MECHANISMS AND DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM 135
round of bidding in the FPSBA always lasts 60 seconds.22 One round of bidding in the
DA always lasts 220 seconds, i.e., 10 seconds per price tick. If a participant accepts a
current ask, he wins the auction but the next round does not start before the 220 seconds
are over.23 Second, all subjects play both the FPSBA and the DA. This within-subject
variation not only increases statistical power in analyzing the difference between the two
mechanisms but also holds the overall time of Experiment 2 constant. Each participant
plays 18 rounds of the FPSBA and 18 rounds of the DA.
Katok and Kwasnica (2007) show that the clock speed has great impact on the
bids in a DA due to the implied differences in opportunity costs. Because we hold
opportunity costs constant, this is not an argument in our experiment. Participants in
the FPSBA have 60 seconds to arrive at a bid that balances the trade-off between the
winning probability and the profit in case of winning. On the one hand, the trade-off
between two consecutive price ticks in a DA is easier and participants should need less
time. On the other hand, we provide some time for the reference point to form which
is assumed to be given in Section 4.2.3. We therefore decide on a clock speed of 10
seconds. This is the same clock speed as in the middle treatment in Katok and Kwasnica
(2007). However, in contrast to their experiment, each DA lasts for 220 seconds in our
experiment.
In addition to control opportunity costs, we also hold action sets constant across the
two mechanisms. In Cox, Smith, and Walker (1983), participants’ bids are rounded to
the next feasible bid in the DA. Participants can then either confirm or alter this rounded
bid. In Katok and Kwasnica (2007), participants can bid integers in the FPSBA whereas
price decrements in the DA were five tokens. In contrast, in our design, participants in the
FPSBA face the same set of possible prices as in the DA. This is a direct transfer of the
model environment in Section 4.2.1 to the laboratory and guarantees strict comparability
between the two mechanisms.
Competitive Bidding
Each auction consists of one participant and one bidding robot as bidders. The bidding
robot draws one price from B or P , respectively, according to a uniform distribution. This
is the robot’s bid in the FPSBA and its stopping price in the DA. We use a bidding robot
as the competitor for three reasons. First, we do not want our results to be confounded
by other-regarding preferences that are not considered in any of the models presented in
Section 4.2.1. Second, we effectively reduce the strategic problem to a decision problem
22If participants do not enter a valid bid by the end of this time limit, they do not participate in the
auction in that round.
23In both mechanisms, after the auction is over, participants see a screen showing the remaining time
until the round is completed and whether or not they have won the auction.
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by fixing the strategy of the competitor. This makes it easier for subjects to focus on
their optimal strategy by breaking the dynamics of higher-order beliefs.24 Third, we are
able to precisely calculate the winning probability and the expected profit. The provision
of this information depends on the DSS-treatment status.
First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction
In the FPSBA, the computer screen informs the participants about their valuation and
features a testing area. In this area, participants can explore the consequences of a
particular bid on their profit and, depending on their DSS-treatment status, on the
winning probability and the expected profit (see Section 4.5.2). Participants are further
informed about the remaining time of this round. Finally, they enter their actual bid
and submit this bid by pressing a button. After submitting their bid, participants are
immediately informed whether they have won the auction and about the remaining time
the current auction lasts. When the round has timed out, a feedback screen informs the
subjects about their valuations, the winning bid, whether or not they receive the item,
and their profit for this round.
Dutch Auction
In the DA, the computer screen informs participants about their valuation and displays
the current price, the time until the next price, and the next price. As in the FPSBA,
participants are informed about their profit given both the current and the next price.
Depending on their DSS-treatment status, participants are also informed about the proba-
bility to be offered the current price and the next price and the associated expected profits
(see Section 4.5.2). Finally, participants can accept the current price by pressing a but-
ton. After either the participant or the computer bidder has accepted the current price,
participants are immediately informed whether they have won the auction and about the
remaining time the current auction lasts. When the round has timed out, participants
receive the same feedback as in the FPSBA.
4.5.2 Decision Support System
The theoretical analysis on the role of preferences in Section 4.2 highlights the fact that
deriving the optimal bid depends on the following aspects: (i) the profit from winning
with the chosen bid, vi − bi, (ii) the probability to win with the chosen bid, Pr{win|bi},
and (iii) the expected utility derived from the combination of the former two. As pointed
24Note that the model in Section 4.2.3 assumes that loss aversion is common knowledge. However,
one cannot ensure common knowledge in reality.
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out in the previous section, the latter depends on the individual preferences whereas the
former two are identical across all theories. Hence, we design a DSS that assists the
bidder by providing (i) the profit from winning, (ii) the winning probability, and (iii) the
expected profit which is the product of (i) and (ii).
Any deviation from bidding predictions can result from two sources: an omitted
preference specification or problems in deriving the optimal bid. Our DSS allows us to
disentangle the role of preferences from the impact of a lack of mathematical sophistica-
tion (complexity). This is because, in the experiment, we fix the bidding strategy of the
competitor and hence reduce the problem to find mutual best responses to the problem
to find a one-sided best response, i.e., an optimization problem. We can thus objectively
state expected profits and winning probabilities that should help participants derive the
bid that maximizes the expected utility based on their actual preference specification.
In other words, we implement the DSS to analyze whether observed bids are due to the
underlying preferences or the complexity of the auction.
Specifically, the DSS varies between participants regarding the information a bidder
receives during an auction. There are three nested levels of DSS: No, Medium, and Full
DSS. In the FPSBA, the information is given for the current test bid. In the DA, the
information is given for both the current and the next price. We vary the information
content of the DSS between participants. The information content in each condition is
as follows:
• No DSS. In the FPSBA, subjects see the profit if bid was successful which is the
profit their test bid would generate given that it won the auction. In the DA,
subjects see the profit at given price which is the profit they would generate if they
accepted the current price or if they now decided to accept the next price.
• Medium DSS. Subjects have the same information as in No DSS. In addition,
in the FPSBA, they also see the winning probability of their test bid which is
the probability of having a higher bid than the competitor plus the probability
of having the same bid and being selected as winner by the tie-breaking rule. In
the DA, subjects receive the probability to be offered the given price for both the
current and the next price. The probability to receive the current price pk is trivially
given by 100%. However, the probability to be offered the next ask, H ik, is highly
non-trivial to derive (see Section 4.A.2).
• Full DSS. Subjects have the same information as in Medium DSS. In addition, in
the FPSBA, they also see the expected profit of their test bid. In the DA, subjects
see the expected profit of the next price. In the FPSBA, the expected profit is the
product of the winning probability and the profit if the bid was successful. In the
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DA, the expected profit is the product of the probability to be offered the given
price and the profit at the given price.
We are not aware of any other work that incorporates decision support in auctions.
Armantier and Treich (2009) elicit both subjective probabilities and risk preferences in an
attempt to find an explanation for overbidding in experimental first-price auctions. The
authors report that participants underestimate their winning probability which indeed
leads to overbidding. Furthermore, Armantier and Treich (2009) investigate the effect
of a feedback system regarding winning probabilities. The feedback is implemented as
follows. Participants are asked to predict their winning probability and they are given
feedback regarding the precision of their prediction at the end of each round. As such,
their feedback system is designed to induce learning whereas learning is not necessary in
our setup as participants are given support before (FPSBA) or during (DA) the auction.
Armantier and Treich (2009) show that overbidding is reduced if their feedback system
is in place.
4.5.3 Predictions
Experiment 1 provides estimates of an individual’s utility function and the respective
input for each preference specification. To get an understanding how this data maps into
bidding predictions, we display the estimated optimal bidding functions based on each
preference specification.
Standard Preferences. If the EUT hypothesis holds, there is no difference between
the behavior in the FPSBA and in the DA. We derive our predictions for standard
preferences with power utility (P-SP) based on u(x) = xβ
G
. For linear utility (L-SP), we
set βG = 1.
KR Preferences. Similar to standard preferences, we consider two alternative utility
specifications. First, we analyze a linear-utility specification (L-KR) with linear consump-
tion utility u(x) = x and a two-piece linear specification for n(x, r) in equation (4.2.7).
Specifically, we set n(x, r) = x − r if x > r and λ(x − r) if x ≤ r. For λ, we use the
coefficient based on the definition by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Second, we assume
a power-utility specification (P-KR) with consumption utility given by u(x) = αG(x)β
G
and gain-loss utility given by n(x, r) = αG(x − r)βG if x > r and αL(x − r)βL if x ≤ r.
This latter specification tests whether the curvature of the utility function in gains and
losses yields a better fit than the standard assumption of linearity.
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and power utility (P-SP). Standard preferences yield the same bidding strategy for both auc-
tion formats. Reported are predictions based on the 25, 50, and 75 quantiles of the curvature
measure βG.
Figure 4.2: Predictions Based on Standard Preferences.
Allais-Type Preferences. We assume that certain outcomes generate utility via uD(x) =
xβ
A
/βAT and risky outcomes via uR(x) = αAT · xβA/βAT. Hence, in the FPSBA, we base
our predictions on uR(x). In the DA, we use uD(x) for utility derived from the current
price, i.e., x = vi − pk. To evaluate the expected utility from waiting for the next price,
we use uR(x) where x = vi − pk−1.25
25Note that for FPSBA Allais-type preferences coincide with standard preferences. Any differences
result from the different elicitation methods.
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(a) First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction.
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(b) Dutch Auction.
10 20 30 40
0
5
10
15
20
L-SP, L-KR (25)
L-KR (50)
L-KR (75)
10 20 30 40
0
5
10
15
20
B
id
L-SP
P-KR (25)
P-KR (50)
P-KR (75)
10 20 30 40
0
5
10
15
20
L-SP
P-KR (25)
P-KR (50)
P-KR (75)
10 20 30 40
0
5
10
15
20
Valuation
B
id
L-SP
AT (25)
AT (50), AT (75)
10 20 30 40
0
5
10
15
20
Valuation
L-SP
AT (25)
AT (50)
AT (75)
Notes: Depicted are the predictions based on Linear KR preferences (L-KR, top panel), Power
KR preferences (P-KR, middle panel), and Allais-type preferences (AT, bottom panel) for the
FPSBA and the DA. The reference level is the prediction based on linear standard preferences
(L-SP, dashed line). For Linear KR preferences, we report predictions based on the 25, 50,
and 75 quantiles of the loss-aversion measure λKT79. Power KR and Allais-type preferences
consist of multiple parameters. Hence, characteristics estimates cannot be ordered reasonably.
For these two specifications, we report the 25, 50, and 75 quantiles of predicted bids.
Figure 4.3: Predictions Based on Non-Standard Preferences.
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4.6 Results: Experiment 2
First, we compare bidding behavior across the three DSS treatments and assess the the-
oretical prediction that the two auction formats are strategically equivalent as predicted
under standard preferences. Second, we present the accuracy of the predictions using the
standard and non-standard preference specifications based on aggregate and individual
parameters from Experiment 1.
4.6.1 Strategic Equivalence
To compare the two auction formats directly, we can only consider winning bids because
we only observe a bid in the DA if a participant stopped the auction and won. In line
with the auction literature, we find overbidding in both formats defined relative to the
risk-neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE) benchmark given by Linear SP (L-SP). For the
FPSBA, average overbidding is 2.78, which is significantly different from the benchmark
(SR test, p = 0.0000). Specifically, overbidding in No DSS amounts to 3.45 (SR test,
p = 0.0008), in Medium DSS to 2.45 (SR test, p = 0.0010), and in Full DSS to 2.34 (SR
test, p = 0.0042). For the DA, average overbidding is 1.59 which is statistically different
from the Linear SP benchmark (SR test p = 0.0000). In particular, overbidding is 1.14
in No DSS (SR test, p = 0.0279), 1.25 in Medium DSS (SR test, p = 0.0844), and 2.28
in Full DSS (SR test, p = 0.0010).
Figure 4.4 displays the median winning bids for each valuation by format over DSS
treatment for the first order of auctions. A pairwise comparison of winning bids for each
valuation shows that in treatment No DSS, the FPSBA generates higher prices than the
DA except for the two lowest valuations based on Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U-tests (see
Table 4.E.7 for details and p-values).26 Treatment No DSS is comparable to standard
experimental auction designs. Hence, the overbidding in the FPSBA in this treatment is
also frequently observed in experimental comparisons between the FPSBA and the DA
and is interpreted as evidence against the strategic equivalence of the two auction formats
(e.g., Coppinger, Smith, and Titus 1980; Cox, Roberson, and Smith 1982; Cox, Smith,
and Walker 1983).
However, we make two interesting observations in our data. First, the difference
between the formats vanishes once we add information. In both treatments Medium
DSS and Full DSS, there is no statistical difference between winning bids in the FPSBA
and the DA. Recall that Medium DSS provides information about the probability to win
(FPSBA) or the probability to receive the next price (DA). This manipulation is already
26Since reasonable bids are bounded by a subject’s valuation and due to the discrete bid space, it is
not surprising that bids are not significantly different for small valuations.
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Notes: Depicted are medians of the winning bids for each valuation and format separated by
decision support. The reference line is the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE) given by
Linear SP (L-SP). Participants in No DSS do not receive additional information. In treatment
Medium DSS, participants receive information about the winning probability (FPSBA) or the
probability to receive the next price (DA). In treatment Full DSS, participants receive the
same information as in Medium DSS and, in addition, the expected profit associated with
their bid.
Figure 4.4: Median Winning Bids Across Decision Support.
sufficient to statistically eliminate the difference between the two formats. The additional
information in terms of expected values in Full DSS does not change this result.
Second, we observe that within participants, there is no difference between the two
formats. In other words, it matters which format is conducted first but then subjects are
consistent across formats. Table 4.E.8 reports a comparison of winning bids across the
two orders. Based on the SR test, bids do not significantly differ for a given valuation.
The other cited experiments that also vary the order of the two formats do not find a
similar consistency in bidding. We think that the consistency in our data stems from
the direct comparability of the two formats in our design by using the same price grid
and holding opportunity costs constant (see Section 4.5.1). Hence, we cannot reject
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equivalence within a given participant. This finding is robust across all DSS conditions.
We conclude that holding opportunity costs and action sets constant between the two
formats makes differences insignificant for experienced bidders. However, it depends on
which format they start with. Note that this between-participant non-equivalence also
vanishes once information is provided. Thus, we reject strategic equivalence between
participants under No DSS but not under Medium and Full DSS. This yields our first
main result:
Result 4 [Strategic Equivalence] We reject strategic equivalence between participants if
no decision support is provided. However, we cannot reject it once information about the
winning probability (in the FPSBA) or the probability to receive the next price (in the
DA) is provided. Equivalence holds within-participants even without decision support.
Due to the apparent order effect and the non-significant difference in bidding within-
participants, the first order of the auction formats determines bidding behavior in the
second order. In the following, we will thus base our results on the between-participant
data of the first 18 periods (i.e., the first order for each format). In this data, every
participant provides one independent observation.
4.6.2 Prediction Accuracy
This section presents the goodness of fit (GOF) of the bidding predictions based on
the measurements from Experiment 1. We use three measures to assess GOF: (i) mean
deviation (MD), (ii) mean absolute deviation (MAD), and (iii) mean squared deviation
(MSD). The three GOF measures assess the deviation D(v, θ) between the observed
winning bid b(v) and the predicted bid bˆ(v, θ) for valuation v and preference specification
θ = {L-SP, P-SP, L-KR, P-KR, AT}, i.e., D(v, θ) = b(v) − bˆ(v, θ). Whereas MD is a
location measure, both MAD and MSD are dispersion measures.
Each GOF measure has unique characteristics necessary to obtain a comprehen-
sive conclusion about the predictive power of each preference specification. MD shows
the direction of the deviation. A positive MD indicates overbidding compared to the
predicted bid (i.e., underprediction) whereas a negative MD indicates underbidding (i.e.,
overprediction). However, positive and negative deviations cancel each other out. This
problem is overcome by the other two measures. MAD takes the average over the absolute
deviation |D(v, θ)| between observed and predicted bid. Hence, deviations do not cancel
and MAD is nonnegative. MSD takes the average over the squared deviation D(v, θ)2
between observed and predicted bids. MSD is also always nonnegative. Both measures
cannot account for the direction of the prediction error by construction but are a measure
for the magnitude of the deviation. MAD weights all deviations equally while MSD puts
a smaller weight on small deviations and a larger weight on large deviations.
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We analyze GOF both on the aggregate and the individual level. On the aggregate
level, we use the mean and median characteristics of the population of bidders to predict
individual bidding behavior. On the individual level, we use each bidder’s individual
behavior in Experiment 1 to derive predictions for his bidding behavior. Specifically, for
each valuation v, Di(v, θ) compares the individual observed bid bi(v) with the prediction
bˆi(v, θi) that is based on the same bidder’s measurement for the preference specification
θ. Note again that we only consider winning bids in the FPSBA to be able to compare
the results with those in the DA.
Aggregate Level
Table 4.E.9 reports all GOF measures based on the mean data for each preference spec-
ification and DSS treatment.27 Table 4.4 presents the MAD for reference. The results
for the Linear SP prediction are separated because they are independent of the measure-
ments of Experiment 1 and always given by βL-SP(v) = v/2. Thus, we set Linear SP as
the benchmark and assess significance relative to this benchmark with the SR test.
Panel A of Table 4.E.9 shows the results for MD. We see that the predictions based
on Linear SP and Linear KR preferences with linear utility (Linear KR) have the small-
est mean deviation. For the FPSBA, all values are positive implying underprediction. In
other words, participants show extensive overbidding given the prediction. In the DA,
Linear KR and Allais-type preferences actually overpredict bidding behavior, i.e., ob-
served bids are smaller than predicted. Panel A further shows that Linear KR generally
has the smallest average prediction error which is further significantly different from the
benchmark given by Linear SP in both auction formats.
Table 4.4 (Panel B of Table 4.E.9) reports the result for the first dispersion measure
MAD. Similar to the MD results, Linear SP and Linear KR show the smallest prediction
error for the median data. This holds for both FPSBA and DA. We see that all predictions
besides Power SP show a similar dispersion because the MAD weights all deviations
linearly. Panel C of Table 4.E.9 reports the results for the second dispersion measure
based on the squared deviation. It is apparent that Power SP provide a much larger
MSD than the other measures. This indicates that Power SP predictions yield some very
large deviations which are hence amplified in the MSD measure. For the FPSBA, this
poor fit occurs primarily under No DSS but remains around an order of magnitude three
for the other two DSS treatments. For the DA, Power SP also performs the worst but
the difference is not as striking as in the FPSBA. Both deviation measures select Linear
KR preferences as the best prediction which is significantly different from Linear SP in
the FPSBA but not statistically distinguishable in the DA.
27Table 4.E.10 reports the same measures based on the median data. The results are generally
consistent with the mean data.
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Table 4.4: Mean Absolute Deviation for Mean Data.
Format First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction Dutch Auction
Preference Specification No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS All No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS All
Linear SP 3.74 2.77 2.93 3.17 2.80 2.77 2.88 2.82
(1.43) (1.08) (1.45) (1.37) (0.98) (1.19) (1.09) (1.06)
Power SP 7.39∗∗∗ 6.24∗∗∗ 6.40∗∗∗ 6.71∗∗∗ 5.05∗∗∗ 5.43∗∗∗ 6.42∗∗∗ 5.66∗∗∗
(1.97) (1.37) (1.57) (1.71) (1.81) (2.17) (1.49) (1.87)
Linear KR 2.14∗∗∗ 2.17∗ 2.28∗ 2.19∗∗∗ 2.91 2.69 1.77∗∗∗ 2.43
(0.93) (0.59) (0.90) (0.80) (1.03) (1.52) (0.74) (1.20)
Power KR 4.36∗∗∗ 3.23∗∗∗ 3.38∗∗∗ 3.69∗∗∗ 3.96∗∗∗ 4.32∗∗∗ 4.99∗∗∗ 4.44∗∗∗
(1.59) (1.27) (1.47) (1.51) (1.54) (1.83) (1.45) (1.62)
Allais-Type 3.96∗∗∗ 2.85 2.98 3.30∗∗∗ 3.10 2.67 2.08∗∗ 2.60
(1.46) (1.19) (1.38) (1.42) (1.24) (1.79) (0.64) (1.31)
Notes: Reported is the mean of the goodness-of-fit (GOF) measure mean abso-
lute deviation (MAD). The deviation is the difference between the individual
observed winning bid and the predicted bid based on the mean measurement
for Power SP and Linear KR preferences or the mean predicted bid for Power
KR and Allais-type. Standard deviation in parentheses. Asterisks indicate a
significant difference between the GOF measure and the benchmark of linear
standard preferences (Linear SP) based on the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. ∗
< 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
Result 5 [Aggregate Accuracy] Based on mean and median data, Linear SP and Linear
KR generally yield the best prediction accuracy across the three goodness-of-fit measures.
Overall, Linear KR preferences yield a significant better fit in the FPSBA but are not
statistically different from Linear SP in the DA.
Individual Level
Table 4.E.11 reports the GOF based on the individual data for each preference specifi-
cation and DSS treatment. We again test whether each GOF is significantly different
from the GOF of the Linear SP benchmark based on the SR test. The individual anal-
ysis confirms the impression obtained from the aggregate data. Linear KR preferences
generally have the best prediction accuracy closely followed by Linear SP. This difference
is significant in the FPSBA but not in the DA.
Panel A of Table 4.E.11 shows the results for MD. Linear KR has the smallest mean
prediction error across all DSS treatments and for both auction formats. For the FPSBA,
Linear KR underpredicts under No and Medium DSS but overpredicts for Full DSS. For
the DA, the pattern is different: overprediction under No DSS and underprediction for
Medium and Full DSS. For both formats, Power SP and Power KR have a positive
MD and thus show underprediction across all DSS treatments. Allais-type preferences
underpredict for the FPSBA and generally overpredict for the DA. The good performance
of Linear KR preferences is further significantly better than the benchmark.
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Table 4.5: Mean Absolute Deviation for Individual Data.
Format First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction Dutch Auction
Preference Specification No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS All No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS All
Linear SP 3.74 2.77 2.93 3.17 2.80 2.77 2.88 2.82
(1.43) (1.08) (1.45) (1.37) (0.98) (1.19) (1.09) (1.06)
Power SP 4.44 3.71∗∗ 5.10∗ 4.38∗∗ 3.72 2.90 3.13 3.26
(3.17) (1.43) (3.23) (2.71) (2.05) (2.57) (1.60) (2.05)
Linear KR 2.67∗ 1.98∗ 3.12 2.57∗∗ 3.12 2.91 2.18∗ 2.72
(1.09) (0.82) (1.39) (1.18) (1.08) (1.69) (1.20) (1.36)
Power KR 4.18 4.39∗∗∗ 4.62∗ 4.38∗∗∗ 5.11∗∗∗ 4.32 5.47∗∗∗ 5.01∗∗∗
(3.53) (1.50) (2.53) (2.62) (2.70) (4.12) (3.11) (3.27)
Allais-Type 4.80 3.25 3.40 3.86 4.06∗∗ 4.34∗ 4.61 4.34∗∗∗
(3.79) (2.33) (2.40) (2.98) (1.96) (2.53) (3.19) (2.57)
Notes: Reported is the mean of the goodness-of-fit (GOF) measure mean ab-
solute deviation (MAD). The deviation is the difference between the individ-
ual observed winning bid and the predicted bid based on the individual mea-
surement. Standard deviation in parentheses. Asterisks indicate a significant
difference between the GOF measure and the benchmark of linear standard
preferences (Linear SP) based on the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗
< 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
Table 4.5 (Panel B of Table 4.E.11) reports dispersion based on the MAD. Linear
KR again has the smallest dispersion in prediction accuray and is significantly different
from Linear SP for No and Medium DSS in the FPSBA and but only for Full DSS in the
DA. Hence, on average, Linear KR is not significantly different from the benchmark in
the DA. Power SP show, on average, significantly worse prediction accuracy than Linear
SP in the FPSBA but the difference is not statistically different from zero in the DA.
Similar to Power SP, Power KR preferences yield a worse fit than Linear SP and this
difference is significant on average across both formats. Although Allais-type preferences
show a worse accuracy than the benchmark, this difference is only significant in the DA.
Using the MSD in Panel C of Table 4.E.11 shows a similar pattern as the MAD. Linear
KR generally performs best while Power KR, Power SP, and Allais-type preferences are
basically equally bad predictors with an MSD that is around three times as large as that
of Linear KR preferences.
Result 6 [Individual Accuracy] Based on the individual data, Linear SP and Linear KR
generally yield the best prediction accuracy across the three goodness-of-fit measures. On
average, both preference specifications underpredict bidding behavior, i.e., participants
choose higher bids relative to their individual prediction. Overall, Linear KR preferences
yield a significantly better fit in the FPSBA but are not statistically different from Linear
SP in the DA.
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Prediction Accuracy: The Role of Numeracy
We analyze how the prediction accuracy relates to further individual characteristics. Our
main independent variable is the numeracy score (Numeracy) elicited in Experiment 1
to account for mathematical illiteracy (see Section 4.3.3). We interact this score with
the three DSS conditions to identify the impact of numeracy when decision support is
available. As the GOF measure, we focus on the MAD in this section for two reasons.
First, we use a dispersion measure instead of the MD because the latter is a net sum
of negative and positive deviations. Although, in general MD and MAD are similar due
to the general pattern of overbidding relative to the prediction, we prefer to base our
analysis on the absolute deviation. Second, MAD shows the same pattern as MSD in
general but we think that MAD is easier to interpret.
Regarding Numeracy, we cannot reject a normal distribution of answers according to
the Shapiro-Wilk test (p = 0.2762) or the Shapiro-Francia test (p = 0.5575). Based on a
Skewness-Kurtosis test, we find evidence for a slight negative skew of −0.5234. However,
the joint test for normality in this case is also non-significant (p = 0.1150). The negative
skewness confirms our choice of the combined test given our student population because
77.11% answer all SNT questions correctly. Hence, our incentivized implementation of
the combined test yields very similar results as Cokely et al. (2012) and the distribution of
scores over the full range makes it a good estimator for decision biases in our parametric
regressions.
We estimate two OLS regression models separately for the two auction formats.
Model 1 regresses MAD on the DSS treatments (with No DSS as the reference category),
Numeracy, and the interaction between Numeracy and the DSS treatments. Model 2
is the same as the first model but additionally controls for the demographic variables
Age, a dummy indicating male participants (Male), and a dummy indicating whether
German is the native language of the participant (German Native) which is a coarse
proxy of the understanding of the instructions and possible cultural differences. We
report heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. Appendix 4.E.5 reports all regression
tables.
For Linear SP, the prediction accuracy generally does not depend on mathematical
literacy. Numeracy is only significant in the DA but not once we control for demographics.
In addition, we do not find a difference between the DSS treatments. Similarly, the
prediction accuracy of Power SP does also neither depend on Numeracy nor on the
provided decision support. For Linear KR preferences, we do not find a significant main
effect of numeracy on the prediction accuracy. In the DA, numeracy interacts with Full
DSS which itself has a large negative main effect. This means, that the prediction is
more accurate in the Full DSS condition but within that condition, the prediction is
slightly worse for those subjects who have better mathematical abilities. For Power KR
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preferences, Numeracy has a diametric effect depending on the auction format. In the
FPSBA, Numeracy worsens prediction accuracy while it enhances it in the DA. We find no
interaction between numeracy and decision support. Finally, for Allais-type preferences,
there is no significant effect of Numeracy or DSS treatment on prediction accuracy.
Overall, Numeracy by itself only has a significant effect under Power KR preferences
which is positive in the FPSBA but negative in the DA. Power KR preferences generally
perform the worst based on the MAD calculated from individual data. This low pre-
diction accuracy is thus further weakened in the FPSBA but slightly enhanced in the
DA for participants with higher numeracy scores. The regression results further indicate
that the prediction accuracy of the two best-performing preference specifications, Linear
SP and Linear KR preferences, does neither depend on the DSS treatment nor on the
mathematical ability in the static FPSBA. However, in the dynamic DA, more informa-
tion (Full DSS) significantly increases the prediction accuracy for Linear KR preferences.
This effect outweighs the slight adverse interaction effect of Full DSS and Numeracy.
Result 7 [Numeracy] Generally, Numeracy has little impact on prediction accuracy par-
ticularly for the best predictors Linear KR and Linear SP. Hence, the prediction accuracy
is absolute in the sense that we do not systematically predict participants with higher
mathematical abilities differently well from those with low abilities.
4.7 Internal Validity
We base our predictions on the elicited utility from Experiment 1. This section discusses
the reliability of the elicitation procedure of Experiment 1. We argue that the hetero-
geneous fit of the preference specifications and in particular the poor fit under power
utility does not result from our implementation of preference elicitation. We first present
an auxiliary result about the degree of probability weighting in our sample. This data
is a side product of the procedure of Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007) and
further confirms that our results are in line with the literature even though we use mon-
etary instead of hypothetical incentives. Subsequently, we discuss the choice of using the
non-parametric elicitation procedure by Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007).
We present possible problems arising from the chaining of decisions and argue that they
do not influence our measurements.
Probability Weighting
Expected utility is linear in probabilities (Machina 2008a). However, Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) find that subjects frequently deviate from linearity by overweighting
small and underweighting large probabilities. The non-parametric elicitation procedure
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of Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007) yields two probabilities that allow us
to comment on the extent of probability weighting around 0.5. We derive the objective
probability pG for gains that feels like 0.5 for the individual. In other words, the weighting
function on the gain domain, wG(·), transforms pG into 0.5, i.e., wG(pG) = 0.5. Further,
we analogously elicit the probability pL on the loss domain such that wL(pL) = 0.5.
However, we note that, in contrast to the elicited utility, these measurements are point
estimates and not the entire weighting function. On average, these probabilities are
given by pG = 0.569 and pL = 0.566 and both are significantly different from 0.5 (SR
test, p = 0.0099 for pG and p = 0.0239 for pL) but not distinguishable from each other.
Hence, close to the literature, we observe probability underweighting around 0.6.
Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007) observe median values of 0.59 for pG and
0.6 for pL. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) observe 0.65 for pG and 0.57 for pL. Our
results are only statistically different from the latter value (SR test, p = 0.0078). Ac-
counting for the precision of the bisection algorithm (±0.015625), on the gain domain, a
total of 49 participants (59.04%) show probability underweighting and 26 (31.33%) show
probability overweighting. On the loss domain, 46 participants (55.42%) show probabil-
ity underweighting and 27 (32.53%) show probability overweighting. We interpret these
results as confirming our incentivized implementation.
Comments on the Elicitation Procedure
The procedure of Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007) is non-parametric because
it does not require assumptions about the functional form of utility. In contrast, paramet-
ric elicitations require a certain specification for identification. These specifications imply
a link between preferences and their mathematical representation that may not be valid
in reality (Van de Kuilen and Wakker 2011). Elicited values thus depend on the particu-
lar parameterization. One advantage of parametric measurements is that they are more
efficient in the sense that far less pairwise comparisons are required (Abdellaoui et al.
2008). This is valuable if there is not much time in the experiment for the elicitation and
explains the popularity of (semi-)parametric measurements (e.g., Abdellaoui et al. 2008;
Abdellaoui, Driouchi, and L’Haridon 2011b; Abdellaoui et al. 2011a; Booij and Van de
Kuilen 2009, and Karle, Kirchsteiger, and Peitz 2014). However, due to the drawbacks of
parametric assumptions, in particularly in the measurement of loss aversion, we decided
to elicit preferences non-parametrically.
Sequentially eliciting indifference points has two potential drawbacks: (i) incentive
compatibility and (ii) error propagation. Regarding the first point, note that procedures
based on the trade-off method are chained in the sense that subsequent lotteries are
constructed based on the response in previous comparisons. This chained structure may
potentially distort the incentive compatibility of the elicitation even if lotteries are played
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out with actual monetary consequences (Harrison 1986; Harrison and Rutstro¨m 2008).
Participants may distort their choices to improve the lotteries that are presented to them
subsequently (Van de Kuilen and Wakker 2011). Similar to Baillon (2008), we mitigate
this problem by perturbing the order in which lotteries are presented to conceal the
chaining of stimuli.28 We have to maintain a certain order of elicitation in the chained
procedure (e.g., step-1 elicitations have to be performed before step-2 elicitations and
so on). However, we mix the elicitation of gains with the elicitation of losses in step 1.
Further, we mix the elicitation of risk and loss aversion with the independent elicitation
of Allais-type preferences.
We think that the above approach makes inferring the chained structure of the
elicitation very hard for participants. In addition, Bleichrodt, Cillo, and Diecidue (2010)
note that because indifference values are elicited indirectly, they are never presented to
the subject which further impairs inferring the chained structure of the trade-off method.
Van de Kuilen and Wakker (2011) argue that subjects would have to be aware of the
presence of chaining and understand how former answers map into the construction of
subsequent lotteries. This requires a very demanding introspection. Neither Bleichrodt,
Cillo, and Diecidue (2010) nor Van de Kuilen and Wakker (2011) find evidence for strate-
gic responses. We further follow Van de Kuilen and Wakker (2011) and check whether
participants were aware of the chained structure by asking two strategy-check questions.29
Two student assistants independently of each other classified the answers.30 They found
no indication that subjects noticed the chained structure of the elicitation.
As the second potential drawback, chained procedures are prone to error propa-
gation because one answer feeds into the next question. However, based on simulation
studies, Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000); Abdellaoui, Vossmann, and Weber (2005), and
Van de Kuilen and Wakker (2011) show that error propagation is a negligible concern.
In addition, in our experiment, subjects have to wait for at least ten seconds before they
can move on to the next lottery pair. We think that this further reduces accidentally
choosing a non-preferred lottery.
28Cerroni, Notaro, and Shaw (2012) find that hiding the chained structure indeed yields more valid
risk estimates than clearly stating the chained structure and that real monetary incentives outperform
hypothetical monetary incentives.
29Question 1: “Was there any reason for you to choose left lotteries or right lotteries more often?”
[German: “Gab es einen Grund fu¨r Sie, linke Lotterien oder rechte Lotterien ha¨ufiger zu wa¨hlen?”].
Question 2: “Can you briefly explain how you determined your choice?” [German: “Ko¨nnen Sie kurz
begru¨nden, wie Sie Ihre Wahl getroffen haben?”]. Both questions are adapted from Van de Kuilen and
Wakker (2011, p. 586). We slightly changed their wording to sound more idiomatic in German.
30Instructions: “Can the answers be categorized in any way?” [German: “Ko¨nnen die Antworten in
irgendeiner Form kategorisiert werden?”].
4.8. CONCLUSION 151
4.8 Conclusion
We examine the predictive power of different preference specifications as well as the role of
decision support in first-price sealed-bid and Dutch auctions. In a laboratory experiment,
we first elicit each participant’s utility function non-parametrically and use this data to
derive various measures regarding risk and loss attitudes as well as Allais-type preferences.
We then use these individual characteristics to predict bidding behavior in a follow-up
experiment with the same participants. We vary the degree of decision support to account
for the complexity in deriving the optimal bid.
We confirm the frequently observed non-equivalence of the first-price and Dutch
auction under the absence of decision support (No DSS). In addition, we observe that
any differences vanish once we provide information about the winning probability. Dif-
ferences between the two auction formats based on preferences should be independent of
the level of decision support. Our results thus indicate that the empirical breakdown of
strategic equivalence is primarily caused by the complexity of the bidding decision rather
than by bidders’ preferences. In addition, Cox, Smith, and Walker (1983) argue that
differences between the two mechanisms result from violations of Bayes’ rule and indi-
rectly test this conjecture by tripling individual payoffs which increases opportunity costs
from miscalculations. In contrast, our design is a direct test of the impact of cognitive
limitations and we find additional evidence for this conjecture.
In the experiment, the implemented DSS is perfect in the sense that we can precisely
calculate the respective probabilities and expected values due to the fixed bidding strategy
of the bidding robot. Obviously, this is not directly implementable in real auctions.
However, the availability of historical bid data promotes the design of decision support
systems similar to our implementation. Thus, our findings on the differences in auction
formats indicates that the higher revenue in the FPSBA is less relevant in real auctions
where bidders are likely to have such support.
Furthermore, we find no difference in bidding behavior within participants even
without providing additional information. That is, subjects do not vary their bidding
behavior if the auction format changes. This within-participant consistency is in contrast
to the literature and we relate this finding to the strict comparability of the two formats
in our experiment. Hence, whereas previous designs may be biased toward finding a dif-
ference, the bidding in our data indicates that a constant action set and fixed opportunity
costs are necessary for consistency between the two formats.31
Regarding the prediction accuracy of elicited preferences, we find that both on the
aggregate and the individual level, expectations-based reference-dependent preferences
31Opportunity costs include, e.g., monitoring costs (Carare and Rothkopf 2005) or costs from partic-
ipating in the experiment (Katok and Kwasnica 2007).
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with a linear utility function (Linear KR preferences) yield the overall best fit. Stan-
dard preferences with linear utility (Linear SP) perform second-best. These results are
generally robust against controlling for demographics and numeracy.
Our results provide evidence for the skepticism of Kagel and Roth (1992) and Go-
eree, Holt, and Palfrey (2002) who doubt that risk aversion is a good explanation of
overbidding in auctions. We find that risk attitudes (risk aversion and risk seeking) ac-
tually predict bidding behavior worst across all considered preference specifications. The
degree of risk aversion that is necessary to explain the observed overbidding highly ex-
ceeds our estimates based on the lottery choices of our participants. We find no significant
correlation between risk aversion and overbidding.
Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey (2002) further point out that probability weighting also
explains overbidding but they cannot differentiate risk aversion and probability weight-
ing. Our results indicate that probability weighting is not a good explanation either.
This is because probability weighting changes the perceived expected value of a decision.
However, participants with full decision support directly see the objective expected value
which is independent from nonlinear probability weighting. As we find no difference be-
tween medium and full decision support, we conclude that the difference between the
FPSBA and the DA is primarily due to difficulties in deriving probabilities (complexity)
and not from weighting such probabilities nonlinearly.
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Appendices
4.A Theoretical Appendix
4.A.1 First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction
In the following, we describe how to derive the bidding function for a first-price sealed-bid
auction with standard preferences in detail (see also Chwe 1989; Cai, Wurman, and Gong
2010). The bidding functions concerning other preference specifications are derived in a
similar fashion and we cover the differences here.
Linear Standard Preferences
Let there be two bidders and fix a bid grid B = {b1, b2, . . . , bj} with bk+1 = bk + δ and
b1 = 0. We prove that there exists a sequence{zk}k∈{1,...,n} with z1 < z2 < ... < zn such
that
β(v) =
b1 for vi ∈ [0, z1]bk for vi ∈ (zk−1, zk] with k ≥ 2 (4.A.1)
constitutes an equilibrium bidding strategy. We begin by writing down the expected
profit for a fixed price bk, given that the other bidder plays according to the bidding
strategy β,
E[pii|bk] = Pr{vj ≤ zk−1}[vi − bk] + Pr{zk−1 < vj ≤ zk}1
2
[vi − bk]
=
1
2
[
F (zk−1) + F (zk)
]
[vi − bk]
=: P kω [v
i − bk],
where P kω is the winning probability of a bid bk. We note that for z1 < z2 < . . . < zn, it
holds that P kω < P
k+1
ω for all k. The mapping v 7→ β(v) should establish an equilibrium,
meaning that no other bid should be a better choice for the bidder. Since the winning
probability and the utility function are both monotonic in b, it suffices to compare the
expected profits from bidding bk−1 and bk+1 with the expected profit from submitting bk.
We have
E[pii|bk+1] =[vi − bk+1]P k+1ω (4.A.2)
E[pii|bk−1] =[vi − bk−1]P k−1ω . (4.A.3)
The comparisons yield the following inequalities:
E[pii|bk]
!≥E[pii|bk+1] and (4.A.4)
E[pii|bk]
!≥E[pii|bk−1]. (4.A.5)
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We note that bk±1 = bk ± δ and hence the first inequality can be rewritten as
vi
[
F (zk−1)− F (zk+1)
]
≥ bk
[
F (zk−1)− F (zk+1)
]
− δ
[
F (zk+1) + F (zk)
]
vi
[
F (zk+1)− F (zk−1)
]
≤ bk
[
F (zk+1)− F (zk−1)
]
+ δ
[
F (zk+1) + F (zk)
]
vi ≤ bk + δ F (zk+1) + F (zk)
F (zk+1)− F (zk−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=zk
.
Analogously, we rewrite the second inequality as
vi ≥ bk−1 + δ P
k
ω
P kω − P k−1ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=zk−1
= bk−1 + δ
F (zk) + F (zk−1)
F (zk)− F (zk−2) .
To compute z1, we assume that no bidder’s valuation exceeds z1. Then, both bidders bid
b1 and P
1
ω is equal to
P 1ω = F (z1). (4.A.6)
It can be seen that it suffices to either compute the left bounds from which on the bidder
would bid bk or the right bounds until which she would bid bk. This would only induce
a slight modification in the bidding strategy from above.
To compute the sequence {zk}k∈N recursively, we still need an initial value. There
are two natural choices. The first one is to set z1 equal to zero; the second one, which
coincides with our bidding strategy from above, is to set zn equal to one. The valuations
of the buyers are drawn from a continuous distribution, so it does not matter how we
define the bidding function for specific valuations. Therefore, we set zn to one and define
that if buyer i’s valuation lies between vi ∈ (zk−1, zk], he bids bk. We have shown that
β indeed constitutes a Bayes Nash Equilibrium since bidding according to this bidding
strategy is a best response to a buyer playing the same strategy.
Power Standard Preferences
In the case of risk aversion or risk affinity, the utility function is given by a convex or
a concave transformation on the utility v − b. Let us assume that the transformation is
given by f(x) := xβ with β > 0. The reasoning from above still holds in this case. For
the first inequality, we have
[vi − bk]β P kω ≥ [vi − bk − δ]β P k+1ω (4.A.7)
⇔ [vi − bk]
[
(P k+1ω )
1/β − (P kω )1/β
]
≤ δ[P k+1ω ]1/β (4.A.8)
⇔ vi ≤ bk + δ
(
F (zk+1) + F (zk)
)1/β
(F (zk) + F (zk+1))1/β − (F (zk−1) + F (zk))1/β︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=zk
. (4.A.9)
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For the first bound, we get
zk := bk + δ
(
F (zk+1) + F (zk)
)1/β
(F (zk) + F (zk+1))1/β − (F (zk−1) + F (zk))1/β , (4.A.10)
for the second bound, we get
zk−1 = bk−1 + δ
(
P kω )
)1/β
(P kω )
1/β − (P k−1ω )1/β
. (4.A.11)
It holds that (
P k+1ω
)1/β
(P k+1ω )
1/β − (P kω )1/β
>
P k+1ω
P k+1ω − P kω
(4.A.12)
for β > 1 and (
P k+1ω
)1/β
(P k+1ω )
1/β − (P kω )1/β
<
P k+1ω
P k+1ω − P kω
(4.A.13)
for β < 1. In (4.A.10), we can see that if the right-hand side becomes smaller, the left-
hand side needs to become smaller as well. With this, we have shown that the equilibrium
threshold values zk are decreasing in the participant’s risk aversion.
KR Preferences
In the case of KR preferences, the utility function is slightly more complex. It is given
by
uKR(x, r) = u(x) + n(x, r) (4.A.14)
with
n(x, r) =
η(u(x)− u(r)) if x > rηλ(u(x)− u(r)), if x ≤ r. (4.A.15)
Let η be normalized to one and λ > 0. Then, the expected utility for a fixed bid
bk, given that the other buyer bids according to β(v), is given by
E[pii|bk] = P kω [vi − bk] + P kω (1− P kω )[vi − bk]− λP kω (1− P kω )[vi − bk] (4.A.16)
= P kω
[
1 + (1− λ)(1− P kω)][vi − bk]. (4.A.17)
This yields
zKRk := bk + δ
P k+1ω
[
1 + (1− λ)(1− P k+1ω )]
P k+1ω
[
1 + (1− λ)(1− P k+1ω )]− P kω[1 + (1− λ)(1− P kω)] . (4.A.18)
For 0 ≤ λ ≤ 2, the effect of reference dependence is clear since for 0 ≤ λ < 1,
P k+1ω
[
1 + (1− λ)(1− P k+1ω )]
P k+1ω
[
1 + (1− λ)(1− P k+1ω )]− P kω[1 + (1− λ)(1− P kω)] > P
k+1
ω
P k+1ω − P kω
(4.A.19)
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whereas for 1 < λ ≤ 2, we have
P k+1ω
[
1 + (1− λ)(1− P k+1ω )]
P k+1ω
[
1 + (1− λ)(1− P k+1ω )]− P kω[1 + (1− λ)(1− P kω)] < P
k+1
ω
P k+1ω − P kω
. (4.A.20)
This is, equilibrium threshold values zk are decreasing in the participant’s loss aversion
if λ ∈ [0, 2]. For λ > 2 and few price steps, it is not guaranteed that the sequence of zKRk
is increasing which raises problems.
Allais-Type Preferences
As discussed in the main section of the paper, Allais-type preferences do not lead to
a different optimization problem compared to standard preferences since there are no
certain payoffs. The easiest way to see this is to boost the degenerate case instead of
penalizing uncertain outcomes. Then, with
uAT(x) =
uD(x) if x ∈ XDuR(x) if x ∈ XR, (4.A.21)
one can write uR(x) = x and the same reasoning as under standard preferences applies.
4.A.2 Dutch Auction
We model the Dutch auction as in Bose and Daripa (2009). Let H ik be the probability
that, with a given distribution F (v), bidder i receives the item at price pk+1 given that
she refuses the price pk. The probability H
i
k consists of two parts: (i) the probability
φik under F that bidder i obtains the item at the next price pk+1 given that it is still
available at that price, i.e., that it has not been sold at price pk; and (ii) the probability
ρik under F that the item is actually available at price pk+1 given that bidder i refused
price pk. Consequently, H
i
k = φ
i
k · ρik.
Computation of φik
The probability to be asked first is one half. If bidder i accepts the offered price pk, she
receives the item with certainty. If bidder j is asked first, bidder i receives the item only
if bidder j refuses the current price pk. If the item is still available at pk, it follows that
vj < zk. Remember that zk is the lowest valuation at which a price pk is still accepted.
Hence, bidder j will not accept the next price pk+1 (given that she has refused the current
price pk) with probability Pr{vj < zk+1|vj < zk} = F (zk+1)/F (zk). Hence,
φik =
1
2
+
1
2
· F (zk+1)
F (zk)
. (4.A.22)
4.A. THEORETICAL APPENDIX 157
Computation of ρik
Define the following events. First, denote by #ik ∈ {1, 2} the position of bidder i in period
k. Second, denote by Aik the event that the price pk is offered to bidder i. We will now
determine the probability of being offered the current price pk:
Pr{#ik = 1|Aik} (4.A.23)
=
Pr{#ik = 1} · Pr{Aik|#ik = 1}
Pr{#ik = 1} · Pr{Aik|#ik = 1}+ Pr{#ik = 2} · Pr{Aik|#ik = 2}
(4.A.24)
=
1
2
1
2
+ 1
2
· F (zk)
F (zk−1)
(4.A.25)
=
F (zk−1)
F (zk−1) + F (zk)
. (4.A.26)
Note that F (vj0) = 1, i.e., the probability that bidder j buys before the starting price is
zero. It holds that
Pr{#ik = 2|Aik} =1− Pr{#ik = 1|Aik} (4.A.27)
=
F (zk)
F (zk−1) + F (zk)
. (4.A.28)
The probability that the price pk+1 is reached consists of two terms. The first term
reflects the case where bidder i is asked first at the current price pk and refuses this
price. This is given by Pr{#ik = 1|Aik}. Subsequently, bidder j refuses the price with
probability F (zk)/F (zk−1). The second term reflects the situation where bidder i is asked
after bidder j was asked first and refuses. Then, the next price is reached with certainty.
Hence the probability ρik that the item is actually available at price pk+1 given that bidder
i refuses price pk is given by
ρik = Pr{#ik = 1|Aik} ·
F (zk)
F (zk−1)
+ Pr{#ik = 2|Aik} · 1 (4.A.29)
=
2 · F (zk)
F (zk−1) + F (zk)
. (4.A.30)
Computation of H ik
We have
H ik =ρ
i
k · φik (4.A.31)
=
F (zk) + F (zk+1)
F (zk) + F (zk−1)
. (4.A.32)
In the case of the uniform distribution on [0, 1], this probability reads
H ik =
zk + zk+1
zk + zk−1
. (4.A.33)
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Linear Standard Preferences
We begin by fixing the price grid such that p1 is the starting price of the Dutch auction
and pn = 0. We determine the sequence zk with z1 > z2 > . . . > zn = 0 which can then
be used to construct the bidding sequence. The buyer has to decide whether to accept pk
now and end the auction or wait for the price pk+1 and accept then. We have a monotonic
utility function and the buyer can always only decide between accepting and waiting in
each stage. Therefore, it is sufficient to compare the payoff in the present period to the
expected payoff in the next price step.
The payoff if the buyers accepts now is given by
piik = v
i − pk. (4.A.34)
The expected payoff of waiting until the next period is given by
E[piik+1] =H
i
k · (vi − pk+1) (4.A.35)
=
F (vjk) + F (v
j
k+1)
F (vjk) + F (v
j
k−1)
· (vi − pk+1). (4.A.36)
Bidder i prefers to accept now over waiting if and only if
piik ≥E[piik+1] (4.A.37)
vi − pk ≥H ik · (vi − pk+1) (4.A.38)
vi · (1−H ik) ≥pk − pk+1 ·H ik, (4.A.39)
where pk+1 = pk − δ. Hence,
vi · (1−H ik) ≥pk − (pk − δ) ·H ik (4.A.40)
vi · (1−H ik) ≥pk · (1−H ik) + δ) ·H ik (4.A.41)
vi ≥pk + δ · H
i
k
1−H ik
. (4.A.42)
With H ik/1−H ik = (F (zk) + F (zk+1))/(F (zk−1)− F (zk+1)), we get
vi ≥ pk + δ · F (zk) + F (zk+1)
F (zk−1)− F (zk+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=zk
(4.A.43)
vi ≥zk. (4.A.44)
Bidder i prefers to wait for the next price over accepting now if and only if his
valuation is strictly smaller than zk. Every bidder with a valuation exceeding zk accepts
price pk, receives the item, and ends the auction. To get the upper interval boundary,
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we determine the minimum valuation zk−1 above which the bidder accepts the previous,
i.e., higher, price pk−1. By the same reasoning as above, we have that the bidder accepts
pk−1 over waiting for pk if and only if
vi ≥ pk−1 + δ · F (zk−1) + F (zk)
F (zk−2)− F (zk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=zk−1
(4.A.45)
vi ≥zk−1. (4.A.46)
Conclusively, bidder i accepts price pk if and only if her valuation lies between zk−1 and
zk. The last thing necessary to recursively determine zk is an initial value. As bidders
with a valuation of zero bid zero, the initial value is given by zn = 0.
Power Standard Preferences
As in the case of risk aversion and affinity in the FPSBA, the transformation does not
yield any technical difficulties. The profit if the buyer accepts now is given by
piik = (v
i − pk)β. (4.A.47)
The expected payoff if the buyer accepts in the next round equals
E[piik+1] = H
i
k · (vi − pk+1)β. (4.A.48)
The reasoning under standard preferences applies and this yields a zk of
zk := pk + δ · (H
i
k)
1/β
1− (H ik)1/β
. (4.A.49)
For β > 1, it holds that
(H ik)
1/β
1− (H ik)1/β
>
H ik
1−H ik
; (4.A.50)
for β < 1, we have
(H ik)
1/β
1− (H ik)1/β
<
H ik
1−H ik
. (4.A.51)
In (4.A.49), we can see that if the right-hand side becomes smaller, the left-hand side
needs to become smaller as well. With this we have shown that the equilibrium threshold
values zk are decreasing in the participant’s risk aversion.
KR Preferences
In the case of reference dependence, the profit if the bidder accepts now is given by
piik = v
i − pk. (4.A.52)
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The expected profit from waiting until the next period is given by
E[piik+1] = H
i
k · (vi − pk+1) (4.A.53)
+H ik(1−H ik) · (vi − pk+1)− λ(1−H ik)H ik · (vi − pk+1) (4.A.54)
= H ik · (vi − pk+1) (4.A.55)
+ (1− λ)H ik(1−H ik) · (vi − pk+1). (4.A.56)
Bidder i prefers to accept now over waiting if and only if
vi − pk ≥ (vi − pk+1)
[
H ik + (1− λ)H ik(1−H ik)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Λik(λ)
. (4.A.57)
Rearranging yields
vi
(
1− Λik(λ)
) ≥ pk − pk+1Λik(λ) (4.A.58)
⇔ vi ≥ pk − (pk − δ)Λ
i
k(λ)
1− Λik(λ)
(4.A.59)
⇔ vi ≥ pk + δ Λ
i
k(λ)
1− Λik(λ)
. (4.A.60)
For 0 ≤ λ < 1, it holds that
Λik(λ)
1− Λik(λ)
>
H ik
1−H ik
; (4.A.61)
for λ > 1, we have
Λik(λ)
1− Λik(λ)
<
H ik
1−H ik
. (4.A.62)
This is, equilibrium threshold values zk are decreasing in the participant’s loss aversion.
Allais-Type Preferences
Allais-type preferences have an influence in the case of the DA because the current price
can be accepted with certainty. This means that in the case of accepting the price pk,
the utility function uD applies whereas in the case of declining, the utility function uR is
relevant. If we assume that for uD and uR, it holds that
uR(x) = αAT · x
βAT
βAT
, uD(x) =
xβ
AT
βAT
(4.A.63)
where αAT ∈ R≥0, we can derive the bidding function in the same way as with standard
and KR preferences, respectively. The utility if the bidder accepts the current price is
given by
uD
(
vi − pk
)
= αAT · (v
i − pk)βAT
βAT
. (4.A.64)
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The expected utility from waiting until the next period is given by
E[uR(vi − pk+1)|pk] = H ik ·
(vi − pk+1)βAT
βAT
. (4.A.65)
Bidder i prefers to accept now over waiting if and only if
vi ≥ pk + δ ·
(
H ik
)1/βAT
α1/βAT − (H ik)1/βAT . (4.A.66)
For αAT = 1 expression (4.A.66) corresponds to (4.A.49). The higher αAT, the smaller
the equilibrium threshold values zk.
4.B Numeracy Tests
We assess individual numeracy and probabilistic literacy by combining two numeracy
tests. This combined test varies in difficulty and increases the variation in scores, i.e.,
the number of correct answers (Cokely et al. 2012). The German translation used in the
experiment is provided in parentheses.
Schwartz et al. (1997) Numeracy Test.
Schwartz et al. (1997) assess numeracy with three open-ended questions. The score
is the total number of correct answers. We slightly adapted the wording to fit into the
neutral framing of our experiment.32
• SNT 1: Imagine that we flip a fair coin 1,000 times. What is your best guess about
how many times the coin would come up heads in 1,000 flips?
times out of 1,000 flips.
Answer: 500 .
[GERMAN TRANSLATION: Stellen Sie sich vor, wir werfen eine faire Mu¨nze 1000
mal. Bei wie vielen der 1000 Wu¨rfe zeigt die Mu¨nze im Durchschnitt Kopf an?]
• SNT 2: In lottery A, the chance of winning a $10 prize is 1%. What is your best
guess about how many people would win a$10 prize if 1,000 people each buy a single
ticket to lottery A?
person(s) out of 1,000.
Answer: 10.
[GERMAN TRANSLATION: In Lotterie A betra¨gt die Chance, einen 10-EUR-
Preis zu gewinnen, 1%. Wie viele Personen gewinnen im Durchschnitt einen 10-
EUR-Preis, wenn 1000 Personen jeweils ein einzelnes Los fu¨r Lotterie A kaufen?]
32The original wording replaces “lottery A” for “BIG BUCKS LOTTERY” in question 2 and “lottery
B” for “ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES” in question 3 (Schwartz et al. 1997, p. 967).
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• SNT 3: In lottery B, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 1,000. What percent of
tickets to lottery B win a car?
%.
Answer: 0.1.
[GERMAN TRANSLATION: In Lotterie B betra¨gt die Chance, ein Auto zu gewin-
nen, 1 in 1000. Wie viel Prozent der Lose fu¨r Lotterie B gewinnen ein Auto?]
Berlin Numeracy Test.
Cokely et al. (2012) develop the Berlin Numeracy Test to assess statistical numeracy
and risk literacy with four items in educated and highly-educated populations. We use
the paper-and-pencil format than incorporates the full set of questions.33
• BNT 1: Imagine we are throwing a five-sided die 50 times. On average, out of
these 50 throws how many times would this five-sided die show an odd number (1,
3 or 5)?
out of 50 throws.
Answer: 30.
[GERMAN TRANSLATION: Stellen Sie sich vor, wir werfen einen fu¨nfseitigen
Wu¨rfel 50 mal. Bei wie vielen dieser 50 Wu¨rfe zeigt dieser fu¨nfseitige Wu¨rfel im
Durchschnitt eine ungerade Zahl (1, 3 oder 5)?]
• BNT 2: Out of 1,000 people in a small town 500 are members of a choir. Out of
these 500 members in the choir 100 are men. Out of the 500 inhabitants that are
not in the choir 300 are men. What is the probability that a randomly drawn man
is a member of the choir? (please indicate the probability in percent).
%.
Answer: 25.
[GERMAN TRANSLATION: Von 1000 Einwohnern einer Kleinstadt sind 500 Mit-
glied im Gesangsverein . Von diesen 500 Mitgliedern im Gesangsverein sind 100
Ma¨nner. Von den 500 Einwohnern, die nicht im Gesangsverein sind, sind 300
Ma¨nner. Wie groß ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass ein zufa¨llig ausgewa¨hlter Mann
ein Mitglied des Gesangsvereins ist? ]
• BNT 3: Imagine we are throwing a loaded die (6 sides). The probability that the
die shows a 6 is twice as high as the probability of each of the other numbers. On
average, out of these 70 throws, how many times would the die show the number
6?
33Cokely et al. (2012) also develop an adaptive version and a median-split version that only require a
subset of questions and are intended to be used if there is little time to assess numeracy.
4.C. INSTRUCTIONS 163
out of 70 throws.
Answer: 20.
[GERMAN TRANSLATION: Stellen Sie sich vor, wir werfen einen gezinkten Wu¨rfel
(6 Seiten). Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass der Wu¨rfel eine 6 zeigt, ist doppelt so hoch
wie die Wahrscheinlichkeit jeder der anderen Zahlen. Bei wie vielen von 70 Wu¨rfen
zeigt dieser Wu¨rfel im Durchschnitt eine 6?]
• BNT 4: In a forest 20% of mushrooms are red, 50% brown and 30% white. A
red mushroom is poisonous with a probability of 20%. A mushroom that is not red
is poisonous with a probability of 5%. What is the probability that a poisonous
mushroom in the forest is red?
%.
Answer: 50.
[GERMAN TRANSLATION: In einem Wald sind 20% der Pilze rot, 50% braun
und 30% weiß. Ein roter Pilz ist mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 20% giftig. Ein
Pilz, der nicht rot ist, ist mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 5% giftig. Wie groß ist
die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass ein giftiger Pilz aus diesem Wald rot ist? ]
4.C Instructions
This section provides the instruction in German (original) and English (translated) sep-
arated by parts 1 and 2. Each part consists of part A and part B. Part B was always
distributed after part A had been conducted. Experiment 1 was identical for each par-
ticipant. Experiment 2 was counterbalanced, i.e., half of the participants received the
first-price sealed-bid auction in part A followed by the Dutch auction in part B. The
other half faced the reversed order. We present the instructions for the full-DSS treat-
ment where subjects had full information. The instructions for the other treatments are
the same and only exclude parts of the decision support which is reported in parentheses
within the instructions.
1	  
	  
INSTRUKTIONEN	  –	  Experiment	  1	  	  
	  
Allgemeine	  Instruktionen	  	  
Herzlich	   willkommen	   und	   vielen	   Dank	   für	   Ihre	   Teilnahme	   an	   diesem	   Experiment!	   Bitte	  
kommunizieren	  Sie	  nicht	  mit	  den	  anderen	  Teilnehmern.	  	  
Wir	  bitten	  Sie,	  die	  Instruktionen	  aufmerksam	  zu	  lesen.	  Wenn	  Sie	  nach	  dem	  Lesen	  oder	  während	  des	  
Experiments	  noch	  Fragen	  haben,	  heben	  Sie	  bitte	  Ihre	  Hand.	  Einer	  der	  Experimentleiter	  wird	  dann	  zu	  
Ihnen	  kommen	  und	  Ihre	  Frage	  beantworten.	  	  
Das	   gesamte	   Doppelexperiment	   (Experiment	   1	   und	   Experiment	   2)	   besteht	   aus	   vier	   unabhängigen	  
Teilen,	  von	  denen	  zwei	  Teile	   (Teil	  1.A	  und	  Teil	  1.B)	  heute	  und	  die	  anderen	  zwei	  Teile	   (Teil	  2.A	  und	  
Teil	   2.B)	   in	   einer	   Woche	   durchgeführt	   werden.	   Ihre	   Entscheidungen	   innerhalb	   eines	   Teils	   haben	  
keinen	  Einfluss	  auf	  die	  anderen	  Teile.	  	  
Sie	   erhalten	   zunächst	   die	   Instruktionen	   für	   Teil	   1.A.	   Nach	   Abschluss	   von	   Teil	   1.A	   erhalten	   Sie	   die	  
Instruktionen	  für	  Teil	  1.B.	  Danach	  bitten	  wir	  Sie,	  einen	  Fragebogen	  auszufüllen.	  Ihre	  Auszahlung	  und	  
Ihre	  Entscheidungen	  werden	  vertraulich	  behandelt.	  
Für	   Ihr	   Erscheinen	   zu	   beiden	   Experimenten	   erhalten	   Sie	   insgesamt	   2,50	   €.	   Zusätzlich	   erhalten	   Sie	  
eine	   Anfangsausstattung	   von	   20,00	   €.	   Die	   Auszahlung	   findet	   im	   Anschluss	   an	   Teil	   2.B	   statt.	   Sie	  
erhalten	  Ihre	  Auszahlung	  nur,	  wenn	  Sie	  an	  beiden	  Experimenten	  teilgenommen	  haben.	  
	  
	  
	   	  
Hinweis:	  
Sie	  können	  in	  diesem	  Doppelexperiment	  je	  nach	  Ihren	  
Entscheidungen	  Gewinne	  und	  Verluste	  machen.	  Ihre	  Auszahlung	  wird	  
nicht	  durch	  die	  Entscheidungen	  anderer	  Teilnehmer	  beeinflusst.	  
Gewinne	  und	  Verluste	  in	  den	  einzelnen	  Teilen	  werden	  miteinander	  
verrechnet.	  
Falls	  Sie	  über	  das	  gesamte	  Doppelexperiment	  Verluste	  ansammeln,	  
sind	  Sie	  verpflichtet,	  diese	  nach	  Teil	  2.B	  in	  bar	  zu	  begleichen.	  
	  
2	  
	  
Teil	  1.A	  
Lotterien	  
In	   Teil	   1.A	   wählen	   Sie	   in	   jeder	   Runde	   zwischen	   zwei	   Lotterien.	   Eine	   Lotterie	   besteht	   aus	  
Wahrscheinlichkeiten	  und	  dazugehörigen	  Geldbeträgen.	  Geldbeträge	  können	  positiv	  (Gewinne)	  oder	  
negativ	  (Verluste)	  sein.	  	  
Dargestellt	   werden	   diese	   Lotterien	   als	   Tortendiagramme.	   Je	   größer	   die	   Fläche,	   desto	   größer	   die	  
Wahrscheinlichkeit,	  dass	  der	  zugehörige	  Geldbetrag	  ausgewählt	  wird.	  	  
Beispiel:	  Eine	  Lotterie	  zahlt	  mit	  40%	  Wahrscheinlichkeit	  15	  EUR	  aus	  und	  mit	  60%	  Wahrscheinlichkeit	  
-­‐10	   EUR.	   Somit	   ergibt	   sich	   also	   in	   40%	  der	   Fälle	   ein	  Gewinn	   von	  15	   EUR	  und	   in	   60%	  der	   Fälle	   ein	  
Verlust	  von	  10	  EUR.	  	  Auf	  Ihrem	  Bildschirm	  sähe	  diese	  Lotterie	  wie	  folgt	  aus:	  
	  
	  
	  
Entscheidung	  	  zwischen	  Lotterienpaaren	  
• Sie	  sehen	  auf	   Ihrem	  Bildschirm	   immer	  zwei	  Lotterien	  nebeneinander	  und	  entscheiden	  sich	  
für	  eine	  von	  beiden.	  Dies	  tun	  Sie,	  indem	  Sie	  auf	  den	  Knopf	  unter	  der	  gewünschten	  Lotterie	  
klicken.	  
• Insgesamt	   werden	   Ihnen	   106	   Lotterienpaare	   dargestellt.	   Die	   Knöpfe	   unter	   den	   Lotterien	  
erscheinen	  erst	  nach	  10	  Sekunden.	  
Beachten	  Sie:	  Auf	  Ihrem	  Bildschirm	  werden	  Zahlen	  gerundet	  angezeigt.	  Dies	  kann	  dazu	  führen,	  dass	  
sich	  die	  dargestellten	  Wahrscheinlichkeiten	  nicht	   immer	  zu	  100%	  addieren.	  Der	  Computer	   rechnet	  
jedoch	  mit	  den	  exakten	  Werten.	  	  
3	  
	  
Auszahlung	  	  
Nachdem	  Sie	   Ihre	  Entscheidungen	   für	  alle	   Lotterienpaare	  getroffen	  haben,	  bestimmen	  Sie,	  ob	  Teil	  
1.A	  bei	  Ihrer	  Auszahlung	  berücksichtigt	  werden	  soll	  oder	  nicht.	  	  
a) Teil	  1.A	  für	  Auszahlung	  verwenden	  
In	  diesem	  Fall	  wird	  Ihre	  Auszahlung	  wie	  folgt	  bestimmt:	  
1. Eine	  der	   von	   Ihnen	   gewählten	   Lotterien	  wird	   zufällig	   durch	  den	  Computer	   ausgewählt	  
und	  durchgeführt.	  Jede	  Lotterie	  hat	  dabei	  die	  gleiche	  Wahrscheinlichkeit	  ausgewählt	  zu	  
werden.	  
2. Das	  Ergebnis	  der	  Lotterie	  (Gewinn	  oder	  Verlust)	  wird	  mit	  Ihren	  Gewinnen	  und	  Verlusten	  
aus	  den	  anderen	  Teilen	  (Experiment	  1	  und	  Experiment	  2)	  verrechnet.	  
Das	   Ergebnis	   der	   Lotterie	   und	   Ihre	   Auszahlung	   erfahren	   Sie	   erst,	   nachdem	   Sie	   Teil	   2.B	  
abgeschlossen	  haben.	  
b) Teil	  1.A	  nicht	  für	  Auszahlung	  verwenden	  
In	  diesem	  Fall	  wird	  Ihre	  Auszahlung	  wie	  folgt	  bestimmt:	  
1. Keine	  der	  von	  Ihnen	  gewählten	  Lotterien	  wird	  bei	  der	  Auszahlung	  berücksichtigt.	  	  
2. Es	  werden	  Ihnen	  20,00	  €	  von	  Ihrer	  Anfangsausstattung	  abgezogen.	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  
	  
	  
1	  
	  
Teil	  1.B	  
Fragen	  
In	  Teil	  1.B	  des	  Experiments	  werden	  Ihnen	  auf	  dem	  Bildschirm	  nacheinander	  sieben	  Fragen	  angezeigt.	  
Sie	   haben	   zur	   Beantwortung	   einer	   Frage	   jeweils	   zwei	   Minuten	   Zeit.	   Nach	   Ablauf	   dieser	   Zeit,	  
erscheint	  automatisch	  die	  nächste	  Frage.	  	  
Eine	  Frage	  gilt	  nur	  dann	  als	  richtig	  beantwortet,	  wenn	  Sie	  die	  korrekte	  Lösung	  in	  das	  entsprechende	  
Feld	  eintippen	  und	  auf	  den	  Knopf	  „Weiter“	  drücken,	  bevor	  die	  Zeit	  abgelaufen	  ist.	  	  
Auszahlung	   	  
Für	  jede	  richtige	  Antwort	  erhalten	  Sie	  0.50	  €.	  
Beachten	  Sie:	   Ihr	  Ergebnis	  aus	  Teil	  1.B	  erfahren	  Sie	  ebenfalls	  erst,	  nachdem	  Sie	  Experimentteil	  2.B	  
abgeschlossen	  haben.	  
	  
	  
	   1	  
Übersicht	  	  
Dieser	  Teil	  des	  Experiments	  besteht	  aus	  18	  Runden,	  die	   jeweils	  die	  gleiche	  Abfolge	  an	  Entscheidungen	  
haben.	  Am	  Ende	  wird	  eine	  der	  18	  Runden	  zufällig	  durch	  den	  Computer	  ausgewählt	  und	  ausgezahlt.	  Alle	  
Runden	  haben	  dabei	  die	  gleiche	  Wahrscheinlichkeit	  ausgewählt	  zu	  werden.	  	  
	  
Erstpreisauktion	  
Sie	   nehmen	   an	   einer	   Erstpreisauktion	   teil,	   in	   der	   Sie	   ein	   Produkt	   erwerben	   können.	   Zu	   Beginn	   jeder	  
Runde	  erfahren	  Sie,	  welchen	  Wert	  das	  Produkt	  für	  Sie	  hat.	  Dieser	  Wert	  wird	  aus	  der	  Menge	  	  	  
{	  6	  €,	  10	  €,	  14	  €,	  18	  €,	  22	  €,	  26	  €,	  30	  €,	  34	  €,	  38	  €	  }	  
gezogen.	  Jeder	  Wert	  kommt	  genau	  zweimal	  vor.	  Die	  Reihenfolge	  ist	  jedoch	  zufällig	  bestimmt.	  
Sie	  befinden	  sich	  in	  einer	  Gruppe	  mit	  einem	  anderen	  Bieter.	  Der	  andere	  Bieter	  ist	  ein	  Bietroboter.	  	  
In	  der	  Auktion	  kann	  ein	  ganzzahliges	  Gebot	  zwischen	  0	  €	  und	  21	  €	  abgegeben	  werden.	  Der	  andere	  Bieter	  
wählt	  sein	  Gebot	  zufällig	  zwischen	  0	  €	  und	  21	  €.	  Jedes	  Gebot	  ist	  dabei	  gleich	  wahrscheinlich.	  
Der	  Bieter,	  der	  das	  höchste	  Gebot	  abgegeben	  hat,	  gewinnt	  die	  Auktion	  und	  erhält	  das	  Produkt.	  Der	  Preis	  
des	   Produkts	   entspricht	   diesem	   höchsten	   Gebot.	   Falls	   Sie	   und	   der	   andere	   Bieter	   das	   gleiche	   Gebot	  
abgeben,	  erhalten	  Sie	  das	  Produkt	  mit	  50%	  Wahrscheinlichkeit.	  
Falls	  Sie	  die	  Auktion	  gewinnen,	  ist	  Ihr	  Gewinn	  gegeben	  durch:	  
Gewinn	  =	  Wert	  –	  Gebot.	  
Falls	  Sie	  die	  Auktion	  nicht	  gewinnen,	  	  beträgt	  Ihr	  Gewinn	  0.	  	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	   	  
	   2	  
Entscheidungshilfe	  
Bevor	   Sie	   Ihr	   echtes	   Gebot	   eingeben,	   können	   Sie	   verschiedene	   Gebote	   testen,	   wofür	   Ihnen	   ein	  
Testbereich	  zur	  Verfügung	  steht.	  	  
Im	  Testbereich	  sehen	  Sie:	  
[Treatments:	  No	  DSS,	  Medium	  DSS,	  Full	  DSS]	  
• Gewinn,	  falls	  Gebot	  erfolgreich	  
Der	  Gewinn,	  falls	  das	  aktuelle	  Testgebot	  erfolgreich	  wäre.	  Dieser	  wird	  wie	  folgt	  berechnet:	  
Gewinn	  =	  Wert	  –	  Gebot.	  
[Treatments:	  Medium	  DSS,	  Full	  DSS]	  
• Gewinnwahrscheinlichkeit	  	  
Die	   Wahrscheinlichkeit,	   dass	   Sie	   mit	   einem	   Gebot	   in	   Höhe	   des	   Testgebots	   die	   Auktion	  
gewinnen.	  	  
[Treatments:	  Full	  DSS]	  
• Erwarteter	  Gewinn	  
Durchschnittlicher	   Gewinn,	   den	   Sie	   mit	   dem	   Gebot	   erwarten	   können.	   Dieser	   wird	   wie	   folgt	  
berechnet:	  
Erwarteter	  Gewinn	  =	  (Gewinnwahrscheinlichkeit)	  x	  (Gewinn,	  falls	  Gebot	  erfolgreich).	  
	  
Gebotsabgabe	  	  
• Um	  Ihr	   finales	  Gebot	  abzugeben,	   tippen	  Sie	  eine	  Zahl	  aus	  der	  erlaubten	  Menge	  der	  Gebote	   in	  
das	  vorgesehene	  Feld	  ein.	  Anschließend	  klicken	  Sie	  auf	  „Gebot	  abgeben“.	  
• Sie	  haben	  in	  jeder	  Runde	  60	  Sekunden	  Zeit,	  Ihr	  finales	  Gebot	  abzugeben.	  Sollten	  Sie	  kein	  Gebot	  
in	  den	  60	  Sekunden	  abgeben	  haben,	  nehmen	  Sie	  in	  dieser	  Runde	  nicht	  an	  der	  Auktion	  teil.	  
	  
Hinweis	  
Eine	   Runde	   dauert	   immer	   60	   Sekunden,	   unabhängig	   davon	   zu	   welchem	   Zeitpunkt	   Sie	   Ihr	   Gebot	  
abgegeben	   haben.	   Nachdem	   Sie	   und	   der	   andere	   Bieter	   ein	   finales	   Gebot	   abgegeben	   haben,	   ist	   die	  
Auktion	  zwar	  beendet,	  aber	  die	  Runde	  endet	  erst,	  wenn	  die	  60	  Sekunden	  abgelaufen	  sind.	  
	  
Ergebnis	  
	   1	  
Übersicht	  	  
Dieser	  Teil	  des	  Experiments	  besteht	  aus	  18	  Runden,	  die	   jeweils	  die	  gleiche	  Abfolge	  an	  Entscheidungen	  
haben.	  Am	  Ende	  wird	  eine	  der	  18	  Runden	  zufällig	  durch	  den	  Computer	  ausgewählt	  und	  ausgezahlt.	  Alle	  
Runden	  haben	  dabei	  die	  gleiche	  Wahrscheinlichkeit	  ausgewählt	  zu	  werden.	  	  
	  
Tickerauktion	  
Sie	  nehmen	  an	  einer	  Tickerauktion	  teil,	  in	  der	  Sie	  ein	  Produkt	  erwerben	  können.	  Zu	  Beginn	  jeder	  Runde	  
erfahren	  Sie,	  welchen	  Wert	  das	  Produkt	  für	  Sie	  hat.	  Dieser	  Wert	  wird	  aus	  der	  Menge	  	  	  
{	  6	  €,	  10	  €,	  14	  €,	  18	  €,	  22	  €,	  26	  €,	  30	  €,	  34	  €,	  38	  €	  }	  
gezogen.	  Jeder	  Wert	  kommt	  genau	  zweimal	  vor.	  Die	  Reihenfolge	  ist	  jedoch	  zufällig	  bestimmt.	  
Sie	  befinden	  sich	  in	  einer	  Gruppe	  mit	  einem	  anderen	  Bieter.	  Der	  andere	  Bieter	  ist	  ein	  Bietroboter.	  	  
In	  der	  Auktion	  startet	  der	  Preis	  bei	  21	  €	  und	  wird	  alle	  10	  Sekunden	  um	  1	  €	  gesenkt.	  Bei	   jedem	  neuen	  
Preis	   wird	   zufällig	   einer	   der	   Bieter	   zuerst	   gefragt,	   ob	   er	   diesen	   Preis	   annehmen	  möchte.	   Nimmt	   der	  
gefragte	   Bieter	   den	   Preis	   an,	   so	   endet	   damit	   die	   Auktion.	   Lehnt	   der	   gefragte	   Bieter	   ab,	   so	   wird	   der	  
gleiche	  Preis	  dem	  verbleibenden	  Bieter	   angeboten.	  Beide	  Bieter	  haben	  die	   gleiche	  Wahrscheinlichkeit	  
zuerst	  gefragt	  zu	  werden.	  	  
Der	  andere	  Bieter	  wählt	   zufällig	  einen	  Preis	   zwischen	  0	  €	  und	  21	  €	  aus,	   zu	  dem	  er	  annehmen	  würde.	  
Jeder	  mögliche	  Preis	  hat	  dabei	  die	  gleiche	  Wahrscheinlichkeit	  ausgewählt	  zu	  werden.	  
Sie	   gewinnen	   die	   Auktion	   und	   erhalten	   das	   Produkt,	   falls	   Sie	   vor	   dem	   anderen	   Bieter	   einen	   Preis	  
annehmen.	  	  
Falls	  Sie	  die	  Auktion	  gewinnen,	  ist	  Ihr	  Gewinn	  gegeben	  durch:	  
Gewinn	  =	  Wert	  –	  Preis.	  
Falls	  Sie	  die	  Auktion	  nicht	  gewinnen,	  	  beträgt	  Ihr	  Gewinn	  0.	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Entscheidungshilfe	  
Sie	  sehen	  auf	  dem	  Bildschirm	  den	  aktuellen	  Preis,	  den	  nächsten	  Preis	  sowie	  die	  Zeit	  bis	  zum	  nächsten	  
Preis.	  	  
Zusätzlich	  sehen	  Sie:	  
[Treatments:	  No	  DSS,	  Medium	  DSS,	  Full	  DSS]	  
• Gewinn	  bei	  gegebenem	  Preis	  
Der	  Gewinn,	  falls	  Sie	  den	  Preis	  annehmen	  würden.	  Dieser	  wird	  wie	  folgt	  berechnet:	  
Gewinn	  bei	  gegebenem	  Preis	  	  =	  Wert	  –	  Preis.	  
[Treatments:	  Medium	  DSS,	  Full	  DSS]	  
• Wahrscheinlichkeit,	  Preis	  angeboten	  zu	  bekommen	  
Die	  Wahrscheinlichkeit,	  dass	  Sie	  den	  jeweiligen	  Preis	  annehmen	  können.	  
[Treatments:	  Full	  DSS]	  
• Erwarteter	  Gewinn	  
Durchschnittlicher	   Gewinn,	   den	   Sie	   erwarten	   können,	   wenn	   Sie	   sich	   jetzt	   entscheiden	   den	  
jeweiligen	  Preis	  anzunehmen.	  Dieser	  wird	  wie	  folgt	  berechnet:	  
Erwarteter	   Gewinn	   =	   (Wahrscheinlichkeit,	   Preis	   angeboten	   zu	   bekommen)	   x	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Gewinn,	  bei	  gegebenem	  Preis).	  
	  
Hinweis	  
Eine	  Runde	  dauert	  immer	  220	  Sekunden,	  unabhängig	  davon	  welchen	  Preis	  Sie	  annehmen.	  Nachdem	  Sie	  
oder	  der	  andere	  Bieter	  einen	  Preis	  angenommen	  haben,	   ist	  die	  Auktion	  zwar	  beendet,	  aber	  die	  Runde	  
endet	  erst,	  wenn	  die	  220	  Sekunden	  abgelaufen	  sind.	  
	  
Ergebnis	  
Nach	   jeder	   Runde	   sehen	   Sie	   das	   Ergebnis	   der	   Runde.	  Hier	   erfahren	   Sie	   den	  Preis,	   ob	   Sie	   das	   Produkt	  
erhalten	  haben	  und	  wie	  hoch	  Ihr	  Gewinn	  ist.	  	  
1	  
	  
Instructions	  –	  Experiment	  1	  	  
	  
General	  Instructions	  
Welcome	  and	  thank	  you	  for	  participating	  in	  this	  experiment.	  Please	  do	  not	  communicate	  with	  other	  
participants.	  
We	   kindly	   ask	   you	   to	   read	   the	   instructions	   carefully.	   If	   you	   have	   any	   questions	   after	   reading	   the	  
instructions	  or	  during	  the	  experiment,	  please	  raise	  your	  hand.	  One	  of	  the	  instructors	  will	  then	  come	  
to	  your	  place	  and	  answer	  your	  question.	  
The	  entire	  double	  experiment	  (experiment	  1	  and	  experiment	  2)	  consists	  of	  four	   independent	  parts	  
of	  which	  two	  (part	  1.A	  and	  part	  1.B)	  will	  be	  conducted	  today	  while	  the	  other	  two	  (part	  2.A	  and	  part	  
2.B)	  will	  be	  conducted	  in	  one	  week	  from	  now.	  Your	  decisions	  in	  one	  part	  do	  not	  influence	  the	  other	  
parts.	  	  
You	  will	   first	   receive	  the	   instructions	   for	  part	  1.A.	  After	  part	  1.A	   is	  completed,	  you	  will	   receive	  the	  
instructions	   for	   part	   1.B.	   Then,	   we	   ask	   you	   to	   fill	   out	   a	   questionnaire.	   Your	   payment	   and	   your	  
decisions	  will	  be	  treated	  as	  confidential.	  
You	  will	  receive	  a	  show-­‐up	  fee	  of	  2.50	  €	  for	  attending	  both	  experiments.	  In	  addition,	  you	  will	  receive	  
an	  endowment	  of	  20.00	  €.	  The	  payment	  will	  take	  place	  at	  the	  end	  of	  part	  2.B.	  You	  only	  receive	  your	  
payment	  if	  you	  participate	  in	  both	  experiments.	  
	  
	  
	   	  
Note:	  
In	  this	  double	  experiment,	  you	  can	  make	  gains	  and	  losses	  depending	  
on	  your	  decisions.	  Your	  payment	  will	  not	  be	  influenced	  by	  the	  
decisions	  of	  other	  participants.	  Gains	  and	  losses	  of	  the	  individual	  parts	  
will	  be	  offset	  against	  each	  other.	  
If	  you	  accumulate	  losses	  over	  the	  entire	  double	  experiment,	  you	  are	  
obligated	  to	  pay	  these	  in	  cash	  at	  the	  end	  of	  part	  2.B.	  
	  
2	  
	  
Part	  1.A	  
Lotteries	  
In	  Part	  1.A,	  you	  will	  choose	  between	  two	  lotteries	  in	  each	  round.	  A	  lottery	  consists	  of	  probabilities	  
and	  according	  monetary	  values.	  Monetary	  values	  can	  be	  positive	  (gains)	  or	  negative	  (losses).	  
These	   lotteries	   will	   be	   shown	   as	   pie	   charts.	   The	   larger	   is	   the	   area,	   the	   larger	   the	   probability	   to	  
receive	  the	  respective	  monetary	  value.	  	  
Example:	  A	  lottery	  pays	  15	  EUR	  with	  a	  40%	  probability	  and	  -­‐10	  EUR	  with	  a	  60%	  probability.	  Hence,	  in	  
40%	  of	  the	  time,	  there	  will	  be	  a	  gain	  of	  15	  EUR	  and	  in	  60%	  of	  the	  time,	  there	  will	  be	  a	  loss	  of	  10	  EUR.	  
On	  your	  screen,	  this	  lottery	  would	  look	  as	  follows:	  
	  
	  
	  
Deciding	  between	  pairs	  of	  lotteries	  
• On	  your	  screen,	  you	  will	  always	  see	  two	  lotteries	  next	  to	  each	  other	  and	  choose	  one	  of	  these	  
lotteries.	  You	  do	  so	  by	  clicking	  on	  the	  button	  below	  the	  lottery	  chosen.	  
• In	  total,	  there	  will	  be	  106	  lottery	  pairs.	  The	  buttons	  below	  the	  lotteries	  will	  appear	  after	  10	  
seconds.	  
Note:	  On	  your	  screen,	  numbers	  will	  be	  rounded.	  This	  may	  cause	  probabilities	  to	  not	  always	  add	  up	  
to	  100%.	  The	  computer,	  however,	  does	  the	  calculations	  using	  the	  exact	  numbers.	  
3	  
	  
Payoff	  
After	   you	   have	   made	   your	   decision	   for	   all	   lottery	   pairs,	   you	   decide	   whether	   part	   1.A	   will	   be	  
considered	  for	  your	  payoff	  or	  not.	  	  
a) Consider	  part	  1.A	  for	  payoff	  
In	  this	  case,	  your	  payoff	  will	  be	  determined	  as	  follows:	  
1. One	  of	   the	   lotteries	   you	  chose	  will	  be	   randomly	   selected	  by	   the	  computer	  and	  played	  
out.	  Every	  lottery	  has	  the	  same	  probability	  to	  be	  selected.	  
2. The	  result	  of	  the	  lottery	  (gain	  or	  loss)	  will	  be	  offset	  against	  the	  gains	  and	  losses	  from	  the	  
other	  parts	  (experiment	  1	  and	  experiment	  2).	  
You	  will	  only	  learn	  the	  result	  of	  the	  lottery	  and	  your	  payoff	  after	  you	  completed	  part	  2.B.	  
b) Do	  not	  consider	  part	  1.A	  	  for	  payoff	  
In	  this	  case,	  your	  payoff	  will	  be	  determined	  as	  follows:	  
1. None	  of	  your	  chosen	  lotteries	  will	  be	  considered	  for	  payoff.	  
2. 20.00	  €	  will	  be	  deducted	  from	  your	  endowment.	  
	  
	  
	  	  
	  
	  
1	  
	  
Part	  1.B	  
Questions	  
In	  Part	  1.B	  of	  the	  experiment,	  you	  will	  subsequently	  see	  seven	  questions	  on	  your	  computer	  screen.	  
You	   have	   two	   minutes	   to	   answer	   one	   question.	   After	   this	   time,	   the	   next	   question	   appears	  
automatically.	  
A	  question	  is	  answered	  correctly	  if	  you	  type	  in	  the	  correct	  answer	  into	  the	  respective	  field	  and	  click	  
on	  the	  button	  “next”	  before	  the	  time	  has	  elapsed.	  	  
Payoff	   	  
For	  each	  correct	  answer,	  you	  receive	  0.50	  €.	  
Note:	  You	  will	  learn	  your	  result	  from	  part	  1.B	  only	  after	  you	  have	  completed	  part	  2.B.	  
	  
	  
	   1	  
Overview	  
This	  part	  of	  the	  experiment	  consists	  of	  18	  rounds	  which	  have	  the	  same	  course	  of	  decisions.	  At	  the	  end,	  
one	  of	  the	  18	  rounds	  will	  be	  randomly	  selected	  by	  the	  computer	  and	  paid	  out.	  All	  rounds	  have	  the	  same	  
probability	  to	  be	  selected.	  	  
	  
First-­‐Price	  Auction	  
You	  will	  participate	  in	  a	  first-­‐price	  auction	  in	  which	  you	  can	  acquire	  a	  product.	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  each	  
round,	  you	  will	  learn	  which	  value	  this	  product	  has	  for	  you.	  The	  value	  will	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  set	  	  
{6	  €,	  10	  €,	  14	  €,	  18	  €,	  22	  €,	  26	  €,	  30	  €,	  34	  €,	  38	  €}.	  
Each	  value	  occurs	  exactly	  twice.	  The	  order,	  however,	  is	  random.	  
You	  are	  in	  a	  group	  with	  one	  other	  bidder.	  This	  other	  bidder	  is	  a	  bidding	  robot.	  
In	  the	  auction,	  you	  can	  enter	  an	  integer	  bid	  between	  0	  €	  and	  21	  €.	  The	  other	  bidder	  will	  choose	  his	  bid	  
randomly	  between	  0	  €	  and	  21	  €.	  Every	  bid	  is	  equally	  likely.	  
The	  bidder	  with	  the	  highest	  bid	  wins	  the	  auction	  and	  receives	  the	  product.	  The	  price	  of	  the	  product	   is	  
given	  by	  this	  highest	  bid.	   If	  you	  and	  the	  other	  bidder	  submit	  the	  same	  bid,	  you	  have	  a	  50%	  chance	  to	  	  
receive	  the	  product.	  
If	  you	  win	  the	  auction,	  your	  profit	  is	  given	  by:	  
	   Profit	  =	  Value	  –	  Bid.	  
If	  you	  do	  not	  win	  the	  auction,	  your	  profit	  is	  0.	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	   	  
	   2	  
Decision	  Support	  
Before	  you	  enter	  your	  actual	  bid,	  you	  can	  test	  different	  bids	  for	  which	  a	  testing	  area	  is	  provided	  for	  you.	  
In	  the	  testing	  area,	  you	  will	  see:	  
[Treatments:	  No	  DSS,	  Medium	  DSS,	  Full	  DSS]	  
• Profit	  if	  bid	  was	  successful	  
The	  profit	  if	  the	  actual	  profit	  was	  successful.	  It	  is	  calculated	  as	  follows:	  
Profit	  =	  Value	  –	  Bid.	  
[Treatments:	  Medium	  DSS,	  Full	  DSS]	  
• Winning	  Probability	  
The	  probability	  that	  you	  win	  the	  auction	  with	  a	  bid	  equal	  to	  the	  test	  bid.	  
[Treatments:	  Full	  DSS]	  
• Expected	  Profit	  
Average	  profit	  that	  you	  can	  expect	  with	  the	  bid.	  It	  is	  calculated	  as	  follows:	  
Expected	  Profit	  =	  (Winning	  Probability)	  x	  (Profit	  if	  bid	  is	  successful).	  
	  
Bid	  Submission	  	  
• To	  submit	  your	  final	  bid,	  type	  in	  a	  number	  out	  of	  the	  feasible	  set	  of	  bids	  into	  the	  respective	  field.	  
Then,	  click	  on	  “submit	  bid”.	  
• In	  each	  round,	  you	  have	  60	  seconds	  to	  submit	  your	  final	  bid.	  If	  you	  do	  not	  submit	  a	  bid	  within	  
these	  60	  seconds,	  you	  will	  not	  participate	  in	  the	  auction	  in	  this	  round.	  
	  
Note	  
One	  round	  always	  lasts	  for	  60	  seconds,	  independently	  of	  when	  you	  submit	  your	  bid.	  After	  you	  and	  the	  
other	  bidder	  submitted	  a	  final	  bid,	  the	  auction	  end	  but	  the	  round	  will	  only	  end	  after	  the	  60	  seconds	  have	  
elapsed.	  
Result	  
After	  each	   round,	  you	  will	   see	   the	   result	  of	   that	   round.	  Here	  you	   learn	   the	  price,	  whether	  or	  not	  you	  
received	  the	  product,	  and	  how	  large	  your	  profit	  is.	  
	  
	  	  
	   1	  
Overview	  
This	  part	  of	  the	  experiment	  consists	  of	  18	  rounds	  which	  have	  the	  same	  course	  of	  decisions.	  At	  the	  end,	  
one	  of	  the	  18	  rounds	  will	  be	  randomly	  selected	  by	  the	  computer	  and	  paid	  out.	  All	  rounds	  have	  the	  same	  
probability	  to	  be	  selected.	  	  
	  
Ticker	  Auction	  
You	  will	   participate	   in	   a	   ticker	   auction	   in	  which	   you	   can	   acquire	   a	   product.	   At	   the	   beginning	   of	   each	  
round,	  you	  will	  learn	  which	  value	  this	  product	  has	  for	  you.	  The	  value	  will	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  set	  	  
{6	  €,	  10	  €,	  14	  €,	  18	  €,	  22	  €,	  26	  €,	  30	  €,	  34	  €,	  38	  €}.	  
Each	  value	  occurs	  exactly	  twice.	  The	  order,	  however,	  is	  random.	  
You	  are	  in	  a	  group	  with	  one	  other	  bidder.	  This	  other	  bidder	  is	  a	  bidding	  robot.	  
In	  the	  auction,	  the	  price	  starts	  at	  21	  €	  and	  will	  decrease	  by	  1	  €	  every	  10	  seconds.	  At	  every	  new	  price,	  one	  
of	  the	  bidders	  is	  randomly	  asked	  whether	  or	  not	  he	  wants	  to	  accept	  the	  price.	  If	  the	  bidder	  accepts	  the	  
price,	  the	  auction	  ends.	  If	  the	  bidder	  rejects	  the	  price,	  the	  same	  price	  is	  offered	  to	  the	  remaining	  bidder.	  
Both	  bidders	  have	  the	  same	  probability	  to	  be	  asked	  first.	  
The	  other	  bidder	  will	   randomly	  choose	  a	  price	  a	  price	  between	  0	   	  €	  and	  21	  €	  which	  he	  would	  accept.	  
Each	  feasible	  price	  has	  the	  same	  probability	  to	  be	  chosen.	  
You	  will	  win	  the	  auction	  and	  receive	  the	  product	  if	  you	  accept	  a	  price	  before	  the	  other	  bidder	  does.	  
If	  you	  win	  the	  auction,	  your	  profit	  is	  given	  by:	  
	   Profit	  =	  Value	  –	  Bid.	  
If	  you	  do	  not	  win	  the	  auction,	  your	  profit	  is	  0.	  
	  
	  
	  
	   	  
	   2	  
Decision	  Support	  
On	  your	  screen,	  you	  see	  the	  current	  price,	  the	  next	  price,	  and	  the	  time	  until	  the	  next	  price	  is	  shown.	  
In	  addition,	  you	  will	  see:	  
[Treatments:	  No	  DSS,	  Medium	  DSS,	  Full	  DSS]	  
• Profit	  at	  given	  price	  
The	  profit	  if	  you	  accepted	  the	  current	  price.	  It	  is	  calculated	  as	  follows:	  
Profit	  at	  given	  price	  =	  Value	  –	  price.	  
[Treatments:	  Medium	  DSS,	  Full	  DSS]	  
• Probability	  to	  be	  offered	  the	  given	  price	  
The	  probability	  that	  you	  can	  accept	  the	  respective	  price.	  	  
[Treatments:	  Full	  DSS]	  
• Expected	  Profit	  
Average	   profit	   that	   you	   can	   expect	   if	   you	   decide	   now	   to	   accept	   the	   respective	   price.	   It	   is	  
calculated	  as	  follows:	  
Expected	  Profit	  =	  (Probability	  to	  be	  offered	  this	  price)	  x	  (Profit	  at	  given	  price).	  
	  
Note	  
One	  round	  always	   lasts	  220	  seconds,	   independently	  of	  which	  price	  you	  accept.	  After	  you	  or	   the	  other	  
bidder	   accepted	   a	   price,	   the	   auction	   ends	   but	   the	   round	   will	   only	   end	   after	   the	   220	   seconds	   have	  
elapsed.	  
	  
Result	  
After	  each	   round,	  you	  will	   see	   the	   result	  of	   that	   round.	  Here	  you	   learn	   the	  price,	  whether	  or	  not	  you	  
received	  the	  product,	  and	  how	  large	  your	  profit	  is.	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4.D Screens in the Lab Experiment
Notes: Depicted is the computer interface used in Experiment 1 for the pairwise
comparison of lotteries. A lottery can be chosen by pressing either the button
Lotterie A (Lottery A) or the button Lotterie B (Lottery B). Buttons appear
after ten seconds.
Figure 4.D.5: Pairwise Comparison of Lotteries.
Notes: Depicted is the computer interface used in the first-price sealed-bid
auction. The individual valuation is depicted at the very top. Participants have
a test button Test-Gebot (Test bid) that allows to enter a bid. Depending on
the decision support, the following information is calculated from the test bid:
Profit falls Test-Gebot erfolgreich (Profit if bid was successful) (No, Medium,
and Full DSS), Gewinnwahrscheinlichkeit (Winning probability) (Medium and
Full DSS), and Erwarteter Profit (Expected profit) (Full DSS). A timer displays
the remaining time to submit a real bid that can be entered in the text field
in the lower right corner and submitted by pressing the button Gebot abgeben
(Submit bid).
Figure 4.D.6: Computer Interface: FPSBA.
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Notes: Depicted is the computer interface used in the Dutch auction. The
individual valuation is depicted at the very top. The screen shows the cur-
rent price, the time until the next price, and the next price. Depending on
the decision support, the following information is calculated automatically:
Gewinn bei gegebenem Preis (Profit at given price) (No, Medium, and Full
DSS), Wahrscheinlichkeit, Preis angeboten zu bekommen (Probability to be of-
fered the given price) (Medium and Full DSS), and Erwarteter Gewinn (Ex-
pected profit) (Full DSS). The current price can be accepted by pressing the
button Preis annehmen (Accept price).
Figure 4.D.7: Computer Interface: DA.
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4.E Empirical Appendix
4.E.1 Summary Statistics: Experiment 1
Age is an integer variable reporting participants’ age. Male and German Native are
dummy variables indicating male participants and whether the native language is Ger-
man. AUCG is the area under the curve on the gain domain and AUCL is the area
under the curve on the loss domain. λ is the parameter of loss aversion: KT79 indicates
the definition of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and KW05 indicates the definition of
Ko¨bberling and Wakker (2005). Allais Type is a dummy indicating whether participants
are consistent with Allais-type preferences based on the common-ratio effect (CRE). Nu-
meracy is an integer variable reporting participants’ numeracy scores.
Table 4.E.6: Summary Statistics by Treatment.
No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS Total
Age 25.48 24.15 22.74 24.16
(4.595) (3.461) (2.596) (3.798)
Male 0.483 0.481 0.407 0.458
(0.509) (0.509) (0.501) (0.501)
German Native 0.828 0.889 0.926 0.880
(0.384) (0.320) (0.267) (0.328)
AUCG 0.463 0.514 0.488 0.488
(0.138) (0.119) (0.127) (0.129)
AUCL 0.369 0.419 0.381 0.389
(0.166) (0.182) (0.200) (0.182)
λKT79 1.627 1.575 1.710 1.637
(0.725) (0.675) (0.727) (0.703)
λKW05 7.885 0.945 7.991 5.662
(35.49) (1.382) (23.31) (24.77)
Allais-Type 0.621 0.741 0.481 0.614
(0.677) (0.526) (0.700) (0.641)
Numeracy 4.517 4.222 4.556 4.434
(1.765) (1.396) (1.219) (1.475)
Notes: Reported is the mean of each variable with standard deviation in paren-
theses separated by treatment. N = 83. Participants in No DSS do not receive
additional information. In treatment Medium DSS, participants receive infor-
mation about the winning probability (FPSBA) or the probability to receive
the next price (DA). In treatment Full DSS, participants receive the same in-
formation as in Medium DSS and, in addition, the expected profit associated
with their bid.
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4.E.2 Individual Utility
This section reports the parametric fit of utility for each participant. N = 83. Dots
represent the non-parametric elicitation of utility (Elicited Utility) and the line is the
parametric fit via non-linear least-squares estimation (Parametric Fit). Figure 4.E.8
shows the individual utility functions for those participants who started with the FPSBA.
Figure 4.E.9 shows the individual utility functions for those participants who started with
the DA.
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Figure 4.E.8: Individual Utility Functions (FPSBA).
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Figure 4.E.9: Individual Utility Functions (DA).
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4.E.3 Bidding Behavior
Table 4.E.7: Average Winning Bids for Periods 1 to 18.
No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS KW test
Valuation FPSBA DA p-value FPSBA DA p-value FPSBA DA p-value p-value p-value
FPSBA DA
6 4.25 7.42 0.8710 4.25 4.00 0.5541 4.25 3.67 0.4450 0.9905 0.9191
10 6.67 6.00 0.3417 7.31 5.93 0.1234 7.38 6.57 0.6310 0.5114 0.6148
14 10.20 8.35 0.0397 10.38 10.50 0.9575 8.67 8.55 0.7575 0.1396 0.1450
18 14.39 11.04 0.0042 12.57 10.91 0.1105 11.25 11.80 0.1498 0.2347 0.7103
22 15.29 12.05 0.0740 14.54 13.83 0.5108 14.67 13.42 0.2008 0.7910 0.6215
26 18.88 14.50 0.0022 15.18 15.71 0.6428 17.09 17.15 0.8142 0.0150 0.0878
30 19.71 16.14 0.0019 17.96 15.73 0.3084 18.00 18.20 0.786 0.0189 0.1328
34 20.20 17.65 0.0062 18.68 17.04 0.1268 18.83 19.17 0.6750 0.0219 0.1285
38 20.20 17.86 0.0190 19.35 18.42 0.4404 18.50 19.77 0.1287 0.0265 0.1372
Average 15.87 13.33 - 14.57 13.86 - 14.93 15.01 - - -
Notes: Reported are the average winning bids for periods 1 to 18 and the
probability that bids in the different formats are drawn from the same dis-
tribution based on the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U-test. The Kruskal-Wallis
(KW) test reports whether there is any significant difference across decision
support systems for a given auction format.
Table 4.E.8: Average Winning Bids for All Periods.
No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS
Valuation FPSBA DA p-value FPSBA DA p-value FPSBA DA p-value
6 3.65 5.15 0.8913 4.10 6.25 0.5637 4.30 3.83 0.1025
10 6.24 6.38 0.5127 6.82 6.23 0.1111 6.86 7.00 0.4242
14 9.61 8.47 0.3387 10.05 9.66 0.3784 9.09 8.84 0.6934
18 12.53 12.06 0.4408 12.50 11.57 0.1619 12.53 12.10 0.7530
22 14.33 14.02 0.7584 13.93 14.43 0.6532 14.70 14.34 0.4190
26 16.63 16.38 0.3626 15.68 16.27 0.1397 16.62 17.56 0.2342
30 17.65 17.88 0.6796 17.88 17.25 0.5559 17.76 18.48 0.1198
34 18.61 18.79 1.0000 17.98 17.98 0.6732 18.56 19.20 0.0861
38 19.41 18.97 0.2599 18.79 18.79 0.1950 18.67 19.50 0.2918
Notes: Reported are the average winning bids for periods 1 to 36 and the prob-
ability that bids in the different formats are drawn from the same distribution
based on Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
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Notes: Depicted are the medians of the winning bids for each valuation, format,
treatment, and order for periods 1 to 18. F-D is the order where participants
start with the FPSBA. D-F is the order where participants start with the DA.
Figure 4.E.10: Median Winning Bids for Periods 1 to 18.
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Notes: Depicted are the medians of the winning bids for each valuation, format,
treatment, and order for periods 19 to 36. F-D is the order where participants
start with the FPSBA. D-F is the order where participants start with the DA.
Figure 4.E.11: Median Winning Bids for Periods 19 to 36.
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4.E.4 Prediction Accuracy: All GOF Measures
Table 4.E.9: Prediction Accuracy for Mean Data.
Format First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction Dutch Auction
Panel A. Mean Deviation (MD)
Preference Specification No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS All No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS All
Linear SP 3.45 2.42 2.46 2.81 0.98 1.27 2.39 1.58
(1.97) (1.39) (1.64) (1.72) (1.78) (2.54) (1.56) 2.02
Power SP 7.39∗∗∗ 6.24∗∗∗ 6.40∗∗∗ 6.71∗∗∗ 4.85∗∗∗ 5.21∗∗∗ 6.36∗∗∗ 5.51∗∗∗
(1.97) (1.37) (1.57) (1.71) (1.81) (2.48) (1.56) (2.02)
Linear KR 1.19∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ -1.37∗∗∗ -1.22∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.86∗∗∗
(1.95) (1.45) (1.73) (1.75) (1.78) (2.59) (1.56) (2.02)
Power KR 4.19∗∗∗ 3.10∗∗∗ 3.18∗∗∗ 3.52∗∗∗ 3.45∗∗∗ 3.78∗∗∗ 4.91∗∗∗ 4.08∗∗∗
(1.95) (1.38) (1.61) (1.71) (1.79) (2.50) (1.55) (2.01)
Allais-Type 3.72∗∗∗ 2.61∗∗∗ 2.69∗∗∗ 3.04∗∗∗ -1.84∗∗∗ -1.74∗∗∗ -0.53∗∗∗ -1.33∗∗∗
(1.94) (1.39) (1.61) (1.71) (1.74) (2.60) (1.57) (2.02)
Panel B. Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD)
Preference Specification No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS All No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS All
Linear SP 3.74 2.77 2.93 3.17 2.80 2.77 2.88 2.82
(1.43) (1.08) (1.45) (1.37) (0.98) (1.19) (1.09) (1.06)
Power SP 7.39∗∗∗ 6.24∗∗∗ 6.40∗∗∗ 6.71∗∗∗ 5.05∗∗∗ 5.43∗∗∗ 6.42∗∗∗ 5.66∗∗∗
(1.97) (1.37) (1.57) (1.71) (1.81) (2.17) (1.49) (1.87)
Linear KR 2.14∗∗∗ 2.17∗ 2.28∗ 2.19∗∗∗ 2.91 2.69 1.77∗∗∗ 2.43
(0.93) (0.59) (0.90) (0.80) (1.03) (1.52) (0.74) (1.20)
Power KR 4.36∗∗∗ 3.23∗∗∗ 3.38∗∗∗ 3.69∗∗∗ 3.96∗∗∗ 4.32∗∗∗ 4.99∗∗∗ 4.44∗∗∗
(1.59) (1.27) (1.47) (1.51) (1.54) (1.83) (1.45) (1.62)
Allais-Type 3.96∗∗∗ 2.85 2.98 3.30∗∗∗ 3.10 2.67 2.08∗∗ 2.60
(1.46) (1.19) (1.38) (1.42) (1.24) (1.79) (0.64) (1.31)
Panel C. Mean Squared Deviation (MSD)
Preference Specification No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS All No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS All
Linear SP 19.65 11.34 13.23 14.93 13.24 12.68 12.61 12.85
(12.36) (6.98) (10.26) (10.58) (8.82) (9.56) (8.78) (8.80)
Power SP 63.51∗∗∗ 44.14∗∗∗ 47.44∗∗∗ 52.20∗∗∗ 34.92∗∗∗ 37.69∗∗∗ 48.47∗∗∗ 40.69∗∗∗
(26.34) (16.94) (21.49) (23.25) (19.81) (25.02) (20.30) (21.93)
Linear KR 8.90∗∗∗ 7.59∗ 8.53∗∗ 8.35∗∗∗ 15.94 14.00 6.87∗∗ 12.05
(6.51) (3.28) (5.54) (5.20) (11.20) (13.75) (5.85) (11.01)
Power KR 24.60∗∗∗ 14.37∗∗∗ 16.19∗∗∗ 18.65∗∗∗ 23.47∗∗∗ 25.21∗∗ 31.20∗∗∗ 26.81∗∗∗
(14.30) (8.60) (11.85) (12.48) (14.60) (18.66) (15.88) (16.28)
Allais-Type 20.50∗∗ 11.57 13.04 15.27∗ 16.42 13.17 7.04∗ 12.04
(12.13) (7.30) (10.06) (10.64) (11.70) (15.83) (5.53) (11.86)
Notes: Reported is the mean of the goodness-of-fit (GOF) measures: mean deviation (MD),
mean absolute deviation (MAD), and mean squared deviation (MSD). The deviation is the
difference between the individual observed winning bid and the predicted bid based on the
mean measurement for Power SP and Linear KR preferences or the mean predicted bid for
Power KR and Allais-type. Standard deviation in parentheses. SP indicates standard and
KR indicates Ko¨szegi-Rabin preferences. Asterisks indicate a significant difference between
the GOF measure and the benchmark of linear standard preferences (Linear SP) based on the
Wilcoxon signed-rank test. ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
4.E. EMPIRICAL APPENDIX 189
Table 4.E.10: Prediction Accuracy for Median Data.
Format First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction Dutch Auction
Panel A. Mean Deviation (MD)
Preference Specification No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS All No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS All
Linear SP 3.45 2.42 2.46 2.81 0.98 1.27 2.39 1.58
(1.97) (1.39) (1.64) (1.72) (1.78) (2.54) (1.56) (2.02)
Power SP 4.21∗∗∗ 3.12∗∗∗ 3.20∗∗∗ 3.54∗∗∗ 1.68∗∗∗ 2.03∗∗∗ 3.16∗∗∗ 2.32∗∗∗
(1.98) (1.37) (1.62) 1.72) (1.80) (2.54) (1.56) (2.03)
Linear KR 2.12∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 1.50∗∗∗ -0.53∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(1.96) (1.41) (1.69) (1.73) (1.77) (2.56) (1.57) (2.01)
Power KR 4.03∗∗∗ 3.01∗∗∗ 3.06∗∗∗ 3.40∗∗∗ 3.53∗∗∗ 3.83∗∗∗ 4.96∗∗∗ 4.14∗∗∗
(1.96) (1.36) (1.62) (1.71) (1.80) (2.53) (1.56) (2.02)
Allais-Type 1.56∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ -3.67∗∗∗ -3.64∗∗∗ -2.46∗∗∗ -3.22∗∗∗
(2.00) (1.42) (1.67) (1.75) (1.71) (2.61) (1.58) (2.01)
Panel B. Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD)
Preference Specification No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS All No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS All
Linear SP 3.74 2.77 2.93 3.17 2.80 2.77 2.88 2.82
(1.43) (1.08) (1.45) (1.37) (0.98) (1.19) (1.09) (1.06)
Power SP 4.36∗∗∗ 3.24∗∗∗ 3.45∗∗∗ 3.71∗∗∗ 2.98 3.09∗ 3.46∗∗∗ 3.19∗∗∗
(1.64) (1.26) (1.47) (1.52) (1.12) (1.40) (1.27) (1.25)
Linear KR 2.73∗∗∗ 2.26∗∗ 2.51∗ 2.51∗∗∗ 2.72 2.57 1.98∗∗∗ 2.41∗∗
(1.10) (0.68) (1.01) 0.95) (0.82) (1.28) (0.72) (0.98)
Power KR 4.19∗∗∗ 3.21∗∗∗ 3.36∗∗∗ 3.61∗∗∗ 4.11∗∗∗ 4.43∗∗∗ 5.06∗∗∗ 4.55∗∗∗
(1.60) (1.14) (1.47) (1.46) (1.48) (1.78) (1.46) (1.58)
Allais-Type 2.39∗∗∗ 2.04∗∗ 2.25∗ 2.23∗∗∗ 4.11∗∗ 3.79 2.71 3.50∗
(1.01) (0.53) (0.92) (0.84) (1.82) (2.46) (1.47) (1.97)
Panel C. Mean Squared Deviation (MSD)
Preference Specification No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS All No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS All
Linear SP 19.65 11.34 13.23 14.93 13.24 12.68 12.61 12.85
(12.36) (6.98) (10.26) (10.58) (8.82) (9.56) (8.78) (8.80)
Power SP 25.97∗∗∗ 15.06∗∗∗ 17.32∗∗∗ 19.71∗∗∗ 14.68 15.22∗ 17.28∗∗∗ 15.79∗∗∗
(15.29) (8.75) (12.53) (13.19) (9.50) (11.82) (10.91) (10.53)
Linear KR 12.73∗∗∗ 8.03∗∗ 9.80∗∗ 10.27∗∗∗ 13.94 12.00 7.58∗∗∗ 11.05∗
(8.58) (4.26) (7.15) (7.06) (9.74) (10.49) (5.86) (8.99)
Power KR 24.25∗∗∗ 14.85∗∗∗ 16.86∗∗∗ 18.88∗∗∗ 25.31∗∗∗ 27.14∗∗∗ 32.63∗∗∗ 28.52∗∗∗
(15.08) (8.55) (12.39) (12.78) (15.01) (19.33) (16.24) (16.70)
Allais-Type 10.26∗∗∗ 6.93∗∗ 8.36∗∗ 8.57∗∗∗ 28.56∗∗∗ 24.64 13.05 21.74∗∗
(7.02) (3.08) (8.36) (8.57) (17.51) (25.94) (9.97) (19.15)
Notes: Reported is the mean of the goodness-of-fit (GOF) measures: mean deviation (MD),
mean absolute deviation (MAD), and mean squared deviation (MSD). The deviation is the
difference between the individual observed winning bid and the predicted bid based on the
median measurement for Power SP and Linear KR preferences or the median predicted bid
for Power KR and Allais-type. Standard deviation in parentheses. SP indicates standard and
KR indicates Ko¨szegi-Rabin preferences. Asterisks indicate a significant difference between
the GOF measure and the benchmark of linear standard preferences (Linear SP) based on the
Wilcoxon signed-rank test. ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
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Table 4.E.11: Prediction Accuracy for Individual Data.
Format First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction Dutch Auction
Panel A. Mean Deviation (MD)
Preference Specification No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS All No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS All
Linear SP 3.45 2.42 2.46 2.81 0.98 1.27 2.39 1.58
(1.97) (1.39) (1.64) (1.72) (1.78) (2.54) (1.56) (2.02)
Power SP 4.03 2.96 4.76 3.88∗ 2.39 1.19 2.48 2.07
(3.64) (2.64) (3.64) (3.33) (3.02) (3.46) (2.37) (2.92)
Linear KR 1.21∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ -0.43∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(2.63) (1.55) (3.22) (2.55) (2.62) (3.20) (2.05) (2.61)
Power KR 3.28 3.86∗∗ 3.42 3.52 4.17∗∗ 2.78 4.97∗∗ 4.06∗∗∗
(4.75) (2.52) (3.87) (3.77) (3.66) (5.09) (3.80) (4.16)
Allais-Type 3.78 1.06 2.72 2.54 -3.54∗∗∗ -0.68∗∗ 0.31 -1.29∗∗∗
(4.85) (3.76) (3.10) (4.10) (2.05) (5.06) (5.62) (4.72)
Panel B. Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD)
Preference Specification No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS All No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS All
Linear SP 3.74 2.77 2.93 3.17 2.80 2.77 2.88 2.82
(1.43) (1.08) (1.45) (1.37) (0.98) (1.19) (1.09) (1.06)
Power SP 4.44 3.71∗∗ 5.10∗ 4.38∗∗ 3.72 2.90 3.13 3.26
(3.17) (1.43) (3.23) (2.71) (2.05) (2.57) (1.60) (2.05)
Linear KR 2.67∗ 1.98∗ 3.12 2.57∗∗ 3.12 2.91 2.18∗ 2.72
(1.09) (0.82) (1.39) (1.18) (1.08) (1.69) (1.20) (1.36)
Power KR 4.18 4.39∗∗∗ 4.62∗ 4.38∗∗∗ 5.11∗∗∗ 4.32 5.47∗∗∗ 5.01∗∗∗
(3.53) (1.50) (2.53) (2.62) (2.70) (4.12) (3.11) (3.27)
Allais-Type 4.80 3.25 3.40 3.86 4.06∗∗ 4.34∗ 4.61 4.34∗∗∗
(3.79) (2.33) (2.40) (2.98) (1.96) (2.53) (3.19) (2.57)
Panel C. Mean Squared Deviation (MSD)
Preference Specification No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS All No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS All
Linear SP 19.65 11.34 13.23 14.93 13.24 12.68 12.61 12.85
(12.36) (6.98) (10.26) (10.58) (8.82) (9.56) (8.78) (8.80)
Power SP 33.16 19.18∗∗ 39.45∗ 30.23∗∗∗ 23.69 17.39 16.04 19.05
(37.43) (10.89) (41.27) (32.66) (22.87) (30.28) (13.66) (22.37)
Linear KR 12.08 6.92 14.19 10.94∗ 17.19 15.35 9.39 13.80
(7.80) (5.14) (10.49) (8.34) (12.18) (18.27) (8.97) (13.42)
Power KR 33.62 25.45∗∗∗ 32.25∗ 30.43∗∗∗ 41.43∗∗∗ 38.57 45.86∗∗∗ 42.21∗∗∗
(45.59) (15.43) (33.19) (33.50) (36.40) (8.92) (33.38) (29.60)
Allais-Type 41.19∗ 18.92 19.78 27.32∗ 29.14∗∗ 28.93∗ 39.15∗ 32.74∗∗∗
(42.16) (21.56) (22.32) (32.00) (19.26) (29.72) (45.70) (33.45)
Notes: Reported is the mean of the goodness-of-fit (GOF) measures: mean deviation (MD),
mean absolute deviation (MAD), and mean squared deviation (MSD). The deviation is the
difference between the individual observed winning bid and the predicted bid based on the
individual measurement. Standard deviation in parentheses. SP indicates standard and KR
indicates Ko¨szegi-Rabin preferences. Asterisks indicate a significant difference between the
GOF measure and the benchmark of linear standard preferences (Linear SP) based on the
Wilcoxon signed-rank test. ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
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4.E.5 Parametric Regressions
Table 4.E.12: Regression of MAD Under Linear Standard Preferences.
Auction Format First-Price Sealed-Bid Dutch
Model (FI) (FII) (DI) (DII)
Medium DSS -0.877 -1.804 1.655 1.789
(1.560) (1.952) (1.317) (1.473)
Full DSS 1.949 0.670 -1.378 -1.563
(2.137) (2.627) (1.277) (1.083)
Numeracy 0.322 0.206 -0.204∗ -0.103
(0.251) (0.345) (0.111) (0.108)
Medium DSS X Numeracy 0.011 0.253 -0.344 -0.382
(0.322) (0.397) (0.253) (0.282)
Full DSS X Numeracy -0.649 -0.349 0.305 0.331
(0.462) (0.546) (0.255) (0.230)
Age 0.017 0.082∗
(0.056) (0.044)
Male -0.842∗ -0.379
(0.435) (0.393)
German Native -0.383 0.517
(0.744) (0.539)
Constant 2.346∗ 3.017 3.759∗∗∗ 1.106
(1.292) (3.084) (0.579) (1.438)
Observations 41 41 41 41
R2 0.19 0.28 0.18 0.27
Notes: Reported are parametric OLS regression estimates. Dependent variable is the mean
absolute deviation (MAD) for linear standard preferences. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
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Table 4.E.13: Regression of MAD Under Power Standard Preferences.
Auction Format First-Price Sealed-Bid Dutch
Model (FI) (FII) (DI) (DII)
Medium DSS -1.306 -2.879 2.224 -0.420
(3.250) (2.967) (2.966) (2.459)
Full DSS -2.292 -5.750 -1.808 -2.531
(3.764) (3.969) (2.885) (2.519)
Numeracy 0.415 0.134 -0.441 -0.340
(0.677) (0.576) (0.306) (0.328)
Medium DSS X Numeracy 0.191 0.523 -0.617 -0.179
(0.724) (0.706) (0.496) (0.382)
Full DSS X Numeracy 0.725 1.416 0.264 0.289
(0.911) (0.955) (0.553) (0.486)
Age -0.096 0.004
(0.152) (0.089)
Male -0.879 -1.555∗∗
(0.871) (0.653)
German Native -1.339 1.979∗∗
(1.141) (0.887)
Constant 2.641 7.830 5.796∗∗∗ 4.670∗
(3.085) (5.306) (1.670) (2.585)
Observations 41 41 41 41
R2 0.17 0.22 0.22 0.34
Notes: Reported are parametric OLS regression estimates. Dependent variable is the mean
absolute deviation (MAD) for power standard preferences. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
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Table 4.E.14: Regression of MAD Under Linear KR Preferences.
Auction Format First-Price Sealed-Bid Dutch
Model (FI) (FII) (DI) (DII)
Medium DSS -1.639 -1.619 1.955 0.096
(1.185) (1.388) (1.922) (1.546)
Full DSS -0.925 -1.339 -3.673∗∗ -3.865∗∗∗
(1.544) (1.743) (1.539) (1.387)
Numeracy -0.173 -0.154 -0.172 -0.253
(0.228) (0.233) (0.155) (0.171)
Medium DSS X Numeracy 0.223 0.208 -0.446 -0.084
(0.294) (0.351) (0.329) (0.285)
Full DSS X Numeracy 0.321 0.441 0.566∗ 0.574∗
(0.342) (0.361) (0.317) (0.300)
Age 0.027 -0.098∗
(0.071) (0.053)
Male -0.009 -0.566
(0.374) (0.429)
German Native -1.009∗∗ -0.140
(0.413) (0.930)
Constant 3.424∗∗∗ 3.506 3.939∗∗∗ 7.214∗∗∗
(0.983) (2.468) (0.945) (2.221)
Observations 41 41 41 41
R2 0.18 0.28 0.24 0.36
Notes: Reported are parametric OLS regression estimates. Dependent variable is the mean
absolute deviation (MAD) for Linear KR preferences. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
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Table 4.E.15: Regression of MAD Under Power KR Preferences.
Auction Format First-Price Sealed-Bid Dutch
Model (FI) (FII) (DI) (DII)
Medium DSS 1.937 1.293 3.904 -0.053
(2.684) (2.627) (4.476) (4.140)
Full DSS 2.567 1.951 -0.895 -2.158
(3.789) (3.592) (4.617) (3.873)
Numeracy 1.226∗ 1.170∗∗ -0.919∗∗∗ -0.683∗
(0.613) (0.570) (0.310) (0.358)
Medium DSS X Numeracy -0.313 -0.125 -0.949 -0.262
(0.650) (0.661) (0.771) (0.708)
Full DSS X Numeracy -0.461 -0.282 0.286 0.387
(0.951) (0.902) (0.912) (0.816)
Age 0.049 0.096
(0.183) (0.140)
Male -0.736 -2.880∗∗∗
(0.705) (0.964)
German Native -0.240 2.564∗
(0.706) (1.400)
Constant -1.136 -1.729 9.447∗∗∗ 5.804
(2.573) (5.124) (1.744) (4.001)
Observations 41 41 41 41
R2 0.22 0.24 0.29 0.43
Notes: Reported are parametric OLS regression estimates. Dependent variable is the mean
absolute deviation (MAD) for Power KR preferences. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
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Table 4.E.16: Regression of MAD Under Allais-Type Preferences.
Auction Format First-Price Sealed-Bid Dutch
Model (FI) (FII) (DI) (DII)
Medium DSS 1.633 2.481 0.489 -1.749
(4.029) (4.326) (3.976) (4.674)
Full DSS -4.266 -4.315 -2.706 -2.943
(3.737) (4.669) (3.455) (3.079)
Numeracy 0.222 0.344 0.036 -0.061
(0.775) (0.766) (0.236) (0.194)
Medium DSS X Numeracy -0.787 -1.046 -0.045 0.508
(0.879) (0.925) (0.754) (0.890)
Full DSS X Numeracy 0.696 0.727 0.667 0.793
(0.823) (1.001) (0.772) (0.726)
Age 0.014 -0.053
(0.204) (0.123)
Male 0.841 -1.179
(1.018) (0.949)
German Native -1.939∗ -2.605∗∗∗
(1.113) (0.699)
Constant 3.839 4.357 3.894∗∗∗ 8.464∗∗
(3.566) (7.288) (1.292) (3.607)
Observations 41 41 41 41
R2 0.13 0.20 0.03 0.17
Notes: Reported are parametric OLS regression estimates. Dependent variable is the mean
absolute deviation (MAD) for Allais-type preferences. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.

Chapter 5
THE EFFECT OF PAYOFF EQUALITY ON
EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
5.1 Introduction
Coordination requires that people match each other’s action to achieve a mutually bene-
ficial outcome. Coordination games generically feature multiple equilibria. This impairs
comparative-static analyses and the derivation of policy advice and makes coordination
games an important topic in both theoretical and experimental economics (Van Huyck,
Battalio, and Beil 1990; Cooper et al. 1990; 1992; Van Huyck, Gillette, and Battalio
1992).1 We study coordination in a minimum-effort game (MEG, Van Huyck, Battalio,
and Beil 1990). In the MEG, actions are strategic complements in the sense that mu-
tually higher payoffs require greater matched action profiles, often termed ‘efforts’. In
addition, equilibria differ in the degree of risk as higher benefits are associated with larger
costs from miscoordination. Players thus always aim at matching the minimum effort in
their group while at the same time preferring that the minimum is high. This results
in a trade-off between efficiency and risk. The Pareto-dominant equilibrium involves the
highest risk while individual payoffs in the least-efficient equilibrium are independent of
the actions of others and thus “secure”. Despite an obvious social optimum, empirical in-
vestigations of the MEG often show that groups are not able to realize the Pareto-optimal
outcome (Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil 1990; Devetag and Ortmann 2007).
The MEG mimics numerous coordination scenarios, e.g., global public goods (Hir-
shleifer 1983; Sandler 1998; Nordhaus 2006), computer security (Riedl, Rohde, and Stro-
bel 2012), and team production such as assembly lines or co-authorships in academia
(Brandts and Cooper 2006). In the financial literature, bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig
1983), speculative attacks against exchange-rate pegs (Obstfeld 1996), and debt crises
(Cole and Kehoe 2000) are typical coordination problems. While the standard MEG is
symmetric, real-world scenarios typically involve highly asymmetric benefits. For exam-
ple, global vaccination campaigns such as the eradication of smallpox are minimum-effort
games because the success depends on the country that implements the weakest cam-
paign. Barrett (2006, p. 181) notes that “the real smallpox game was characterized by
substantial asymmetries. By the time the eradication program began, the rich coun-
tries had already eliminated smallpox within their borders. Eradication would succeed
1The literature on coordination games is extensive, both theoretically and experimentally. We refer
the reader to the surveys by Ochs (1995),Camerer (2003), and Devetag and Ortmann (2007).
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only if the remaining endemic countries eliminated the disease.” However, rich countries
still occasionally imported smallpox from poor countries due to international travel and
trade. Hence, while the “vaccination” equilibrium was clearly in common interest, poor
countries had larger benefits from coordination on this equilibrium than rich countries.
This paper introduces asymmetric payoffs into the MEG and investigates how the
resulting payoff inequality affects individuals’ ability to coordinate. We manipulate payoff
inequality by introducing two types: a low-cost type and a high-cost type. The low-cost
type has low costs of effort provision and thus always benefits more from coordination on
higher effort levels than the high-cost type. Payoffs between the two types are unequal in
all but one equilibrium. We say that an equilibrium is equality-dominant if it is the only
one featuring equal payoffs. In the experiment, either the Pareto-dominant equilibrium
is equality-dominant or the secure equilibrium is equality-dominant. As a check for
robustness, we further vary the strategic uncertainty of the game by manipulating off-
equilibrium payoffs of the low-cost type. Under low strategic uncertainty, the low-cost
type is only hardly affected by miscoordination while strongly benefiting from successful
coordination. Under high strategic uncertainty, the low-cost type still benefits more from
coordination but now also loses much from miscoordination.
An extensive literature shows that preferences for avoiding inequality are important
across a wide range of settings and significantly impact the outcomes in many kinds of
social interaction (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Fehr and Schmidt
2006). We incorporate inequality aversion into the theory of potential games (Monderer
and Shapley 1996) and derive the according social-preference potential to investigate
whether equality dominance might serve as an equilibrium selection device. We predict
that subjects always choose the equality-dominant equilibrium irrespective of whether it
is Pareto-dominant or secure. In an experimental investigation of this game, we show that
social preferences indeed strongly affect behavior in the MEG, with groups converging
towards the secure equilibrium when it is equality-dominant and strategic uncertainty is
high. An increase in strategic uncertainty however, does not deter successful coordination
if the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is equality-dominant.
We contribute to the literature in several ways. We are the first to incorporate payoff
inequality into an MEG and vary which equilibrium is equality-dominant. Furthermore,
we advance the literature on the role of the theory of potential games for predicting
behavior in the MEG. While our experimental investigation generally finds support for
our theoretical prediction which is in line with previous research, the data also show
that off-equilibrium payoffs in general and strategic uncertainty in particular matter for
decision making in the MEG. Increasing strategic uncertainty by asymmetric changes in
off-equilibrium payoffs cannot be analyzed by the theory of potential games but matter
strongly for actual behavior. Last, we complement the findings in Chen and Chen (2011)
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who show the effect of group identity on equilibrium selection, in revealing that also
equality in equilibrium helps with regard to equilibrium selection, emphasizing the role
of social preferences for coordination success.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the standard
minimum-effort game. We introduce payoff inequality and derive our prediction in Section
5.3. We then present our experimental design (Section 5.4). In Section 5.5, we present
our results. Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 The Standard Minimum-Effort Game
The standard symmetric minimum-effort game MEG = (N,E, pii) consists of i ∈ N =
{1, . . . , n} players that choose an effort level ei ∈ Ei = {e0, . . . , ek} with 1 = e0 < e1 <
. . . < ek, ∆e = e1−e0 = . . . = ek−ek−1 = 1, and E = E1× . . .×En. We denote an action
profile by e = (e1, . . . , en) ∈ E and an equilibrium by e∗. A player’s payoff function is
given by:
pii(e) = bmin{e} − cei + a, (5.2.1)
for every i = 1, . . . , n, where b > c is the benefit from coordination, c > 0 is the effort
cost, and a ≥ 0 is a constant. The generic feature of the MEG is that all common
effort levels are Nash equilibria because a player does not gain from unilateral deviation.
A unilateral increase in effort does not raise the minimum but only increases costs. A
unilateral decrease in effort reduces the minimum but the savings in costs is less than
the forfeited benefit from higher coordination because b > c. Hence, the number of Nash
equilibria of the MEG corresponds to the number of effort levels |Ei|.2
In addition, all equilibria are Pareto-rankable, i.e., larger equilibrium efforts gen-
erate higher payoffs. Two equilibria of the game often receive special attention: the
Pareto-dominant and the secure equilibrium. In the Pareto-dominant equilibrium, all
players choose their maximum effort and, hence, maximize efficiency and individual pay-
offs. In the secure equilibrium, all players choose the minimum effort thereby minimizing
efficiency in equilibrium while also minimizing their individual risk from miscoordination
because the respective effort is the maximin strategy.
We analyze equilibrium selection using the theory of potential games. Potential
games are games that admit a potential function and only Nash equilibria are local max-
imizers of the potential function (Monderer and Shapley 1996). Hence, the theory of
potential games is a refinement that can be applied to the MEG (Monderer and Shapley
1996; Anderson, Goeree, and Holt 2001; Goeree and Holt 2005; Chen and Chen 2011).
The potential function accounts for all players’ deviation incentives and in particular
2As is standard in the coordination literature, we only consider pure-strategy Nash equilibria. See
also Footnote 4.
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coincides with risk dominance in symmetric 2x2 games (Goeree and Holt 2005).3 In the
MEG, the theory of potential games can be used as a refinement because it determines
a threshold equilibrium benefit from coordination, bMEG, that can select a unique equi-
librium for a given value of the actual benefit b (Monderer and Shapley 1996). If the
actual benefit is below the equilibrium threshold, the secure equilibrium is selected. If
the actual benefit is above the equilibrium threshold, the Pareto-dominant equilibrium
is selected. If the actual benefit equals the equilibrium threshold, the potential does not
select an equilibrium. The predictions of this deterministic potential game are thus very
clear cut.
Anderson, Goeree, and Holt (2001), Goeree and Holt (2005), and Chen and Chen
(2011) augment the deterministic theory of potential games by allowing for decision errors
in the sense of quantal responses (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995). Introducing noise into
the decision process weakens the clear-cut statements obtained from the potential and
turns them more into a prediction about convergence. Both Goeree and Holt (2005) and
Chen and Chen (2011) find experimentally that coordination outcomes in a continuous
MEG closely resemble the prediction of such stochastic potential games after some time
of learning.
The Potential Minimum-Effort Game
The symmetric MEG belongs to the class of games that admit a potential function (Mon-
derer and Shapley 1996; Ui 2001). A potential function P maps the set of action profiles
into the real numbers such that the difference from unilateral deviations is proportional
to the difference in the deviator’s payoff (Ui 2001). P : E → R is called a weighted
potential for game MEG if
pii(ei, e−i)− pii(e′i, e−i) = wi
(
P (ei, e−i)− P (e′i, e−i)
)
(5.2.2)
for every i ∈ N and all ei, e′i, e−i ∈ E. The parameter wi > 0 is the weighting factor. MEG
is called a w-potential game if it admits a weighted potential function. The potential is
unique up to an additive constant. If wi = 1 for every i, P is an exact potential and
MEG an (exact) potential game. The potential is basically a global payoff function that
captures the incentives of unilateral deviations for every player.
3Equilibrium selection based on strategic uncertainty is at the core of the concept of risk dominance
(Harsanyi and Selten 1988). Risk dominance is an equilibrium-selection criterion that incorporates the
deviation incentives of each player. The risk-dominant equilibrium has the highest loss from unilateral
deviation. The according risk-dominant strategy is also a best reply to a strategy that plays each
action with equal probability. In symmetric 2x2 coordination games, such as the stag-hunt game, the
secure equilibrium is usually also risk-dominant. Although this concept is theoretically appealing and
experimentally successful (e.g., Cabrales, Garcia-Fontes, and Motta 2000), it is not clear how to generalize
it to games with larger action spaces.
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Potential games have several interesting features. First, every local maximizer of
the potential function is a Nash equilibrium but not vice versa. Hence, the potential
refines the set of equilibria (Monderer and Shapley 1996).4 In case that P has a unique
maximizer, the potential can therefore also be used as a selection criterion. Second, the
argmax set of P often has the largest basin of attraction and several learning algorithms
converge to this set. Monderer and Shapley (1996) show that every finite weighted
potential game has the fictitious-play property (Brown 1951). Fictitious play is a belief-
based learning process that selects a pure strategy given the current history of opponent’s
choices.5 In addition, better-response dynamics (Young 1993) as well as log-linear learning
(Marden and Shamma 2012) typically converge to the argmax set of P . Further, Ui
(2001) shows that the unique maximizer of P is robust to imperfect information (Kajii
and Morris 1997).6
Monderer and Shapley (1996) show that the MEG is a potential game with the
following exact potential
PMEG(e) = bmin{e} − c
∑
i∈N
ei. (5.2.3)
The potential (5.2.3) allows to derive a threshold bMEG for the benefit parameter b such
that the secure equilibrium is the unique maximizer of PMEG(e) if b < bMEG and the
Pareto-dominant equilibrium is the unique maximizer if b > bMEG. The threshold is
derived by noting that any candidate action profile to maximize the potential has to be
an equilibrium action profile e∗ where every player chooses the same effort, i.e., ei = e for
every i.7 Hence, the equilibrium potential of game MEG is given by PMEG(e∗) = be−nce
with threshold benefit bMEG = nc. If b < bMEG, then PMEG(e) is maximized at e∗ where
ei = e
0 for every i. If b > bMEG, then e∗, where ei = ek for every i, maximizes PMEG(e).
If b = bMEG, every equilibrium maximizes PMEG(e) and the potential does not refine the
set of equilibria.
The empirical practicability of the theory of potential games in predicting behavior
in the MEG has first been discussed in Monderer and Shapley (1996). Goeree and Holt
(2005) and Chen and Chen (2011) test the theory directly with experimental data showing
that predicted behavior actually often coincides with empirical behavior.
4Further, if P is concave and continuously differentiable, then every mixed-strategy equilibrium
profile is pure and maximizes P (see Neyman 1997 and footnote 4 in Monderer and Shapley 1996).
5Fictitious play modifies the player’s beliefs given the history of his opponents’ choices. The player
then rationally chooses an action based on these beliefs.
6An equilibrium of the complete-information game G is robust if every incomplete-information game
with payoffs given by G with high probability has a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium such that the equilibrium
of G is played with high probability (Ui 2001).
7This observation holds for all potentials in this paper and we thus focus on the equilibrium potential
and the equilibrium benefit for clarity of exposition. Nevertheless, keep in mind that a potential has to
fulfill condition (5.2.2).
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5.3 The Asymmetric Minimum-Effort Game
We modify the standard symmetric MEG by introducing heterogeneous costs for the
players. We first examine standard preferences, i.e., players only consider their own
payoffs. Subsequently, we analyze the role of payoff (in)equality for equilibrium selection
using a Fehr and Schmidt (1999) preference specification.
5.3.1 Asymmetric MEG with Standard Preferences
There are two types identified by θ ∈ {l, h} and cθ is the cost parameter of type θ. Higher
types (θ = h) have higher costs than lower types (θ = l), i.e., ch > cl. We will construct
the payoff function such that all but one equilibrium feature unequal payoffs. Second, we
vary which of the two extreme equilibria features equal payoffs. The treatment indicator
τ ∈ {τ , τ} identifies the equilibrium with equal payoffs. If τ = τ , then the secure
equilibrium e∗ has equal payoffs and all other equilibria have unequal payoffs. If τ = τ ,
then the Pareto-dominant equilibrium e∗ has equal payoffs and all other equilibria have
unequal payoffs. We say that an equilibrium is equality-dominant if it has equal payoffs.
The resulting asymmetric minimum-effort game (aMEG) has the same set of players
and the same action set as the standard MEG. However, the individual payoff function
with heterogeneous costs now reads:
piheti (e; θ, τ) = bmin{e} −
clei + a+ cl + d(l, τ) if θ = lchei + a+ ch + d(h, τ) if θ = h, (5.3.1)
where b > ch > cl > 0. Hence, the set and Pareto-ranking of Nash equilibria is the
same as in the standard MEG of Section 5.2. We abbreviate (5.3.1) by pii,θ,τ . The fixum
d(θ, τ) ∈ {d(θ), d(θ)} depends on type θ for a given value of the treatment indicator τ .
We will discuss the value of d(θ, τ) for both treatments in the following.
Secure Equilibrium is Equality-Dominant. In this case, τ = τ and d(θ, τ) is given
by:
d(θ) = 0, θ = l, h. (5.3.2)
Hence, there is no adjustment of payoffs for τ = τ and the constants a, cl and ch scale
payoffs such that e∗ = (e01, . . . , e
0
n) is equality-dominant. In any other equilibrium e
∗,
payoff inequality between the low and high-cost type is given by (e∗− 1)(ch− cl). Hence,
the slope of inequality is constant and greater equilibria generate greater payoff inequality.
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Pareto-Dominant Equilibrium is Equality-Dominant. In this case, τ = τ and
d(θ, τ) is given by:
d(θ) =
−d if θ = l+d if θ = h. (5.3.3)
In treatment τ , the additional fixum d > 0 scales payoffs such that the Pareto-dominant
equilibrium has equal payoffs, i.e., e∗ = (ek1, . . . , e
k
n) is equality-dominant. We achieve
this by setting
d =
(|Ei| − 1)(ch − cl)
2
(5.3.4)
such that d equals the average maximum inequality between the two types. Hence, d
mirrors the previous wedge between payoffs. However, in this case, smaller equilibria
generate greater payoff inequality. The slope of inequality is given by the cost difference
ch − cl and is the same as if the secure equilibrium was payoff-dominant. It is important
to note that due to the definition of d(θ, τ), both games MEG and aMEG have the same
efficiency measured by the sum of players’ payoffs in each action profile.
Asymmetric Potential MEG. The game aMEG = (N,E, pii,θ,τ ) is a potential game
admitting the following exact potential function:
P aMEG(e) = bmin{e} − cl
∑
i∈Nl
ei − ch
∑
i∈Nh
ei (5.3.5)
where Nh is the set of low-cost types and Nh is the set of high-cost types. There are nl
low-cost types and nh high-cost types and n = nh+nl. The equilibrium threshold benefit
is thus baMEG = nlcl + nhch. The interpretation of the threshold is the same as before.
If b < baMEG then {e∗} = arg maxe∈EP aMEG(e) and the secure equilibrium maximizes
the potential. If b > baMEG then {e∗} = arg maxe∈EP aMEG(e) and the Pareto-dominant
equilibrium maximizes the potential. However, if b = baMEG then the potential is the
same in all equilibria. We will now introduce social preferences into game aMEG and
analyze the effect of payoff inequality on the equilibrium threshold benefit and hence on
equilibrium selection.
5.3.2 Asymmetric MEG with Social Preferences
Chen and Chen (2011) emphasize the importance of social preferences in coordination.
In particular, they analyze the effect of group identity on behavior in the MEG and find
that subjects choose higher effort levels if playing against an in-group member rather
than an out-group member. Their results show that a common group identity can lead
to more efficiency in the MEG.8
8Other explanations are also in line with such a pattern. For example, an increase in perceived
similarity among members of the in-group might align higher-order beliefs in a way that it is easier for
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We assume that subjects have social preferences and are averse to payoff inequality.
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) propose that people dislike absolute payoff differences. They
distinguish advantageous inequality (“guilt”) where the individual earns more than her
peers and disadvantageous inequality (“envy”) where the individual earns less than her
peers. Hence, in an aMEG, individual utility under Fehr-Schmidt (FS) preferences is
given by:
ui(e; θ, τ, α, β) = pii,θ,τ − αi 1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
max{pij,θ,τ − pii,θ,τ , 0}
− βi 1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
max{pii,θ,τ − pij,θ,τ , 0}. (5.3.6)
The factor βi ∈ [0, 1) weights guilt against the own monetary payoff and αi ≥ 0 weights
envy for every i. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) further assume that people are loss-averse in
social comparison, i.e., envy weights heavier than guilt and hence αi ≥ βi. Note that
payoffs only differ between types but are equal within types. We abbreviate (5.3.6) by ui
and denote the aMEG with social preferences by aMEG-SP = (N,E, ui).
Because of the construction of d(θ, τ), the absolute payoff difference between types
in any equilibrium e∗ is given by:
∆pi∗i (τ) =
pi∗i,l,τ − pi∗i,h,τ = (ch − cl)(e− 1) if τ = τpi∗i,h,τ − pi∗i,l,τ = (ch − cl)(|Ei| − e) if τ = τ , (5.3.7)
for every i. If τ = τ , then low-cost types make greater equilibrium profits than high-
cost types unless the equilibrium is the equality-dominant equilibrium e∗ in which case
payoffs are the same. If τ = τ , then high-cost types make greater equilibrium profits
than low-cost types in all but the equality-dominant equilibrium e∗. Hence, individual
equilibrium utility under FS preferences is given by:
ui(e
∗; θ, τ, αi, βi) =
pi∗i,l,τ − βi
nh
n−1∆pi
∗(τ)− αi nhn−1∆pi∗(τ) if θ = l
pi∗i,h,τ − αi nln−1∆pi∗(τ)− βi nln−1∆pi∗(τ) if θ = h.
(5.3.8)
Using (5.3.7) and (5.3.8), we can construct the equilibrium potential for game aMEG-SP
and derive the equilibrium threshold baMEG(τ) that we state in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 [Equilibrium Threshold Benefit of aMEG-SP] In the minimum-effort game
with heterogeneous costs and social preferences (aMEG-SP), the equilibrium threshold
benefit is given by
baMEG-SP(τ) = nlcl + nhch
+
nh
n−1(ch − cl)
∑
i∈Nl βi +
nl
n−1(ch − cl)
∑
i∈Nh αi if τ = τ
− nh
n−1(ch − cl)
∑
i∈Nl αi − nln−1(ch − cl)
∑
i∈Nh βi if τ = τ .
individuals to match others’ actions. Another explanation might be a higher degree of trust towards
in-group members (see, for example, Mussweiler and Ockenfels (2013) for evidence on similarity-effects
in social interaction). Manzini, Sadrieh, and Vriend (2009) further show that simple social cues signaling
trust can help groups to overcome coordination failures.
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The derivation is relegated to Appendix 5.A.
The equilibrium threshold allows us to derive predictions about equilibrium selec-
tion. In the experiment, we set the benefit from coordination to the value of baMEG, i.e.,
to the equilibrium value without social preferences. In that case, the potential does not
refine the set of equilibria for standard preferences. However, if players are inequality
averse, they choose the minimum effort if the secure equilibrium is equality-dominant
and the maximum effort if the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is equality-dominant.
Proposition 7 [Equilibrium Selection Under Social Preferences] Consider b = baMEG.
Under social preferences, if the secure equilibrium is equality-dominant, subjects choose
the minimum effort level. If the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is equality-dominant, sub-
jects choose the maximum effort level.
Proof. Consider b = baMEG and note that baMEG = baMEG(τ) = baMEG(τ). Players are
inequality averse, i.e., αi, βi > 0 for every i. If τ = τ , then b
aMEG(τ) < baMEG-SP(τ).
The equilibrium potential P aMEG-SP(τ) is maximized in the minimum action profile e∗
and all players choose the minimum effort. If τ = τ , then baMEG(τ) > baMEG-SP(τ). The
equilibrium potential P aMEG-SP(τ) is maximized in the maximum action profile e∗ and all
players choose the maximum effort.
In the experiment, we focus on n = 2 players in which case the equilibrium threshold
benefit without social preferences reduces to baMEG = cl + ch. The equilibrium threshold
benefit with social preferences is then given by baMEG-SP(τ) = cl+ch+(αj +βi)(ch−cl) >
baMEG if the secure equilibrium is equality-dominant and by baMEG-SP(τ) = cl + ch− (αj +
βi)(ch − cl) < baMEG if the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is equality-dominant.
5.3.3 Robustness: Increasing Strategic Uncertainty
The prediction in Proposition 7 is very clear cut because any positive degree of social
preferences selects a unique equilibrium. Section 5.4.1 presents our parameterization. We
choose parameters to maximize equilibrium inequality for a given value of the benefit b.
This means that cl is much smaller than ch under the condition that b
aMEG- = cl + ch.
While the benefit from coordination on higher effort levels is very large for the low-cost
type, their loss from miscoordination is small and thus they do not risk much to strive
for high effort levels. Hence, the low-cost types can try to enforce the Pareto-dominant
equilibrium by sticking to the maximum effort despite some experiences that this does
not always pay off.
For the high-cost type, this situation might have the spirit of a decision rather
than a strategic problem because he decides whether to “follow” the maximum effort or
not. In other words, strategic uncertainty is greatly reduced if the low-cost types face
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low payoff risks. This is a consequence of our decision to maximize payoff inequality in
equilibrium. To make the risk for the low-cost type more meaningful, we have to change
the off-equilibrium payoffs for the case that the low-cost type chooses higher efforts.
Such a change increases the strategic uncertainty in the game because the high-cost type
can no longer be sure that the low-cost type sticks to high effort levels. Hence, we
test the robustness of our results with two additional treatments that increase strategic
uncertainty in the aMEG.
We manipulate the low-cost type’s off-equilibrium payoffs by subtracting a term
that linearly increases in the difference between his own effort level, ei, and the effort
level of his partner, ej. Specifically, the adjusted payoff is given by
p˜ii,θ,τ = pii,θ,τ − ζθ ·max{ei − ej, 0} (5.3.9)
where ζl > ζh ≥ 0 is the adjustment factor of the low-cost and high-cost type, respectively.
Appendix 5.A.2 shows the according normal form of the adjusted asymmetric MEG which
we denote by aMEG-adj = (N,E, p˜ii,θ,τ ).
9
5.4 Experiment
We first present the parameters used in the experiment and define the treatments that
we conduct. Subsequently, we discuss the procedural and organizational details of the
experiment.
9Note that the incorporation of such asymmetric off-equilibrium payoffs does not allow to construct
a potential function fulfilling condition (5.2.2) for all ei, e
′
i, e−i ∈ E. This is because changes in the
potential from unilateral deviations do no longer coincide with changes in the deviator’s payoff if ei 6=
ej . Thus, we cannot analyze the role of increased strategic uncertainty using the theory of potential
games. However, we can determine the best responses of each player given the strategy of his partner
under FS preferences. The low-cost type always benefits more from higher matched action profiles,
hence, his strategy is to always match his partners effort level. If the secure equilibrium is equality-
dominant, the high-cost type chooses the minimum effort in our high-uncertainty setting as long as
p˜ii,h,τ (1, 1) > p˜ii,h,τ (2, 1) > p˜ii,h,τ (2, 2) for the action profile e = (el, eh). This condition can be rewritten
as αh > α(βh) > 0 where
α(βh) :=
b− ch
ch − cl + βh
cl + ζl
ch − cl (5.3.10)
denotes a minimum level of disadvantageous inequality for the high-cost type (With a slight abuse of
notation, let βh denote the advantageous-inequality parameter of the high-cost type.). For an average
value of advantageous inequality given by β = 0.3, we obtain a minimum level of disadvantageous
inequality of α(0.3) = 0.43 which is much below the average level found in the literature. For example,
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) report an average α of 0.85 and an average β of 0.32. Goeree and Holt (2000)
report an average α of 0.84 and an average β of 0.39. Blanco, Engelmann, and Normann (2011) report
an average α of 0.91 and an average β of 0.38. If the Pareto-dominant equilibrium (7,7) is equality-
dominant, best responses under FS preferences coincide with best responses under standard preferences
and do not refine the set of equilibria as long as αi, βi ≥ 0. As Engelmann (2012) shows, negative values
for α and β are equivalent to a preference for efficiency (e.g., Charness and Rabin 2002). In other words,
agents might be willing to increase inequality in order to maximize efficiency.
5.4. EXPERIMENT 207
5.4.1 Parameters and treatments
In our experiment, subjects play the asymmetric MEG in groups of n = 2 as in Goeree
and Holt (2005) and Chen and Chen (2011). In contrast to these former studies, we
stick to the standard discrete representation of the MEG (Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil
1990). The discrete MEG with two players allows us to write the game in normal form
which has two advantages. First, subjects see the entire distribution of payoffs for any
action profile and do not have to calculate their own and their partner’s payoffs. Second,
the normal-form representation is easier to understand compared to stating the payoffs
in their functional form.
Subjects simultaneously choose an effort level from the set Ei = {1, 2, . . . , 7}. The
benefit factor is b = 12 and the costs are cl = 1 for the low-cost type and ch = 11 for the
high-cost type. The constant is a = 55. This implies that the additional fixum takes the
values d = 0 if the secure equilibrium is equality-dominant and d = (7−1)(11−1)/2 = 30 if
the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is equality-dominant. In the robustness treatments, low-
cost types have an adjustment factor of ζl = 10 and high-cost types have an adjustment
factor of ζh = 0.
We thus manipulate two factors: (i) equality dominance and (ii) strategic uncer-
tainty. Equality dominance has two levels indicating whether the secure equilibrium
(1, 1) is equality-dominant or whether the Pareto-dominant equilibrium (7, 7) is equality-
dominant. Strategic uncertainty also has two levels indicating low uncertainty (LU) if
ζl = ζh = 0 or high uncertainty (HU) if ζl = 10 and ζh = 0. We fully cross both factors.
This results in four treatments: LU11, LU77, HU11, and HU77. As successful coordi-
nation should be most prevalent in treatment LU77, we refer to this treatment as our
baseline and interpret all results relative to this benchmark throughout the analysis.
5.4.2 One-Shot and Repeated Interaction
Our theory considers a static game with simultaneous decisions. However, subjects in
coordination experiments typically play the stage game repeatedly to coordinate on one
equilibrium over time. Theories involving potential games in MEGs are often used in this
sense of convergence (e.g. Goeree and Holt 2005; Chen and Chen 2011). We also assume
that groups converge while learning. However, as our theory suggests, we expect to find
differences even in a one-shot interaction.
Therefore, we apply a two-part procedure during our experiment. Subjects were
aware that the experiment consists of two parts but did not know what each part was
about. In the first part, subjects played game aMEG for only one round. They were
told that they would receive information about this part only after the second part was
completed. In the second part, subjects played the stage game for T = 30 periods. Each
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period t = 1, . . . , T consists of two screens: (i) a decision screen and (ii) a feedback screen
(see Appendix 5.B for screenshots). We adopt the design of Chen and Chen (2011) while
also showing the normal form of the game on the decision screen. After making their
decisions for round t, each subject received the following information: her own effort, the
effort of her partner, her own payoff, and the payoff of her partner. Furthermore, as in
Chen and Chen (2011), a subject saw her history of play for every period k = 1, . . . , t−1:
her effort in k, her period-k partner’s effort, her own payoff in period k, and her period-k
partner’s payoff.
5.4.3 Organization
We conducted the experiment in the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER),
University of Cologne, Germany.10 The experiment was computerized via z-Tree (Fis-
chbacher 2007). We used the recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner 2004) to invite a random
sample of the laboratory’s subject pool via email. A total of 256 subjects participated
in the experiment. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the treatment groups and
were only allowed to participate once.
We ran eight sessions with 32 subjects each. Half the subjects were low-cost types
(denoted as “role X” in the instructions) and the other half were high-cost types (role Y).
We applied a strangers matching procedure as follows: Subjects were grouped in cohorts
of n = 8 individuals with four subjects in role X and four subjects in role Y. Each round,
within a cohort, we randomly matched one X subject with one Y subject.
The experiment took place in January and February 2015. Subjects received a hard
copy of the instructions (see Appendix 5.C) which were read out loud. Then, subjects were
allowed to take as much time as needed to familiarize themselves with the experiment.
Questions were answered in private. During the experiment all payoffs were stated in
Experimental Currency Units (ECU). The exchange rate was 30 ECU to 1 Euro for the
one-shot part and 400 ECU to 1 EUR for the repeated part. Average payment was 12.25
EUR (about 13.99 USD) for about 60 minutes of experimentation.
5.5 Results
For our analysis, we are mainly interested in effort choices, coordination success, and
efficiency. We present the results of both the one-shot interaction (part one of the ex-
periment) and the repeated interaction (part two) in each of these dimensions. We first
discuss the effort choices. Here, we also show whether and how the cost types influence
behavior. Afterwards, we investigate how differences in choices affect coordination success
10www.cler.uni-koeln.de.
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and efficiency.11 In part one of the experiment, each of the N = 256 subjects generates
one independent observation. In part two, each subject plays the stage game for T = 30
periods generating 7680 observations clustered in 32 cohorts in a panel-structure dataset,
generating 8 independent observations per treatment.
5.5.1 Effort Provision
Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of one-shot efforts across treatments. In our baseline
treatment LU77, the equilibrium (7, 7) is both equality- and Pareto-dominant. Proposi-
tion 7 states that subjects choose the maximum effort of seven. In total, 85.9% of the
subjects indeed choose the maximum effort level while only 6.3% choose the minimum.
In treatment LU11, the equilibrium (1, 1) is equality-dominant but Pareto-inferior to
all other equilibria. Proposition 7 now states that subjects choose the minimum effort.
However, in total, 79.7% of the subjects choose the maximum effort and 7.8% choose the
minimum effort. Effort choices do not differ between treatments, with the average efforts
in both treatments are close to the maximum (6.47 vs. 6.28; Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
U-test, p = 0.3665). This suggests that, at least in the initial one-shot interaction, deci-
sion makers do not choose in line with our theoretical prediction in case of LU11.12 With
regard to the robustness treatments, in HU77, a total of 87.5% choose the maximum
effort and 3.1% choose the minimum while in HU11 54.7% choose the maximum and
17.2% choose the minimum. Choices are significantly different (6.58 vs. 5.19, U-test,
p = 0.0000).13 Furthermore, pooling the data across treatments, we observe that high-
cost types choose lower effort levels than low-cost types (U-test, p = 0.0058) and that
subjects tend to react to increased strategic uncertainty by decreasing their effort choices
(U-test, p = 0.0243). These results suggest that subjects generally coordinate quite suc-
cessfully while we still find evidence for differences between treatments conditional on the
equality-dominant equilibrium. In addition, both cost types and the level of uncertainty
seem to be relevant when it comes to coordination success which we analyze in more
detail in the following.
Collapsing all data of part two on the cohort level yields eight independent obser-
vations per treatment. We find that the trend observed in the one-shot interaction is
similar but more pronounced for the collapsed data. LU77 again has the highest average
effort which is significantly different from LU11 (U-test, p = 0.0208) while effort levels
11Summary statistics on demographic and attitudinal variables regarding risk and social preferences of
our subject sample can be found in Appendix C. This data has been elicited through a post-experimental
questionnaire.
12Even though these results do not reflect our theoretical prediction, they are in line with high initial
effort levels in former research on the discrete MEG (e.g. Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil 1990; Manzini,
Sadrieh, and Vriend 2009).
13The distribution of efforts in HU11 also differs from LU77 (U-test, p = 0.0001) and HU77 (U-test,
p = 0.0000).
210 5. PAYOFF EQUALITY AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
6.3%
7.8%
85.9%
7.8%
12.5%
79.7%
3.1%
9.4%
87.5%
17.2%
28.1%
54.7%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
LU77 LU11 HU77 HU11
Effort = 1 Effort = 2,3,4,5,6 Effort = 7
Notes: Reported is the distribution of one-shot effort separated by treatment.
N = 256. 77 indicates that the Pareto-Dominant equilibrium is equality-
dominant and 11 indicates that the secure equilibrium is equality-dominant.
LU refers to low strategic uncertainty and HU refers to high strategic uncer-
tainty.
Figure 5.1: Distribution of One-Shot Efforts across Treatments.
in LU77 are not statistically distinguishable from HU77 (U-test, p = 0.6737). More-
over, effort choices differ substantially and significantly between LU11 and HU11 (U-test,
p = 0.0209), showing that under high uncertainty subject refrain from choosing high
effort levels when (1, 1) is equality-dominant.
Over the course of the 30 periods, most of the subjects either choose the maximum
or the minimum effort level which are, with regard to our theory, the two levels we are
primarily interested in. Figure 5.2 shows the frequency of these effort levels separated
by cost type for each treatment. The top panel shows the two main treatments. We see
that both types most often choose the maximum effort in LU77 whereas high-cost types
choose somewhat lower effort levels in LU11. The frequency of maximum effort choices
across all periods drops from 98.3% in LU77 to 92.0% in LU11 for low-cost types and
from 90.9% to 70.2% for high-cost types. The large drop for high-cost types indicates the
role of inequality aversion. Even though low-cost types tend to generally stay with the
maximum effort, some high-cost types refuse to choose the maximum which hence often
results in non-equilibrium outcomes. However, because low-cost types do not lose much
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from miscoordination in LU11, they continue to choose high effort levels anticipating that
many high-cost types choose the maximum.
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Figure 5.2: Frequency of Effort Choices across Treatments.
The bottom panel shows the robustness treatments with high strategic uncertainty.
We observe that both types generally choose the maximum effort in HU77. The left graph
confirms our result that strategic uncertainty does not have much of an effect if (7,7) is
equality-dominant. Effort levels remain high throughout the experiment. However, the
right graph shows how increased strategic uncertainty interacts with equality dominance.
In treatment HU11, low-cost types are confronted with severe losses from miscoordination.
Hence, in contrast to LU11, it is expensive to stick to the maximum effort if high-cost
types refuse to choose the maximum as well. This explains the convergence to lower
effort levels in HU11 depicted in Figure 5.D.10 in Appendix 5.D. In fact, we observe that
modal effort-choices in HU11 reverse around period ten. Starting with around 60% of the
low-cost types choosing the maximum effort in period one, this fraction drops to around
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30% for the last ten periods. The share of high-cost types choosing the maximum effort
also drops by 50% from about 40% in period one to around 20% in the last ten periods.
We further run parametric regressions to analyze the effect of equality dominance
and strategic uncertainty on effort choices while controlling for demographics and atti-
tudinal variables regarding risk and social preferences that we define in Appendix 5.D.1.
Dummy variable ED11 takes value one if (1,1) is equality-dominant and zero if (7,7) is
equality-dominant. High SU takes value one if strategic uncertainty is high and zero if
strategic uncertainty is low. We use these two dummies and their interaction as our main
explanatory variables. Their factorial crossing generates all four treatment conditions.
It follows that the baseline treatment in the regression is given by LU77. Period is an
integer variable indicating the period in which a decision was made. The dummy Type
takes value one for high-cost types and zero for low-cost types.
Table 5.1 shows the results of random-effects regressions of effort choices on the
treatment factors and various controls. The first two models utilize the complete data
while the last two models are based on data from the last five periods to observe behavior
after convergence. Models (I) and (III) analyze the main explanatory variables and only
control for period. Models (II) and (IV) control for players’ types, demographics and
attitudinal variables. Models (II Type) and (IV Type) examine the effects of the two
cost types.
The regression results confirm our previous results and show that the effects are
robust over time and against the inclusion of controls. We find that the impact of equality
dominance is significant and that strategic uncertainty has no significant effect by itself.
The coefficients have the hypothesized signs. If (1,1) is equality-dominant, subjects choose
lower effort levels than if (7,7) is equality-dominant. The interaction effect between
equality dominance and strategic uncertainty is quantitatively large and significant. In
line with our previous results, strategic uncertainty only influences subjects’ effort choices
if (1,1) is equality-dominant. Regarding the control variables, we see that none of the
demographic or attitudinal variables has a consistent or significant effect on effort choices.
Result 8 [Effort Choice] If (7,7) is equality-dominant, subjects choose significantly larger
effort levels than if (1,1) is equality-dominant. Strategic uncertainty has no effect by itself
but strongly reduces effort levels if (1,1) is equality-dominant. The effects are robust over
time and against the inclusion of demographics as well as risk and social preferences.
Models II and IV suggest that Type has a negative effect on effort choices, i.e.,
high-cost types choose lower effort levels, confirming the impression of Figure 5.2. We
disentangle the impact of the cost type in two further models. In Models (II Type) and
(IV Type), we interact the Type-dummy with the treatment indicators. We find that the
main effect of equality dominance vanishes while its interaction with strategic uncertainty
increases in absolute terms and remains significant. The main effect of Type is now less
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Table 5.1: Repeated-Interaction Effort: Random-Effects Regressions.
All Periods Last Five Periods
Model (I) (II) (II Type) (III) (IV) (IV Type)
Estimation GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS
ED11 -0.818∗∗∗ -0.657∗∗ -0.096 -0.759∗∗ -0.562∗ 0.012
(0.278) (0.281) (0.161) (0.324) (0.317) (0.216)
High SU -0.254 -0.141 -0.071 -0.241 -0.087 0.047
(0.234) (0.242) (0.128) (0.200) (0.219) (0.118)
ED11 X High SU -2.048∗∗∗ -2.228∗∗∗ -2.674∗∗∗ -2.866∗∗∗ -3.106∗∗∗ -3.741∗∗∗
(0.768) (0.705) (0.678) (0.851) (0.760) (0.800)
Period -0.016∗ -0.016∗ -0.016∗ -0.022 -0.022 -0.022
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Type -0.682∗∗∗ -0.285∗∗ -0.659∗∗∗ -0.280∗∗
(0.146) (0.140) (0.166) (0.123)
Age 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.003
(0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.023)
Male -0.151 -0.158 -0.371 -0.369
(0.166) (0.161) (0.231) (0.232)
German Native -0.337 -0.354 -0.429∗ -0.458∗
(0.222) (0.223) (0.253) (0.259)
Risk-Averse -0.416 -0.459 -0.246 -0.286
(0.282) (0.291) (0.492) (0.506)
Risk-Seeking 0.298 0.259 0.365 0.334
(0.414) (0.431) (0.493) (0.514)
Social Preference -0.055 -0.062 -0.046 -0.052
(0.039) (0.039) (0.048) (0.047)
Type X ED11 -1.107∗∗∗ -1.129∗∗
(0.386) (0.449)
Type X High SU -0.131 -0.258
(0.287) (0.324)
Type X ED11 X High SU 0.893∗ 1.267∗∗
(0.513) (0.614)
Constant 7.085∗∗∗ 8.088∗∗∗ 7.943∗∗∗ 7.459∗∗∗ 8.464∗∗∗ 8.307∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.715) (0.712) (0.644) (0.996) (0.998)
Observations 7680 7680 7680 1280 1280 1280
Subjects 256 256 256 256 256 256
Cohorts 32 32 32 32 32 32
R2 0.29 0.33 0.34 0.41 0.45 0.46
Notes: Reported are random-effects GLS regressions with random effect on subject. Dependent
variable is the chosen effort. Models (I), (II), and (II Type) are based on data from all periods.
Models (III), (IV) and (IV Type) are based on data from the last five periods. ED11 indicates
that (1,1) is equality-dominant. High SU indicates high strategic uncertainty. Standard errors
clustered on the cohort level in parentheses. ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
in absolute terms but remains significant. The interaction terms including Type show
that if (1,1) is equality-dominant, high-cost types choose significantly lower effort levels.
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The interaction between Type and strategic uncertainty is not significant, suggesting that
the two cost types do not react differently to strategic uncertainty. Finally, the three-
way interaction confirms that the low-cost types under high strategic uncertainty abstain
from choosing high effort levels if (1,1) is equality-dominant because this is getting too
expensive. This behavior results in a convergence towards worse equilibria as evident in
Figure 5.2.
Result 9 [The Role of Types on Effort Choice] The effect of equality dominance varies
by cost type. High-cost types choose significantly lower effort levels in particular in cases
where payoffs in (1,1) are equal. Low-cost types’ willingness to choose high effort levels
only vanishes when confronted with higher losses due to increased strategic uncertainty.
5.5.2 Coordination and Efficiency
The differences in choices should also cause differences in outcomes between treatments.
Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990) argue that there are two types of coordination
failure in the MEG. First, players may fail to coordinate at all. That is, they may fail to
anticipate their partner’s effort and thus choose ei 6= ej. Hence, miscoordination results in
disequilibrium. Second, players may fail to coordinate on the Pareto-efficient equilibrium
and thus waste efficiency. That is, they choose a common action profile, ei = ej, but this
action profile is not optimal in efficiency terms, i.e., (ei, ej) 6= (7, 7). This section reports
how well subjects manage to overcome both these forms of coordination failures.
Coordination is achieved if both players choose the same effort level, defined by a
variable that can take the values zero (no coordination) or one (coordination). Further-
more, following Chen and Chen (2011), we call Efficiency the difference between the sum
of actual payoffs and minimum payoffs normalized by the range of possible payoffs.
Efficiency :=
Actual Payoffs−Minimum Payoffs
Maximum Payoffs−Minimum Payoffs
=
(pii + pij)−mine{pii + pij}
maxe{pii + pij} −mine{pii + pij} . (5.5.1)
The lowest efficiency is realized if one player chooses the maximum effort while the other
player chooses the minimum effort. Highest efficiency is realized if both players choose the
maximum effort. We will report efficiency in percentage values by multiplying equation
(5.5.1) by 100%.
Regarding the one-shot decisions, treatment LU77 achieves 71.9% coordination
which is only marginally larger than and not statistically distinguishable from the 68.8%
in treatment LU11, based on Fisher’s exact test. Increasing strategic uncertainty in HU77
does not have an effect on successful coordination (75.0%) compared to LU77. However,
coordination rates collapse when (1,1) is equality-dominant and strategic uncertainty is
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high. Treatment HU11 only achieves 25.0% coordination. This 64% drop from LU11 is
both economically large and statistically significant (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.000). In
terms of efficiency, treatment LU77 also achieves the highest level of 89.8% which is not
different from the 86.2% in LU11 (U-test, p = 0.6032). As with coordination, efficiency
is not affected by increased strategic uncertainty in HU77 where subjects realize 85.9%.
However, efficiency deteriorates if (1,1) is equality-dominant and strategic uncertainty is
high. Average efficiency drops by around 41% to 51.1% in HU11 (U-test, p = 0.0000).
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Notes: Reported is the frequency of coordination over periods separated by
treatments. N = 256. Coordination is achieved if both players simultaneously
choose the same effort level. The gray area represents no successful coordina-
tion, i.e., both players choose different effort levels. The solid line represents
coordination on the secure equilibrium (1,1) and the dashed line represents
coordination on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium (7,7). 77 indicates that the
Pareto-dominant equilibrium (7,7) is equality-dominant and 11 indicates that
the secure equilibrium (1,1) is equality-dominant. LU refers to low strategic
uncertainty and HU refers to high strategic uncertainty.
Figure 5.3: Frequency of Coordination across Treatments.
Figure 5.3 shows the frequency of coordination on either equilibrium (1,1) or equi-
librium (7,7) and the frequency of no successful coordination for the repeated data
over the course of the experiment. We generally observe a high level of coordination
in LU77. In particular, if they coordinate successfully, groups in LU77 coordinate on
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the Pareto-efficient equilibrium (7,7). In LU11 subjects also mainly coordinate on the
Pareto-dominant equilibrium but are less successful as groups often miscoordinate. Col-
lapsing the data on the cohort level, we find that coordination rates drop significantly
in treatment LU11. Both the frequency of coordination on (7,7) drops from 90.0% in
LU77 to 66.0% in LU11 (U-test, p = 0.0306) and the frequency of miscoordination rises
from 10.0% to 32.0% (U-test, p = 0.0305). In addition, the frequency of coordination
on the secure equilibrium (1,1) rises from 0.0% to 1.8% which is statistically significant
(U-test, p = 0.0645) but economically small. In terms of efficiency, subjects in treatment
LU77 realize nearly perfect results with an average of 96.9% across all periods. This is
significantly more than the 81.8% in treatment LU11 (U-test, p = 0.0156).
The high uncertainty treatments show that the prevalent interaction between equal-
ity dominance and strategic uncertainty also affects coordination rates. Increasing strate-
gic uncertainty has no significant effect on coordination if (7,7) is equality-dominant;
neither for the frequency to coordinate on either (7,7) or (1,1) nor on the miscoordina-
tion rate. However, if (1,1) is equality-dominant, coordination on (7,7) drops to 23.1% if
strategic uncertainty is high (U-test, p = 0.0208) while there is no statistical difference
in the frequency of miscoordination which averages 32.1% in LU11 and 34.4% in HU11.
Coordination on (1,1) gets more common, increasing from an average of 1.8% in LU11
to 36.8% in HU11 (U-test, p = 0.0548). Subjects in treatment HU77 realize an average
efficiency of 87.3% which is not statistically different from LU77. Compared to treatment
LU11, treatment HU11 features a large drop in efficiency which falls by around 33% to
54.6% (U-test, p = 0.0157).14
Result 10 [Coordination and Efficiency] Coordination rates and efficiency are signifi-
cantly higher if (7,7) is equality-dominant than if (1,1) is equality-dominant. This holds
both for overall coordination rates and for coordination on the Pareto-dominant equilib-
rium (7,7). Strategic uncertainty has no effect if (7,7) is equality-dominant but coordina-
tion rates and efficiency are lower if (1,1) is equality-dominant and strongly deteriorate
when strategic uncertainty is also high.
5.6 Conclusion
We analyze the effect of payoff inequality in a minimum-effort game with Pareto-rankable
equilibria. Making use of a social-preference model applied to the potential of the coordi-
nation game, we predict that subjects choose the maximum effort and coordinate on the
efficient Pareto-dominant equilibrium if it is also equality-dominant. If the secure equilib-
14We complement the analyses on coordination outcomes and efficiency using parametric regressions
in Appendix 5.D.2, confirming these findings.
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rium is equality-dominant, we predict that subjects choose the minimum effort. We test
this prediction in a laboratory experiment with both one-shot and repeated interactions.
We find that inequality aversion plays an important role in equilibrium selection.
When the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is also equality-dominant, subjects coordinate
on the maximum effort rapidly. This high coordination outcome is robust against in-
creasing strategic uncertainty. This is remarkable because subjects could actually lose
money from miscoordination in the respective treatment, suggesting that they are very
certain about their opponent’s behavior if the Pareto-dominant is the only equilibrium
with equal payoffs. If the secure equilibrium is equality-dominant, coordination success
worsens. In this case, we find a large interaction effect of strategic uncertainty and equal-
ity dominance resulting in coordination on the least-efficient equilibrium in many cases.
Our experiment suggests that an equal-payoff Pareto-dominant equilibrium can result in
substantial efficiency gains.
Our results have implications for the economic design of institutions such as bank-
ing regulation. In financial coordination settings, agents often have heterogeneous risks
depending on their investment and how diversified their portfolio is. Bank runs are a
prime example for this heterogeneity and deposit insurance is the most-prevalent policy
intervention. In case of a run, small depositors would thus lose a substantial fraction of
their wealth from miscoordination relative to large diversified depositors. Deposit insur-
ance is one mean to protect small depositors from the adverse effects of bank runs. There
are two effects of deposit insurances. First, the insurance reduces inequality in the run
equilibrium because only deposits exceeding the insurance level are at risk. Second, com-
mon knowledge of such a mechanism should prevent larger depositors from withdrawing
because they know that small depositors will not withdraw whatsoever. Hence, under
deposit insurance, small investors still have a larger benefit from higher coordination but
now their risk is greatly reduced which in turn reduces the strategic uncertainty faced by
large depositors.
However, before the financial crises starting in 2007, bank deposits were only secured
up to around 20,000 EUR in the EU and up to 100,000 USD in the US (CESifo 2011).
Such an insurance creates inequality for large depositors who at the same time benefit
little from the interest payment. In 2008, the fourth-largest US bank in terms of assets
was Wachovia (Alvarez 2010). This bank experienced a so-called “silent run” of large
investors who withdrew around five billion USD to bring their account balance below the
level covered by the insurance.15 As a consequence, regulators urged the sale of Wachovia
which was eventually bought by Wells Fargo. In the aftermath of this and other severe
banking panics, the European Union raised the deposit insurance to 100,000 EUR and the
15See Rothacker (2008) and Stevenson and Slater (2008).
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US increased it to 250,000 USD.16 In addition, in 2008 and 2010, respectively, Germany
and Ireland declared all deposits to be safe to prevent massive capital flights.
Our results indicate the chances and risks of such a policy intervention. On the
one hand, the general argument for an increase in the insurance level is the reduction in
strategic uncertainty. Our results reinforce this logic. Higher deposit insurance reduces
the losses from miscoordination and thus strategic uncertainty among depositors. On the
other hand, we also point out the risk of such a change because higher insurance coverage
leads to less inequality in the run equilibrium. As outcomes are generally worse across all
dimensions if the secure equilibrium has equal payoffs, such a policy change may actually
weaken the systemic stability of the banking sector. However, our results regarding the
interaction effect suggest that the net effect is positive and thus the no-run equilibrium
is fortified by an increase in deposit insurance.
16See EUC (2010) and FDIC (2010).
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5.A Theoretical Appendix
5.A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
In this section, we construct the equilibrium potential for game aMEG-SP. Note that we
only have to consider equilibria because we search for the arg max set of the potential
which is by construction of game aMEG only maximized if e1 = e2 = . . . = en (Goeree
and Holt 2005). Subsequently, we derive the equilibrium threshold stated in Lemma 1.
We will construct the equilibrium potential and hence the threshold values for both values
of τ separately.
Case 1: Secure Equilibrium is Equality-Dominant
In this case, τ = τ , and the equilibrium utility is given by
ui(e
∗; θ, τ , αi, βi) = be−
cle+ a+ cl − βi 1n−1nh(ch − cl)(e− 1) if θ = lche+ a+ ch − αi 1n−1nl(ch − cl)(e− 1) if θ = h.
yielding the equilibrium Potential
P aMEG-SP(τ) = be− nlcle− nhche−
∑
i∈Nl
βi
1
n− 1nh(ch − cl)(e− 1)
−
∑
i∈Nh
αi
1
n− 1nl(ch − cl)(e− 1)
and thus the equilibrium threshold benefit is given by
baMEG-SP(τ) = nlcl + nhch +
∑
i∈Nl
βi
nh
n− 1(ch − cl) +
∑
i∈Nh
αi
nl
n− 1(ch − cl). (5.A.1)
Case 2: Pareto-Dominant Equilibrium is Equality-Dominant
In this case, τ = τ , and the equilibrium utility is given by
ui(e
∗; θ, τ , αi, βi) = be−
cle+ a+ cl − d− αi 1n−1nh(ch − cl)(|Ei| − e) if θ = lche+ a+ ch + d− βi 1n−1nl(ch − cl)(|Ei| − e) if θ = h.
yielding the equilibrium Potential
P aMEG-SP(τ) = be− nlcle− nhche−
∑
i∈Nl
αi
1
n− 1nh(ch − cl)(|Ei| − e)
−
∑
i∈Nh
βi
1
n− 1nl(ch − cl)(|Ei| − e)
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and thus the equilibrium threshold benefit is given by
baMEG-SP(τ) = nlcl + nhch −
∑
i∈Nl
αi
nh
n− 1(ch − cl)−
∑
i∈Nh
βi
nl
n− 1(ch − cl). (5.A.2)
The combination of (5.A.1) and (5.A.2) yields the expression stated in Lemma 1.
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5.A.2 Normal Form Representations
Role 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
X 103 91 79 67 55 43 31
Y 103 102 101 100 99 98 97
X 92 92 80 68 56 44 32
Y 91 102 101 100 99 98 97
X 81 81 81 69 57 45 33
Y 79 90 101 100 99 98 97
X 70 70 70 70 58 46 34
Y 67 78 89 100 99 98 97
X 59 59 59 59 59 47 35
Y 55 66 77 88 99 98 97
X 48 48 48 48 48 48 36
Y 43 54 65 76 87 98 97
X 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Y 31 42 53 64 75 86 97
N
u
m
b
e
r
 o
f  
X
Number of Y
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Notes: Reported is the normal-form representation of treatment LU77. In this
treatment, the Pareto-dominant equilibrium (7,7) is equality-dominant and
strategic uncertainty is low.
Figure 5.A.4: Normal Form of LU77.
Role 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
X 133 121 109 97 85 73 61
Y 73 72 71 70 69 68 67
X 122 122 110 98 86 74 62
Y 61 72 71 70 69 68 67
X 111 111 111 99 87 75 63
Y 49 60 71 70 69 68 67
X 100 100 100 100 88 76 64
Y 37 48 59 70 69 68 67
X 89 89 89 89 89 77 65
Y 25 36 47 58 69 68 67
X 78 78 78 78 78 78 66
Y 13 24 35 46 57 68 67
X 67 67 67 67 67 67 67
Y 1 12 23 34 45 56 67
6
5
4
3
Number of Y
7
N
u
m
b
e
r
 o
f  
X
2
1
Notes: Reported is the normal-form representation of treatment LU11. In
this treatment, the secure equilibrium (1,1) is equality-dominant and strategic
uncertainty is low.
Figure 5.A.5: Normal Form of LU11.
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Role 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
X 103 81 59 37 15 -7 -29
Y 103 102 101 100 99 98 97
X 92 92 70 48 26 4 -18
Y 91 102 101 100 99 98 97
X 81 81 81 59 37 15 -7
Y 79 90 101 100 99 98 97
X 70 70 70 70 48 26 4
Y 67 78 89 100 99 98 97
X 59 59 59 59 59 37 15
Y 55 66 77 88 99 98 97
X 48 48 48 48 48 48 26
Y 43 54 65 76 87 98 97
X 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Y 31 42 53 64 75 86 97
N
u
m
b
e
r
 o
f  
X
Number of Y
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Notes: Reported is the normal-form representation of treatment HU77. In
this treatment, the Pareto-dominant equilibrium (7,7) is equality-dominant
and strategic uncertainty is high.
Figure 5.A.6: Normal Form of HU77.
Role 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
X 133 111 89 67 45 23 1
Y 73 72 71 70 69 68 67
X 122 122 100 78 56 34 12
Y 61 72 71 70 69 68 67
X 111 111 111 89 67 45 23
Y 49 60 71 70 69 68 67
X 100 100 100 100 78 56 34
Y 37 48 59 70 69 68 67
X 89 89 89 89 89 67 45
Y 25 36 47 58 69 68 67
X 78 78 78 78 78 78 56
Y 13 24 35 46 57 68 67
X 67 67 67 67 67 67 67
Y 1 12 23 34 45 56 67
6
5
4
3
Number of Y
7
N
u
m
b
e
r
 o
f  
X
2
1
Notes: Reported is the normal-form representation of treatment HU11. In
this treatment, the secure equilibrium (1,1) is equality-dominant and strategic
uncertainty is high.
Figure 5.A.7: Normal Form of HU11.
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5.B Screens in the Lab Experiment
This section shows the computer screens in the repeated game. The one-shot game
has a similar interface but without the history of play. In the one-shot game, subjects
received information about their own and their partner’s choice only at the very end of
the experiment (after the repeated game was completed). In the repeated game, subjects
received information at the end of each period. For more information see Section 5.4.2.
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5.C Instructions
The following pages report the instructions in both German (original) and English (trans-
lated). Subjects first received the general instructions along with the instructions of part
1 and the according payoff table. Only the payoff table varied by treatment. The re-
spective payoff tables were given on a separate sheet (referred to as “Figure 1”) and
are identical to the normal form representations (see Section 5.A.2). After part 1 was
finished, subjects received the instructions for part two. All instructions were read out
loud.
Allgemeine Instruktionen 
 
Herzlich willkommen und vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme an diesem Experiment. Bitte 
kommunizieren Sie ab sofort und bis zum Ende des Experiments nicht mehr mit den anderen 
Teilnehmern. 
Wir bitten Sie, die Instruktionen aufmerksam zu lesen. Die Instruktionen sind für alle Teilnehmer in 
diesem Raum identisch. Wenn Sie nach dem Lesen oder während des Experiments noch Fragen haben, 
heben Sie bitte Ihre Hand. Einer der Experimentleiter wird dann zu Ihnen kommen und Ihre Frage 
persönlich beantworten. Ihre Auszahlung und Ihre Entscheidungen werden vertraulich behandelt. 
Sie erhalten für Ihr Erscheinen eine Teilnahmepauschale in Höhe von 2,50 EUR. Zusätzlich können 
Sie in diesem Experiment Geld verdienen. Wie viel Sie verdienen, hängt sowohl von Ihren 
Entscheidungen als auch den Entscheidungen anderer Teilnehmer ab. Ihre Auszahlungen werden im 
Laufe des Experiments in virtuellen Geldeinheiten, den Experimental Currency Units (ECU), 
angegeben. Ihre Auszahlung wird nach dem Ende des Experimentes in Euro (EUR) umgerechnet und 
in bar an Sie ausgezahlt.  
Das Experiment besteht aus zwei Teilen (Teil 1 und Teil 2). Sie erhalten zunächst die Instruktionen für 
Teil 1. Nach Abschluss von Teil 1 erhalten Sie die Instruktionen für Teil 2. Danach bitten wir Sie 
einen Fragebogen auszufüllen. Ihre Auszahlung, Ihre Entscheidungen und Ihre Antworten im 
Fragebogen werden vertraulich behandelt. 
 
  
Instruktionen Teil 1 
 
Übersicht 
• Teil 1 besteht aus einer einzigen Entscheidung.  
• Es gibt zwei Rollen: X und Y. Die Hälfte der Teilnehmer hat Rolle X und die andere Hälfte 
hat Rolle Y. Es wird zu Beginn des Experiments zufällig bestimmt, ob Sie Rolle X oder Rolle 
Y haben.  
• Sie bilden eine Gruppe mit einem Partner, der die jeweils andere Rolle hat: Wenn Sie Rolle X 
haben, hat ihr Partner Rolle Y. Wenn Sie Rolle Y haben, hat ihr Partner Rolle X.  
• 30 ECU entsprechen 1 EUR. 
 
Ablauf  
• Sowohl Sie als auch Ihr Partner wählen eine Zahl aus der Menge {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}.  
• Die Höhe der Auszahlungen hängt ab von: 
o Ihrer gewählten Zahl. 
o Der Zahl Ihres Partners. 
o Ihrer Rolle (X oder Y). 
• Tabelle 1 zeigt die möglichen Auszahlungen. Die Entscheidung der Person in Rolle X ist hier 
in den Zeilen abgetragen, während die Entscheidung der Person in Rolle Y in den Spalten 
abgetragen ist. Die Entscheidungen beider Personen ergeben das Feld in der Tabelle, in dem 
Sie die Auszahlungen ablesen können. Die Auszahlung von X steht jeweils im oberen Teil 
eines Feldes und die Auszahlung von Y steht im unteren Teil. 
 
Informationen 
Das Ergebnis des ersten Teils erfahren Sie nach dem Ende des zweiten Teils des Experiments. Sie 
erhalten dabei folgende Informationen: Ihre gewählte Zahl, die Zahl Ihres Partners, Ihre Auszahlung 
und die Auszahlung Ihres Partners. 
 
 
  
Instruktionen Teil 2 
 
Übersicht 
• Teil 2 besteht aus 30 Runden, in denen Sie jeweils eine Entscheidung treffen.  
• Jede Runde hat den gleichen Ablauf wie Teil 1 und auch die Entscheidungssituation ist die 
gleiche, die in Tabelle 1 dargestellt ist. 
• Sie haben die gleiche Rolle wie in Teil 1 (X oder Y). Diese Rolle behalten Sie für alle 30 
Runden. 
• Sie bilden in jeder Runde eine Gruppe mit einem Partner, der die jeweils andere Rolle hat: 
Wenn Sie Rolle X haben, hat ihr Partner immer Rolle Y. Wenn Sie Rolle Y haben, hat ihr 
Partner immer Rolle X.  
• In jeder Runde wird Ihnen zufällig ein Partner aus diesem Raum neu zugeordnet mit dem Sie 
in der jeweiligen Runde eine Gruppe bilden. 
• 400 ECU entsprechen in diesem Teil 1 EUR. Ihre Auszahlungen aus allen Runden werden am 
Ende für Ihre Endauszahlung zusammengerechnet. 
 
Informationen 
• Nach jeder Runde erhalten Sie folgende Informationen: Ihre gewählte Zahl, die Zahl Ihres 
Partners, Ihre Rundenauszahlung und die Rundenauszahlung Ihres Partners. 
• Zusätzlich zeigen wir Ihnen Ihre vorherigen Entscheidungen, die Entscheidungen Ihrer 
vorherigen Partner und Ihre gesamte bisherige Auszahlung in Teil 2 an. 
 
Endauszahlung 
Am Ende des Experiments zahlen wir Ihnen Teil 1 und Teil 2 in bar aus. 
 
 
Tabelle 1: Auszahlungen 
 
 
 
 
Rolle 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
X 103 91 79 67 55 43 31
Y 103 102 101 100 99 98 97
X 92 92 80 68 56 44 32
Y 91 102 101 100 99 98 97
X 81 81 81 69 57 45 33
Y 79 90 101 100 99 98 97
X 70 70 70 70 58 46 34
Y 67 78 89 100 99 98 97
X 59 59 59 59 59 47 35
Y 55 66 77 88 99 98 97
X 48 48 48 48 48 48 36
Y 43 54 65 76 87 98 97
X 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Y 31 42 53 64 75 86 97
Z
a
h
l 
v
o
n
 X
Zahl von Y
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
General Instructions 
 
 
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. From now on until the end of the 
experiment, please refrain from communicating with other participants.  
We kindly ask you to read the instructions thoroughly. The instructions are identical for all 
participants in this room. If you have any questions after reading the instructions or during the 
experiment, please raise your hand. One of the instructors will then come to you and answer your 
question in person. Your payment and your decisions will be treated confidentially. 
You will receive a show-up fee of 2,50€. Additionally, you can earn money in this experiment. How 
much you earn depends on your decisions as well as on the decisions of other participants. During the 
experiment your payoff will be calculated in a virtual currency: Experimental Currency Units (ECU). 
After the experiment, your payoff will be converted into Euros (EUR) and given to you in cash. 
The experiment consists of two parts (part 1 and part 2). First, you will receive the instructions for part 
1. After the completion of part 1, you will receive the instruction for part 2. Next, we ask you to 
complete a questionnaire. Your payoff, your decisions and the answers in the questionnaire will be 
treated confidentially. 
 
 
  
Instructions Part 1 
 
Overview 
• Part 1 consists of a single decision. 
• There are two roles: X and Y. Half of the participants take on role X and the other half takes 
on role Y. It will be randomly determined at the beginning of the experiment, whether you 
take on role X or role Y. 
• You will form a group with one partner, who takes on the respective other role: If you take on 
role X, your partner takes on role Y. If you take on role Y, your partner takes on role X. 
• 30 ECU correspond to 1 EUR. 
 
Procedure 
• You and your partner both choose a number out of the set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}. 
• You payoff is determined by: 
o Your chosen number. 
o The number of your partner. 
o Your role (X or Y) 
• Table 1 shows the possible payoffs. The decision of the participant with role X is displayed in 
the rows and that of the participant with role Y in the columns. The decisions of both 
participants result in the cell of the table where you can find the payoffs. The payoff of X is 
displayed in the upper part of the cell, whereas the payoff of Y is displayed in the lower part. 
 
Information 
You will learn the results of the first part of the experiment at the end of the second part. Then, you 
will receive the following information: Your chosen number, the number of your partner, your payoff, 
and your partner’s payoff. 
  
Instructions Part 2 
 
Overview 
• Part 2 consists of 30 rounds. In each round you will make a decision. 
• Each round follows the same course as in part 1 and the decision situation is the same as 
displayed in Table 1. 
• You take on the same role as in part 1 (X or Y). You will keep this role for all 30 rounds. 
• You will form a group with one partner who takes on the respective other role: If you take on 
role X, your partner always takes on role Y. If you take on role Y, your partner always takes 
on role X. 
• In each round, you will be randomly assigned a new partner from this room with whom you 
will form a group. 
• 400 ECU correspond to 1 EUR in this part. Your payoff from all rounds will be converted and 
summed up at the end. 
 
Information 
• At the end of each round, you will receive the following information: Your chosen number, 
the number of your partner, your payoff in this round and your partner’s payoff in this round. 
• In addition, we will display your previous decision, your previous-partners’ decisions, and 
your total payoff of part 2 up to that point. 
 
Final Payoff 
At the end of the experiment, you will receive your payment for part 1 and part 2 in cash. 
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5.D Empirical Appendix
5.D.1 Summary Statistics
Table 5.D.2 reports summary statistics for the two main treatments, LU77 and LU11,
as well as for the two robustness treatments, HU77 and HU11. Panel A reports demo-
graphics. Age reports the age of the participant. Male is a dummy variable taking the
value one for male participants and zero for female participants. German Native is a
dummy variable indicating whether a participant’s mother tongue is German or not. If a
participant indicated multiple mother languages including German, she is also considered
German native.
Because coordination games feature strategic risk by construction and, in addition,
payoffs in our game are generally unequal, we ask one question on risk preferences and
one question on social preferences regarding income inequality. Panel B reports these
attitudes. Risk-Averse is a dummy indicating whether the participant was classified as
risk-averse, Risk-Neutral is a dummy indicating whether the participants was classified
as risk-neutral, and Risk-Seeking is a dummy indicating whether the participant was
classified as risk-seeking.17 Social Preference takes values from one to ten where one
indicates that income should be made more equal and ten indicates that income differences
need to be larger as incentives for individual effort.18
17Risk preferences were obtained by asking participants to choose between a certain payoff of $50 and
a gamble that pays with equal probability either $100 or $0. Because the gamble is a mean-preserving
spread of the certain payoff, we classify subjects as being risk-averse if they indicate to prefer the certain
outcome, as risk-neutral if they indicate to be indifferent, and as risk-seeking if they indicate to prefer
the gamble.
18The social preference question is taken from the World Values Survey (WVS), Wave 6 (See www.
worldvaluessurvey.org): “How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely
with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if
your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. [1] Incomes should be
made more equal, ..., [10] We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort.” In the
questionnaire, we used the translation provided in the German version of the WVS.
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Table 5.D.2: Summary Statistics by Treatment: Demographics and Attitudinal Variables.
Treatments LU77 LU11 HU77 HU11 Total
Panel A. Demographics
Age 23.86 23.48 24.45 24.08 23.97
(5.65) (3.90) (3.17) (7.56) (5.33)
Male 35.9% 50.0% 51.6% 45.3% 45.7%
German Native 53.1% 76.6% 70.3% 67.2% 66.8%
Panel B. Attitudes
Risk-Averse 75.0% 85.9% 84.4% 76.6% 80.5%
Risk-Neutral 12.5% 6.25% 6.25% 1.56% 6.64%
Risk-Seeking 12.5% 7.81% 9.38% 21.9% 12.9%
Social Preference 4.25 4.25 3.98 5.25 4.43
(2.64) (2.14) (2.24) (2.31) (2.38)
Notes: Reported is the mean or the share of demographic and attitudinal
variables by treatment. Standard deviations in parentheses. N = 256. All
information were surveyed through a post-experimental questionnaire.
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5.D.2 Further Analyses
Effort choices over time
Figure 5.D.10 shows the mean effort level over all periods for each treatment. As one
can see, the interaction between strategic uncertainty and equality dominance increases
over time. While average effort levels remain fairly constant in LU77 and HU77, the gap
between LU11 and HU11 widens.
1
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6
7
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fo
rt
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Period
LU77 HU77 LU11 HU11
Notes: Reported are the average effort levels over periods separated by treat-
ment. N = 256. 77 indicates that the Pareto-dominant equilibrium (7,7)
is equality-dominant and 11 indicates that the secure equilibrium (1,1) is
equality-dominant. LU refers to low strategic uncertainty and HU refers to
high strategic uncertainty.
Figure 5.D.10: Average Effort across Treatments.
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Coordination outcomes
We further analyze coordination outcomes by logistic regressions of the dummy Coordi-
nation that takes the value one if ei = ej and zero if ei 6= ej. Each period, two matched
subjects generate one observation. Hence, we have 3840 observations when we utilize all
30 periods and 640 observations when we analyze the last five periods. Table 5.D.3 re-
ports the results. Coordination is significantly hampered if (1,1) is equality-dominant. In
line with the results regarding effort choice, we do not find any direct effect of increased
strategic uncertainty on the ability to coordinate. In contrast to the analysis of effort, the
interaction between strategic uncertainty and equality dominance is also not significant.
The period coefficient indicates that subjects learn to better coordinate over time.
Table 5.D.3: Repeated-Interaction Coordination: Logistic Regressions.
All Periods Last Five Periods
Model (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Estimation Logistic Logistic Logistic Logistic
ED11 -2.003∗∗∗ -1.476∗∗ -1.639∗∗ -1.264∗∗
(0.416) (0.644) (0.649) (0.552)
High SU -0.314 -0.348 -0.020 -0.308
(0.433) (0.782) (0.704) (0.700)
ED11 X High SU 0.017 0.242 0.618 0.645
(0.579) (0.904) (0.929) (0.966)
Period 0.052∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ -0.176∗ -0.120∗∗
(0.005) (0.013) (0.091) (0.056)
Constant 2.304∗∗∗ 1.602∗∗∗ 8.058∗∗∗ 5.561∗∗∗
(0.324) (0.546) (2.626) (1.657)
Observations 3840 3840 640 640
Subject Pairs 128 128 128 128
Cohorts 32 32 32 32
Random Effects Yes No Yes No
Clustered S.E. No Yes No Yes
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.04
Notes: Logistic regressions. Dependent variable is coordination in perecentages. Coordina-
tion is achieved if both players choose the same effort level. Data is collapsed for every two
subjects that are partners in a given period. Models (I) and (II) are based on data from all
periods. Models (IV) and (V) are based on data from the last five periods. Standard errors in
parentheses. If applicable, standard errors are clustered on the cohort level. Random effects
are on subject pairs. ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
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Efficiency
Table 5.D.4 presents the results of random-effects regression of efficiency on the treatment
indicators confirming the non-parametric results. If (1,1) is equality-dominant, efficiency
significantly drops by about 15% points while strategic uncertainty has no significant
main effect. The interaction between equality dominance and strategic uncertainty is
also significant and increases in magnitude for the last five periods. The effect of Period
is significant but economically small.
Table 5.D.4: Repeated-Interaction Efficiency: Random-Effects Regressions.
All Periods Last Five Periods
Model (I) (II)
Estimation GLS GLS
ED11 -15.155∗∗∗ -13.392∗∗
(5.013) (5.637)
High SU -9.580 -9.706
(6.741) (6.354)
ED11 X High SU -17.600∗ -20.439∗∗
(10.555) (10.025)
Period 0.137∗ -0.956∗∗
(0.080) (0.422)
Constant 94.783∗∗∗ 123.800∗∗∗
(2.030) (11.854)
Observations 3840 640
Subjects Pairs 128 128
Cohorts 32 32
R2 0.25 0.29
Notes: Reported are random-effects GLS regressions with random effect on subject. Dependent
variable is efficiency in percentages. Efficiency is defined as the difference between the sum of
actual payoffs and the minimum sum of payoffs divided by the difference between the maximum
sum of payoffs and the minimum sum of payoffs. Model (I) is based on data from all periods.
Model (II) is based on data from the last five periods. ED11 indicates that (1,1) is equality-
dominant. High SU indicates high strategic uncertainty. Standard errors clustered on the
cohort level in parentheses. ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
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